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I. ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Scope of the Fourth Amendment
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution1 protects
people from unreasonable governmental2 searches and seizures. Thus,
the fourth amendment applies only when it appears that a search or
seizure has taken place.3 In the seminal case of Katz v. United States,4
the Court rejected the "trespass" doctrine5 and held that a search or
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The amendment reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
2. The fourth amendment affords no protection against searches and seizures by private
parties. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465,475 (1921) (the amendment "was not intended
to be a limitation on other than governmental agencies.... ."); United States v. Ogden, 485
F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1973), cer. denied, 416 U.S. 987 (1974) ("If the search was private,
the Fourth Amendment does not apply.").
3. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967).
4. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
5. Under the "trespass" doctrine, "surveillance without any trespass and without the
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seizure, as those terms are used in the fourth amendment, occurs when
the government invades the defendant's "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy."6 The "reasonableness" of a search or seizure generally depends
on the factual circumstances surrounding the governmental conduct in
question! However, warrantless searches, with a few well-delineated
exceptions,' are regarded as unreasonable per se.9
"[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a per-
son knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home. . . , is not
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. . . .But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected."10 The unique security problems posed by
incarcerated persons, however, require that fourth amendment
problems arising in the prison setting receive a somewhat different
treatment. 1 While a prisoner does not surrender all his fourth amend-
ment rights,' 2 governmental interests are accorded great weight in such
cases. An example is United States v. Hearst,3 a case in which jail
officials secretly monitored a conversation between the incarcerated de-
fendant and her visitor.'4 Noting that the monitoring in question was
a routine security measure, the Ninth Circuit held that the monitoring
seizure of any" material object fell outside the ambit of the Constitution .... ." Id. at 353.
See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942) (use of listening device which was
attached to the outside of, but did not penetrate, the wall of suspect's office did not violate
fourth amendment); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,465-66 (1928) (wiretap accom-
plished without trespass upon suspects' properties "did not amount to a search or seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."). The Court in Katz declared that
Goldman and Olmstead "can no longer be regarded as controlling." 389 U.S. at 353.
6. 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan
articulated a useful two-prong test for determining whether a defendant entertained a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy. It must appear "first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable." .d. at 361.
7. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967); United States v. Friesen, 545 F.2d 672,
673 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977).
8. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to arrest); Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967) ("hot pursuit" exception).
9. See, ag., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486-87 (1964); Chapman v. United States,
365 U.S. 610, 613-15 (1961).
10. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
11. See Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1961) ("In prison, official surveillance has
traditionally been the order of the day.")
12. See Bouse v. Bussey, 573 F.2d 548 (9th Cir., 1977) (forcible removal of a sample of
pubic hair during pretrial detention constituted unreasonable search).
13. 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978).
14. Defendant's visitor was not her attorney. The monitoring of conversation between a
prisoner and her attorney may constitute a violation of the sixth amendment. See Massiah
v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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was reasonable, and hence not violative of the fourth amendment.15
In two recent cases involving the use of electronic devices, the intru-
sive activity was held to be outside the scope of the fourth amendment.
Hodge v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. 16 involved the
use of a pen register, a device which produces a written record of all the
telephone numbers dialed from a given telephone. 17  In rejecting the
defendant's argument that the fourth amendment prohibits the use of
such a device, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the amendment pro-
tects only the contents of a conversation, not the fact that it occurred."'
Relying on an earlier Ninth Circuit case in which it had been held that
no reasonable expectation of privacy exists with respect to telephone
company billing records,19 the Hodge court noted that "pen register
records are even farther removed than billing records from the content
of the communications."''z Consequently, "the information recorded
by pen registers is not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection."21
Electronic tracking devices which enable investigators to monitor the
movements of a suspect also fall outside the scope of the fourth amend-
ment, ie., their use does not constitute a search.22 Therefore, a war-
rant to use such a device is unnecessary "unless fourth amendment
rights necessarily would have to be violated in order to initially install
the device."'' 3 These rules were applied by the Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Curtis,' 4 in which a tracking device was installed on an air-
plane rented by the defendant. The court held that the fourth amend-
ment had not been violated even though no prior judicial approval of
15. 563 F.2d at 1346.
16. 555 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1977).
17. See id. at 255 n.l; Note, The Legal Constraints Upon the Use of the Pen Register as a
Law Enforcement Tool, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1028, 1029 (1975).
18. 555 F.2d at 256.
19. United States v. Fithian, 452 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1975), in which the court stated: "No
one justifiably could expect that the fact that a particular call was placed will remain his
private affair when business records necessarily must contain this information." Id. at 506
(footnote omitted).
20. 555 F.2d at 257.
21. Id Accord, United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1975). Apparently,
"[t]he possibility that the Fourth Amendment applies to pen registers has not been fore-
closed in all circuits." 555 F.2d at 257 n.7. See, ag., United States v. John, 508 F.2d 1134
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975).
22. United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Huf-
ford, 539 F.2d 32, 33 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976). "[IThe device only
augments that which can be done by visual surveillance alone .... " Id. at 34.
23. United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing United States v.
Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 34 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976)).
24. 562 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1977).
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the use of the device had been obtained.2" Significantly, the court ex-
pressly confined its holding to the circumstances of the case,26 and it
declared that "in the ordinary case, we are inclined to the view that
secret surveillance devices in vehicles should be installed pursuant to
court order. ... 27 In a footnote,28 the author of the opinion ex-
pressed both his reluctance to follow the Ninth Circuit precedents,29
and his preference for the Fifth Circuit view that the use of tracking
devices does constitute a search and, hence, may not be undertaken in
the absence of prior judicial approval.3 0
The fourth amendment affords protection against governmental
searches and seizures." In United States v. Humphrey,32 an airline em-
ployee opened a package in the presence of the package's owner. The
search was conducted in accordance with the company's policy of in-
25. Id. at 1156.
26. The court emphasized that Government officials, prior to installing the device, "had
been given reliable information, based on articulable facts, that the plane was being utilized
in the pursuit of criminal activity by a specific, identifiable individual." Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at n.2.
29. See cases cited in note 21 supra.
30. See United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 864-67 (5th Cir. 1975), aft'don rehearing,
537 F.2d 227, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1976), (en banc) (per curiam) (8-8 decision).
31. See note 2 supra. Searches and seizures by private parties will be treated as govern-
mental activity "when the government has preknowledge of and yet acquiesces in a private
party's conducting a search and seizure which the government itself, under the circum-
stances, could not have undertaken. .. ." United States v. Goldstein, 532 F.2d 1305, 1311
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960 (1976) (quoting United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605,
609 (5th Cir. 1975)). "[A] search is a search by a federal official if he had a hand in it ....
It is immaterial whether a federal agent originated the idea or joined in it while the search
was in progress." Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949). In United States v.
Cella, 568 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1977), the court treated a private individual as a government
agent with respect to actions undertaken by him pursuant to an agreement whereby he be-
came an informant and gathered information for the government. Id. at 1282. In United
States v. Ogden, 485 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1973), cer. denied, 416 U.S. 987 (1974), an airline
employee's search of a passenger's bag was held to be individual action, thus beyond the
scope of the fourth amendment, because the search was not prompted by federal agents or
regulations nor conducted pursuant to any widespread governmental anti-hijacking effort,
but resulted simply from the employee's own curiosity. Id. at 538-39. Cf. United States v.
Fannon, 556 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1977) (search by airline employees subject to fourth amend-
ment limitations because search was authorized by Air Transportation Security Act as part
of government's air security program); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973)
(search conducted as part of nationwide anti-hijacking program fell within fourth amend-
ment regardless of whether it was conducted by private individual or public official). Other
leading Ninth Circuit cases applying the rule of Lustig v. United States are Gold v. United
States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967) (no impermissible governmental involvement because
opening of package was discretionary act of airline manager) and Corngold v. United States,
367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966) (opening of package by airline employee solely to aid the enforce-
ment of a federal statute constituted governmental search).
32. 549 F.2d 650 (9th Cir, 1977).
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specting the contents of damaged packages to protect itself against
spurious damage claims. Although the employee had previously in-
formed an airport officer of his intention to search the package and the
officer had stationed himself nearby to observe the inspection, the court
held that the search was a private one and not a subterfuge by the gov-
ernment inasmuch as the employee had been motivated by private in-
terests.
33
Since there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect
to abandoned property, the inspection, examination or confiscation of
such property is not controlled by fourth amendment limitations. 34
"Abandonment is primarily a question of intent, and intent may be
inferred from words, acts, and other objective facts."35 Among the fac-
tual situations in which abandonment has been found are: (1) suspect
directed the destruction of materials;36 (2) suspect jettisoned contra-
band from a moving vehicle;37 (3) suspect denied ownership of suit-
cases;3 8 and (4) suspect placed contraband behind the seat of police car
in which he was being transported.39
"The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, in-
cluding seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional
arrest."' 4  However, the amendment does not proscribe all searches
and seizures, only those that are unreasonable. 41  Although an intru-
sion incident to a brief detention is less severe than that involved in a
full-scale arrest,42 an investigatory stop may be reasonable, and thus
33. Id. at 653.
Even if the employee, in addition to his primary motive, may have desired to help the
Government, the seizure, and the subsequent search, would not necessarily become
governmental. See, e.g., Wolf Low v. United States, 391 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1968); Gold
v. United States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967).
Id. at 653 n.4.
34. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924) ("[tjhere was no seizure in the
sense of the law" when officers examined the contents of bottles that had been abandoned);
United States v. Humphrey, 549 F.2d 650, 652-53 (9th Cir. 1977) (when newspaper was
taken from defendant who then proceeded to walk away, paper was abandoned, and defend-
ant had no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to such paper).
35. United States v. Jackson, 544 F.2d 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1976).
36. United States v. Cella, 568 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1978).
37. United States v. McLaughlin, 525 F.2d 517, 519-20 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427
U.S. 904 (1976).
38. United States v. Jackson, 544 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Colbert, 474
F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1973).
39. United States v. Maryland, 479 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1973).
40. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
41. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). See note 7 supra and accompany-
ing text.
42. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975).
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constitutional, even under circumstances which do not establish proba-
ble cause to arrest.43 "If after a valid investigatory stop probable cause
arises, the search [or arrest] may then be made."' In United States v.
Coades,4 s for example, police officers in pursuit of two bank robbers
observed two pedestrians a short distance from the bank. No other
people were in sight, and the pedestrians matched the descriptions pre-
viously given by eye witnesses. The officers ordered the suspects to
halt. At that point, one of the suspects dropped a mask and surgical
gloves resembling those that had been worn by the robbers. The sus-
pects were arrested and subsequently argued in court that the evidence
obtained incident to the arrest should have been suppressed since the
officers had no probable cause to arrest at the time they ordered the
suspects to halt. The court concluded that, under the circumstances,
an investigatory stop was warranted." The detention, in turn, re-
vealed the gloves and mask which provided probable cause to arrest;
hence the arrest too was valid.47
Unlike an investigatory stop, an arrest may not be based merely on
"reasonable suspicion" but requires "probable cause. '48 "An officer,
to have probable cause to arrest, must have facts and circumstances
within his knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy in-
formation sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that an of-
43. See, e.g., id. at 881 (when officer's observations lead to "reasonable suspicion" that
vehicle contains illegal aliens he may stop and investigate); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143, 145-46 (1972) ("[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks...
probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a crimi-
nal to escape.' Rather, "[a] brief stop of a suspicious individual... may be most reason-
able in light of the facts known to the officer at the time."); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-27
(1968) (officer's reasonable belief that he is dealing with an "armed and dangerous individ-
ual" justifies "frisk" for weapons even in the absence of probable cause to arrest); United
States v. Avalos-Ochoa, 557 F.2d 1299, 1301 (9th Cir. 1977) (following the rule of United
States . Brignoni-Ponce).
44. United States v. Burgarin-Casas, 484 F.2d 853, 854 (9th Cir. 1973), cer. denied, 414
U.S. 1136 (1974). See, ag., United States v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 558 F.2d 956, 964 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1050 (1978); United States v. Russell, 546 F.2d 839, 840 (9th Cir.
1976); United States v. Bates, 533 F.2d 466, 468-69 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Portillo-
Reyes, 529 F.2d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 899 (1976).
45. 549 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1977).
46. Id. at 1305.
47. Id.
48. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). If probable cause is established,
the arrest will almost certainly to be held valid regardless of whether the arresting officer had
a warrant. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), in which the following statement was
made: "[W]hile the Court has expressed a preference for the use of arrest warrants when
feasible... it has never invalidated an arrest supported by probable cause solely because
the officers failed to secure a warrant." Id. at 113.
[Vol. I11
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fense had been committed and the person arrested had committed it."4 9
In determining whether an arrest was based on probable cause, the
court will examine the circumstances that were within the knowledge of
the arresting officer at the moment of the arrest.5 ° If, in retrospect, it
appears that the quantum of evidence sufficient to establish probable
cause was not present until after the arrest, the arrest will be invali-
dated.51
B. The Exclusionary Rule
As a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard the rights se-
cured by the fourth amendment, the exclusionary rule requires that evi-
dence obtained in contravention of the fourth amendment be excluded
from a criminal prosecution. 2 The courts have stressed that the rule is
intended to eliminate the incentive for, thereby deterring, constitution-
ally offensive police conduct in gathering evidence.5 3
49. United States v. Avalos-Ochoa, 557 F.2d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir. 1977). See Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); United States v. Dixon, 558 F.2d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 927 (1978).
50. See United States v. Sanudo-Perez, 564 F.2d 1288, 1290-91 (9th Cir. 1977). See
generally Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314-25 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussion of the background and purpose behind the "probable cause" requirement).
51. See United States v. Sanudo-Perez, 564 F.2d 1288, 1290-91 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Viewing
the facts retrospectively with respect to what everyone ultimately learned, probable cause
could be discerned. But these facts were not put together until after the arrest ... ."). A
valid arrest may result from an investigatory stop although such a stop need not, itself, be
based on probable cause. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
52. See, ag., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961) (exclusionary rule applies to
criminal trials in state courts as well as federal courts); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
391-92, 398 (1914) (evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment cannot be used
in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure). But see, e.g.,
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48, 350 (1974) (exclusionary rule does not
proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings; application of the rule is
restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives can be most efficaciously served;
"[a]llowing a grand jury witness to invoke the exclusionary rule would unduly interfere with
the effective and expeditious discharge of the grand jury's duties.").
53. See, eg., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,656,659 (1961) (admission of illegally obtained
evidence encourages fourth amendment violations; the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
compel respect for the constitutional guarantees of the fourth amendment and to preserve
judicial integrity); United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 53 (9th Cir. 1975) (the exclusionary
rule "was designed not to compensate for the unlawful invasion of one's privacy but to deter
future unlawful police conduct .... ") (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217
(1960)).
In United States v. Hole, 564 F.2d 298, 301 (9th Cir. 1977), the Ninth Circuit reempha-
sized the policy of deterrence underlying the rule, concluding that "no sound reason [exists]
to vitiate an agent's affidavit submitted in support of a request for a search warrant even if
the affidavit contains information which is both material and false as long as the misstate-
ment was made in good faith and neither intentionally nor recklessly."
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Although recognizing the importance of protecting fourth amend-
ment rights, the Ninth Circuit has favored restricting the application of
the exclusionary rule to those areas in which its remedial objectives are
most efficaciously served. 4 The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doc-
trine,55 for example, requires the suppression of evidence obtained
through the use of other information gathered in a constitutionally of-
fensive manner. 6 The application of this doctrine, however, may. be
54. See United States v. Raftery, 534 F.2d 854 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976)
("[tihe purpose of the rule would not be served by forbidding the Government from using
the evidence to prove the entirely separate offense of perjury before a grand jury occurring
after the illegal search and seizure and suppression of the evidence in the state court."). Cf.
United States v. Ryan, 548 F.2d 782, 787 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 965 (1977)
(due process rights of third person are not violated if government informer freely consented
to electronic surveillance). See also Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250passim (1969);
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
55. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963) (exclusionary rule pre-
cludes use of evidence obtained as "fruit" of illegal search); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) ("[t]he essence of a provision forbidding the acquisi-
tion of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used
before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.").
56. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963). See, e.g., United States v.
Humphrey, 549 F.2d 650, 652 (9th Cir. 1977) (improper for court to consider acts establish-
ing abandonment of property if acts "tainted" by unlawful police action); United States v.
Celia, 568 F.2d 1266, 1284-85 (9th Cir. 1977) (defendant who claims he was the victim of an
unconstitutional search must go forward with specific evidence demonstrating the unlawful
conduct; burden then shifts to the prosecution to establish an independent source of evi-
dence); United States v. Sand, 541 F.2d 1370, 1375-76 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1103 (1977) (absent a showing of illegally secured information there is no fourth amendment
violation and government not obliged to demonstrate independent origin of evidence).
It is unclear whether the rule requires exclusion of evidence garnered through exploitation
of statements obtained in the absence of Miranda warnings. See United States v. Lemon,
550 F.2d 467, 472 (9th Cir. 1977) (whether "fruits" doctrine applies to evidence obtained in
absence of Miranda warnings is unresolved). See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (government must immediately honor any request for an attorney or refrain from
further questioning until a lawyer is secured). The Ninth Circuit has concluded, however,
that when the "fruit" of an initial illegal confession is a second confession, the degree to
which the second confession was voluntary, rather than the illegality surrounding the first,
determines its admissibility. United States v. Toral, 536 F.2d 893, 896-97 (9th Cir. 1976)
(second confession not suppressed when illegality surrounding first was due to incomplete
Miranda warnings rather than coercion). Cf United States v. Womack, 542 F.2d 1047,
1051 (9th Cir. 1976) (when first confession invalid due to absence of counsel, second confes-
sion suppressed despite waiver because of defendant's belief that counsel unavailable). The
mere fact that the prosecution elects not to introduce an inculpatory statement made by the
defendant after receiving Miranda warnings does not raise a presumption of illegality, at
least when the statement has low evidentiary value. United States v. Gaines, 563 F.2d 1352,
1359 (9th Cir. 1977).
Even when evidence is improperly seized, a conviction will stand if there is no reasonable
possibility that the items obtained from the search contributed to the conviction. "Only
when the Government's evidence so overwhelmingly supports the verdict that the tainted
evidence becomes relatively insignificant does the admission of such evidence not contribute
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avoided if the evidence could have been obtained through independent
and lawful means, 7 or, if the connection between the evidence intro-
duced at trial and the initial search or seizure was sufficiently attenu-
ated to "dissipate the taint" of the primary illegality. 8  In United
States v. Cella,5 9 for example, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that no taint
exists if the illegally obtained information causes the Government to
intensify its investigation or if it gives an impetus or direction to the
prosecution. In so concluding, the court adhered to the test previously
established in United States v. Cales,60 directing that,
"[t]he district court must seek to discover what kind of direction and im-
petus the illegal ... [conduct] gave to the ... investigation: did anything
seized illegally, or any leads gained from that illegal activity, tend signifi-
cantly to direct the investigation toward the specific evidence sought to be
suppressed? Under this test the government should have the opportunity
to establish that, even though the [illegally obtained] information...
may have been a factor in the decision to 'target' [an individual] .... the
evidence which it intends to use at trial was obtained from sources suffi-
ciently independent of the ... [illegality]."61
The exclusionary rule may be invoked only by those persons having
standing to litigate the legality of a search or seizure. Determined pur-
suant to federal law,62 proper standing requires that the defendant be
"aggrieved" by an allegedly illegal seizure.63  A litigant is sufficiently
to the conviction." United States v. Hunt, 548 F.2d 268, 269 (9th Cir. 1977) (Sneed, J.,
dissenting).
57. See United States v. Abascal, 564 F.2d 821, 829 (9th Cir. 1977) (necessity of searching
defendant's car could be independently supported by information derived from legal sources
unrelated to initial illegal search); United States v. Caceres, 545 F.2d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir.
1977) (admission of information obtained from tape monitoring of face-to-face conversation
proper when application for authorization is based on independent recollection of previous
meetings rather than on previously unauthorized monitorings).
58. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963). The exclusionary rule does not
mandate exclusion of properly seized evidence merely because it was obtained contempora-
neously with an unlawful seizure. Id. at 491. United States v. Daniels, 549 F.2d 665, 668
(9th Cir. 1977) (seizure of marijuana pursuant to warrant proper although letters illegally
seized in same search; "Wong Sun's 'taint' reaches items derived from unconstitutional be-
havior, not items derived from constitutional behavior even when contemporaneous with
that which is unconstitutional.").
59. 568 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1977).
60. 493 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1974).
61. United States v. Cella, 568 F.2d 1266, 1286 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting United States v.
Cales, 493 F.2d 1215, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 1974)).
62. Id. 1279 ('The test is one of federal law, neither enlarged by what one state court may
have countenanced, nor diminished by what another may have colorably suppressed.')
(quoting Elkins v. United States, ?," . U.S. 206, 224 (1960)).
63. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
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aggrieved to challenge the validity of a search and seizure only if he
satisfies three requirements.
[T]here is no standing to contest a search and seizure where... the de-
fendants: (a) were not on the premises at the time of the contested search
and seizure; (b) alleged no proprietary or possessory interest in the prem-
ises; and (c) were not charged with an offense that includes, as an essential
element of the offense charged, possession of the seized evidence at the
time of the contested search and seizure.64
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Cella65 rejected the adoption of
the "target doctrine" as a basis for standing. This doctrine confers the
right to contest the seizure of evidence upon the person against whom
the seized evidence is to be used. This per se grant of standing endows
the "target" of the search with the same power to object to the propri-
ety of the search as that of the actual victim.66 Noting that the adop-
64. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 229 (1973). See also Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960) (legitimate presence on premises where search occurs satisfies "per-
son aggrieved" requirement for standing; charge of a crime which includes as an eventual
element possession of the evidence seized, coupled with possession or a right to possession at
time of seizure, confers standing); United States v. Cella, 568 F.2d 1266, 1280 (9th Cir. 1977)
(standing may be either implied as a matter of law (automatic standing) or established by
facts (actual standing)); United States v. Boston, 510 F.2d 35, 38 (9th Cir. 1974), cerl. denied,
421 U.S. 990 (1975) ("automatic standing" requires that possession of the seized evidence at
the time of the seizure be an essential element of the offense charged).
Actual standing, established by the facts of the case, requires that the defendant demon-
strate an interest in the area searched or the evidence seized sufficient to support a reason-
able expectation of privacy therein. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 261; United States v.
Cella, 568 F.2d 1266, 1281-82 (9th Cir. 1977) ("target" doctrine rejected; only actual victim
of search and resultant invasion of privacy has actual standing); United States v. Haddad,
558 F.2d 968, 975 (9th Cir. 1977) (no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to hotel
room from which defendant had been justifiably ejected). The meaning of "invasion of
privacy" in this context has been clarified by the Supreme Court: the movant must either (I)
have owned or possessed the property seized at the time of the seizure; (2) have had a sub-
stantial proprietary or possessory interest in the premises searched; or (3) have been legiti-
mately on the premises when the search occurred. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. at 229;
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-90 (1968). Any claim of a proprietary or
possessory interest in that which was seized must, moreover, be unequivocal. United States
v. Guerrera, 554 F.2d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 1977) (concession of ownership or possession im-
plied in a motion to suppress too equivocal to confer standing); United States v. Prueitt, 540
F.2d 995, 1005 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063 (1977) (court will not assume
existence of possessory interest).
An individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records, and therefore has
no standing to object to their search. See United States v. Privitera, 549 F.2d 1317, 1318
(9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977) (defendant has no standing to move
to quash subpoena of bank records); United States v. Sand, 541 F.2d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1103 (1977) (defendant has no standing to move to quash Inter-
nal Revenue Service summons seeking bank records).
65. 568 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1977).
66. Id. at 1281-82. A contrary result was reached in United States v. Rosenberg, 416
F.2d 680, 681-82 (7th Cir. 1969). In Rosenberg, the court allowed the defendant to move to
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tion of the doctrine would be constitutionally inconsistent, the Cella
court concluded that "the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment
are personal rights, and may be enforced by exclusion of evidence se-
cured by means of an unlawful search and seizure only by one whose
own protection and privacy was infringed by the search and seizure.
'67
In United States v. Jamerson,68 however, the Ninth Circuit conferred
the benefit of automatic standing69 upon defendants charged with Dyer
Act 70 violations. Recognizing the soundness of the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Jones v. United States,7 1 the Jamerson court concluded
that "a person accused of a Dyer Act violation . . has automatic
standing to contest the validity of a search or seizure of a vehicle or its
contents where possession of the vehicle forms a basis of the charge.
'72
C. Search Warrants and Probable Cause
The fourth amendment sets forth the conditions under which a war-
rant may issue.73 In applying these fourth amendment protections, the
Supreme Court has articulated the several requirements which must be
met before a search warrant will be considered valid. First, the affida-
vit presented to the magistrate in support of the warrant must allege
facts sufficient to enable the magistrate to determine that probable
cause for the search or arrest exists.74 Second, the items to be seized
and the place to be searched must be described with particularity, indi-
suppress seized evidence even though the seizure occurred in the office of an individual
other than the defendant.
67. 568 F.2d at 1281. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the persons "against whom the
search is directed" may include only the actual victims of the privacy invasion. Id. at 1282.
68. 549 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1977).
69. "Automatic" standing is conferred on a defendant "by a charge of a crime which
includes as an essential element possession of the evidence seized, with such possession or
rights to possession existing at the time of the seizure." United States v. Celia, 568 F.2d
1266, 1280 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting United States v. Boston, 510 F.2d 35, 37 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 990 (1975)). See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 228-29 (1973)
and text accompanying note 64 supra. The justification for automatic standing lies in
preventing the government from taking inconsistent positions during the course of the trial.
Absent the doctrine, the prosecution could avoid the strictures of the fourth amendment by
denying that the defendant possessed the seized evidence while simultaneously charging him
with such possession.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1977) (prohibition against knowingly transporting a stolen vehicle
in interstate commerce).
71. 362 U.S. 257, 263-64 (1960). See note 64 supra.
72. 549 F.2d at 1269.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."
74. See, eg., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107-12 (1965); Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948).
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cating that evidence of criminal activity will be found at the place to be
searched. 5 Third, the person issuing the warrant must be a neutral
and detached magistrate capable of determining whether probable
cause exists for the requested arrest or search.76 The Court has stated
that in determining the existence of these requirements a common
sense approach should be used."
Where the inference of probable cause is to be drawn solely from
information furnished by an unnamed informant rather than from the
direct observations of the affiant, the reliability of the informant and
his information must be established. The Supreme Court set forth a
two-pronged test in Aguilar v. Texas"8 and Spinelli v. United States7 9
which requires (1) that the affidavit set forth the underlying circum-
stances which reveal the source of the informer's information pertain-
ing to the criminal activity, and (2) that the affidavit contain sufficient
facts to enable the magistrate to conclude that the unnamed informant
is credible or that his information is reliable. The Ninth Circuit re-
cently applied this test in the case of United States v. Hellman,80 which
involved a mail fraud through the use of credit cards. Appellant ar-
gued that the affidavit on which a search warrant was issued was
insufficient under Aguilar and Spinelli since certain information
contained therein was supplied by a special investigator from a credit
card association.8' The court upheld the warrant, however, finding the
affidavit to be sufficient. According to the court, the information con-
tained in the affidavit was reliable since it was information which
would be disclosed in a routine check by experienced investigators.8 2
Further, the source of the informant's information was sufficiently es-
tablished since "the affidavit contained highly detailed information set-
ting forth the nature and underlying circumstances of the affiant's
personal investigation." 83  Thus the two requirements of Aguilar-
75. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504-05 (1973); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476,
485 (1965); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961); Trupiano v. United States,
334 U.S. 699, 710 (1948).
76. See, ag., Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-53 (1971) (plurality opinion); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
77. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965). See United States v. Collins,
559 F.2d 561, 564 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 907 (1977); United States v. Bowers, 534
F.2d 186, 192 n.5 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 942 (1976).
78. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
79. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
80. 556 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1977).
81. Id. at 444-45.
82. Id. at 445.
83. Id.
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Spinelli were met and the warrant was valid.
In United States v. Garrett," the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that the
second prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test "can... be met by circum-
stantial evidence on the trustworthiness of the tip.""5 In that case, an
unnamed informant told a police officer that he had made several her-
oin purchases from the defendant. The informant stated that he had
observed heroin at the defendant's residence and gave a detailed
description of the residence, the car and some personal and family at-
tributes of defendant.8 6 The police officer stated in the affidavit that he
had independently corroborated the informer's tip as to all facts but the
presence of the heroin, and that further inquiry had shown defendant
to be a known narcotics dealer.87
The court held that the first prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test was met
since the informant was relating his personal observations and was di-
rectly involved in the criminal activity.88 The court then concluded
that the second prong was also met even though there was no direct
objective evidence in the affidavit supporting the credibility of the in-
formant or the reliability of his information. The independent corrob-
oration of the facts by the officer, the defendant's notorious reputation,
and the informant's involvement in the crime constituted a sufficient
basis of circumstantial evidence from which such reliability could be
inferred, and the constitutional minimums were therefore met.89
In addition to showing the existence of probable cause, an affidavit
must "particularly" describe the items to be seized and the premises to
be searched.' The Ninth Circuit found a search to be unlawful and
unreasonable for failure to meet this constitutional requirement in
United States v. Drebin.91 There, a warrant describing the items to be
seized as "illegally produced and stolen copies of... motion picture
films which are duly copyrighted" was invalid since it "left to the exe-
cuting officers the task of determining what items fell within the broad
categories stated in the warrant" and since "[tihe warrant provided no
guidelines for the determination of which films had been illegally re-
84. 565 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 974 (1978).
85. Id. at 1070 (citing United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971) and Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959)).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. See notes 73 & 75 supra.
91. 557 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904 (1978). The error in admit-
ting the evidence obtained from the unlawful search was, however, found to be harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1323.
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produced." 92
When first amendment rights are involved, this "particularity" re-
quirement is even more strictly applied.93 The Supreme Court held in
Marcus v. Search Warrant94 that where allegedly obscene materials are
sought to be seized, there must be a "step in the procedure before
seizure designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity." 95
This first amendment protection was reemphasized in Roaden v.
Kentucky96 where the Court stated:
In short ... the constitutional requirement that warrants must particu-
larly describe the 'things to be seized' is to be accorded the most scrupu-
lous exactitude when the 'things' are books, and the basis for their seizure
is the ideas which they contain .... No less a standard could be faithful
to First Amendment freedoms.97
The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed this stringent approach in two 1977
cases. In United States v. Tupler,9 the court held a seizure of allegedly
obscene films invalid where the procedure by which the warrant was
issued was not designed to enable the magistrate to "focus searchingly"
on the question of obscenity. Although the affidavit requesting the
warrant described photographs on the film boxes which portrayed sex-
ual activity, this was not sufficient to give the judge probable cause to
believe that the films were obscene.9 9 According to the court, "[a]
searching focus on obscenity requires the issuing judge or magistrate to
base his evaluation of probable cause on direct evidence of the contents
of at least a fair sample of the material itself.""1°° In United States v.
Sherwin, 0 1 the Ninth Circuit upheld the sufficiency of search warrant
affidavits which gave specific facts as to the contents of allegedly ob-
92. Id. at 1322-23.
93. See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973); Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392
U.S. 636 (1968); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961); United States v. Sherwin,
572 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 3101 (1978); United States v. Tupler, 564
F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1977).
94. 367 U.S. 717 (1961) (warrant for the seizure of allegedly obscene books could not be
issued on the conclusory opinion of a police officer that the books sought to be seized were
obscene).
95. Id. at 732.
96. 413 U.S. 496 (1973) (seizure incident to arrest but without a warrant of allegedly ob-
scene film was unreasonable under fourth amendment standards).
97. Id. at 504 (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965)).
98. 564 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1977).
99. Id. at 1297.
100. Id. at 1298. The court held the warrant insufficient even though it also contained
several pieces of circumstantial evidence implicating the defendants in the crime of trans-
porting obscene materials interstate.
101. 572 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3101 (1978).
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scene magazines."0 2 However, the seizure of other magazines not de-
scribed in the warrant was found to be unlawful and unreasonable in
light of the first amendment protections to which such materials are
entitled. The court stated that "[t]he importance of protecting First
Amendment freedoms precludes police officers from making adhoc de-
terminations at the scene as to which materials are probably ob-
scene." 3  Such a procedure failed to allow a magistrate to "focus
searchingly on the question of obscenity" and was therefore an unrea-
sonable seizure under first amendment standards. 1' 4
In the area of particularity, courts are also faced with the issue of
whether misrepresentations in the affidavit render it insufficient under
fourth amendment standards.'0 5 In United States v. Hole,"° the Ninth
Circuit found an affidavit for a search warrant sufficient despite mate-
rial, although unintentional, misstatements.' 0 7  The court stated that
since the purpose of the exclusionary rule under the fourth amendment
is to deter lawless police action, 08 "there is no sound reason to vitiate
an agent's affidavit. . . even if the affidavit contains information which
is both material and false as long as the statement was made in good
faith and neither intentionally nor recklessly."'109
The authority to issue a search or arrest warrant is placed solely in
the hands of a neutral and detached magistrate. ' 0 In United States v.
Garrett,"' one appellant argued that a search warrant was constitu-
tionally insufficient since it was signed by a state judge of record rather
102. Id. at 198.
103. Id at 200.
104. Id. at 201.
105. See United States v. Prewitt, 534 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Damitz,
495 F.2d 50 (9th Cir. 1974).
106. 564 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1977).
107. Id. at 301. The affidavit contained an accurate summary of a criminal record report
of the California Department of Justice. However, the report itself was incorrect as to cer-
tain material dates.
108. Id See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); United States v. Damitz, 495
F.2d 50, 55-56 (9th Cir. 1974) ("A rule excluding evidence because of a Fourth Amendment
violation should be motivated by a basic purpose of the Amendment and the exclusionary
rule, namely the deterrence of lawless police action."
109. 564 F.2d at 301. In holding as it did, the Ninth Circuit aligned itself with a majority
of the circuits which have considered the issug. See United States v. Rosenbarger, 536 F.2d
715, 720 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977); United States v. Marihart, 492
F.2d 897, 899-900 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 827 (1974); United States v. Carmichael,
489 F.2d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc). But see United States v. Astroff, 556 F.2d 1369
(5th Cir. 1977) (even negligent misstatements vitiate an otherwise valid affidavit if the mis-
statements are material).
110. See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
111. 565 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 974 (1978).
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than a federal magistrate and since it failed to designate the name of
the federal magistrate to whom the search warrant was to be re-
turned." 2 The Ninth Circuit found no insufficiency. Issuance of a
federal warrant by a judge of a state court is expressly authorized by
rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and since the
warrant return was made within two days to a federal magistrate, no
reversible error was committed.'
13
D. Electronic Surveillance
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Katz v. United States,'
1 4
Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968.111 Title III of the Act prohibits the interception1 6 of wire or oral
communications except within narrowly defined circumstances.1 7 In
Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. , the Ninth Circuit held that
the installation of a pen register 1 9 neither violated the fourth amend-
ment nor exceeded the permissive scope of Title 111.120 The court re-
lied upon the statutory definition of "interception" in determining that
a pen register was incapable of making the "aural acquisition" prohib-
ited by Title 111.121
112. Id. at 1071.
113. Id.
114. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (as fourth amendment protects people, not places, physical pene-
tration into a constitutionally protected area not necessary to invoke fourth amendment pro-
tection).
115. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).
116. The concept of interception is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) as "the aural acquisi-
tion of the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic,
mechanical, or other device." (emphasis added).
117. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(2) (1976).
118. 555 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1977).
119. A pen register is "a device attached to a given telephone line. . . [which] records on
a paper tape dashes equal in number to the number dialed. . . . There is neither recording
or [sic] monitoring of the conversation." Id. at 255 n.1 (quoting United States v. Caplan,
255 F. Supp. 805, 807 (E.D. Mich. 1966)).
120. 555 F.2d at 256, 257. The court in Hodge held that the use of a pen register in
connection with an investigation into obscene phone calls was not prohibited by Title III of
the Crime Control Act because a pen register is "incapable of making an aural acquisition of
any communication" and is therefore not an "interception" as defined by § 2510(4) of the
Act. Id. at 257. See note 116 supra. Use of a pen register also does not violate the fourth
amendment because a pen register record does not monitor the content of a conversation
nor, since the record does not indicate whether calls placed on the monitored phone were
completed, establish that a conversation took place. "'mhe expectation of privacy pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment attaches to the content of the telephone conversation and
not to the fact that a conversation took place."' 555 F.2d at 256 (quoting United States v.
Baxter, 492 F.2d 150, 167 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974)).
121. 555 F.2d at 257. See note 120 supra.
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In United States v. Bowler,12 2 the Ninth Circuit reiterated the ration-
ale of Hodge in holding that "snifters"" 3 also are not governed by Title
111.124 In so concluding the court stated that the use of a snifter is not
restricted by the Crime Control Act because "'the right of privacy pro-
tected by the wire tap statute goes to message content rather than the
fact that a call was placed'."'"
Under the Crime Control Act, authorized wiretaps are permitted
26
but applications for such authorization must comply with the standards
of specificity and necessity enumerated in the Act. 27 In United States
v. Spagnuolo'28 the Ninth Circuit analyzed the adequacy of affidavits
submitted to support applications for wiretaps in connection with
breaking an illegal gambling business. The standard to be utilized in
such an analysis is defined in the Crime Control Act,1 29 but interpreta-
tions of that standard have varied.130  In an attempt to promulgate a
manageable standard by which to judge the sufficiency of affidavits
under the Act, the Spagnuolo court set out certain guidelines.131 The
affidavit, when viewed in its entirety, must give a factual basis "suffi-
cient to show that ordinary investigative procedures have failed or will
122. 561 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1977).
123. A snifter "records each telephone emission of a 2,600 cycle tone characteristic of the
illegal use of a blue box." Id. at 1325. "A blue box... is used to circumvent the toll call
billing system of the phone company." Id. at 1324 n.1.
124. Id. at 1325.
125. Id. (quoting United States v. Goldstein, 532 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 960 (1976)). Cf. United States v. Cornfeld, 563 F.2d 967 (9th Cir. 1977) (under 47
U.S.C. § 605 and 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(2)(a)(i), telephone company was within its rights in moni-
toring telephone lines by tape recorder on suspicion that subscriber was using illegal "blue
box" to make long distance calls, and disclosing such information to the FBI).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (1976).
127. Id. § 2518.
128. 549 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1977) (affidavit sufficient where it included account of nine
month investigation, infiltration and FBI surveillance of gambling organization, even
though government unable to identify all participants).
129. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) states:
(1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire
or oral communication ... shall include the following information:
(c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures
have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if
tried or to be too dangerous ....
130. Compare United States v. Kalustian, 529 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1976) (affidavits inade-
quate because of a failure to allege facts demonstrating necessity) with United States v. Ker-
rigan, 514 F.2d 35 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975). Cf. United States v. Adams,
536 F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Pezzino, 535 F.2d 483 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 839 (1976); United States v. Smith, 519 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1975).
131. 549 F.2d at 710.
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fail in the particular case at hand."132 The affidavit must reveal that a
good faith effort has been made to identify those violating the law.
Further, it must be shown that normal investigative techniques, em-
ployed for a reasonable period of time, have failed to build the case.1
33
Any showing that the employment of normal investigative techniques
would be too dangerous or unlikely to succeed must, in order to allow
the district judge to determine whether a wiretap is necessary, meet a
standard of reasonableness with regard to the factual history.
34
The Ninth Circuit has utilized the same standards of reasonableness
in analyzing compliance with the minimization requirements of section
2518(5) of the Crime Control Act.131 In conducting an authorized
wiretap, the executing officers must limit the extent of their interference
with communication outside the scope of the wiretap order.136  In ad-
dition, once a pattern of innocent calls develops, recording of such calls
should be terminated.'37 The reasonableness of the interception and
132. Id. According to the Sagnuolo court, this may be accomplished by a description of
the particular illicit operation's peculiarities which necessitate a wiretap and of the unsuc-
cessful investigatory efforts of the police. Id see, e.g., United States v. Feldman, 535 F.2d
1175 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 996 (1975); United States v. Kerrigan, 514 F.2d 35 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975).
133. 549 F.2d at 710. The procedures need not have been completely unsuccessful, but
need only reach a stage at which further use cannot reasonably be required. Id. at n.1. See
United States v. Abascal, 564 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Sandoral, 550 F.2d
427 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Scully, 546 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 970 (1977).
134. 549 F.2d at 710 ("fAIn affidavit is not insufficient because it did not prove beyond a
shadow of doubt that ordinary techniques will fail or that their use will result in a loss of life
or some equivalent disaster"). Cf. United States v. Abascal, 564 F.2d 821, 826 (9th Cir.
1977) ("The government must do more than merely characterize a case as a 'gambling con-
spiracy' or a 'drug conspiracy' or any other kind of case that is in general 'tough to crack'.").
135. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976) states in part:
No order entered under this section may authorize or approve the interception of any
wire or oral communication for any period longer than is necessary to achieve the ob-
jective of the authorization, nor in any event longer than thirty days .... Every order
and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the authorization to intercept shall
be executed as soon as practicable, [and] shall be conducted in such a way as to mini-
mize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under
this chapter ....
See United States v. Abascal, 564 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1977) (no failure of minimization
where authorized life of wiretaps very brief, identities of those involved in drug conspiracy
uncertain and guarded language used on telephone).
136. See 564 F.2d at 827.
137. Id Cf. United States v. Chavez, 533 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
911 (1976) (pattern of innocent calls not established by fact that many conversations often
started innocently and covered wide-ranging topics not related to criminal activity); United
States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 42-43 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975) (govern-
ment evidence indicated efforts made to reduce interception of innocent personal calls to
smallest practicable number).
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the extent of minimization must be determined by the facts of each
case.
138
Codifying the "fruit of the poison tree" doctrine with respect to the
Crime Control Act, 139 section 2515 of the Act prohibits the use at trial,
and in certain other proceedings, 14° of the content of any intercepted
wire communication or any evidence derived therefrom "if the disclo-
sure of that information would be in violation of this chapter."'
141
In United States v. Donovan,'42 the Supreme Court held that sup-
pression of evidence under section 2515 was not warranted where law
enforcement officials had failed to comply with the identification and
notice requirements of the Crime Control Act, 143 but had satisfied all
other statutory requirements for obtaining a wiretap authorization. 144
138. 564 F.2d at 827. See United States v. Chavez, 533 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976). Cf. United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 756 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 917 (1976) (district court erred by focusing on reasonableness of
agent's intent, rather than on reasonableness of particular interception).
139. See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 558 (1974) (Powell, 3., dissenting);
United States v. Spagnuolo, 549 F.2d 705,712 (9th Cir. 1977). See Developments in Criminal
Law and Procedure in the Ninth Circuit, 1976.,4 Survey, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 855, nn.145-51
and accompanying text (1977).
140. The protection of § 2515 extends to grand jury proceedings, but only when a grand
jury witness has sufficient standing to pray for the statutory suppression remedy. See
United States v. Privitera, 549 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977) (bank
depositors whose records not object of subpoena are not "aggrieved" and hence unable to
object to subpoena). See generaly Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 47, 52 (1972)
(grand jury witnesses can refuse to testify where the substance of their testimony was discov-
ered by illegal electronic surveillance).
141. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1976). See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 434, 435-36,
438 (1977) (failure to comply with statutory identification and notice requirements of the
Crime Control Act does not require suppression of evidence obtained under intercept order
that in all other respects satisfies statutory requirements); United States v. Cabral, 554 F.2d
363, 365 (9th Cir. 1977) (suppression not required where communication used as evidence
against defendant was not unlawfully intercepted, the orders authorizing the interception
were not insufficient on their face and interceptions were made in conformity with intercept
orders); United States v. Spagnuolo, 549 F.2d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 1977) (suppression required
where conversations intercepted under invalid wiretap formed the essence of the probable
cause allegations in affidavits for two subsequent wiretaps).
142. 429 U.S..413 (1977).
143. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv), (8)(d) (1976).
144. 429 U.S. at 432. The circumstances that trigger suppression under § 2515 are enu-
merated in § 2518(l)(a): "(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; (ii) the order of
authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or (iii) the
interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval." In
Donovan, the facts were such that the only question was whether the communications were
"unlawfully intercepted." The Court stated that "the intercept order may issue only if the
issuing judge determines that the statutory factors are present, [i.e., failure or unlikely suc-
cess of normal investigative techniques and existence of probable cause to believe that (i) an
individual is engaged in criminal activity, (ii) particular communications concerning the
offense will be obtained through interception; and (iii) the target facilities are being used in
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The Ninth Circuit relied on the Donovan rationale in United States v.
Cabral.145  In Cabral the government failed to comply with section
2518(1)(b)(iv) of the Crime Control Act, requiring that individuals
known to be engaged in criminal activity be named in wiretap applica-
tions. The Cabral court found that, as in Donovan, suppression of the
evidence was not required since the communications used against
Cabral had not been unlawfully intercepted, the orders authorizing the
interception were not insufficient on their face, and the interceptions
were made in conformity with the intercept orders.
146
E Warrantless Searches Based on Probable Cause
1. Search Incident to Arrest
The rationale justifying the warrantless search incident to arrest has
traditionally been the need for protection of the arresting officer and
the preservation of evidence. 147  The search must, of course, be inci-
dent to a valid arrest.141 Under the prevailing view, the search is con-
sidered reasonable even if made in the absence of evidence of the crime
for which the suspect was arrested or in the absence of fear of the ar-
resting officer for his safety. 149  The permissible scope of such a search
is, however, limited to the arrestee's person and the area within his im-
connection with the specified criminal activity] and the failure to name additional targets in
no way detracts from the sufficiency of those factors." Id. at 435.
145. 554 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1977).
146. Id. at 365. See note 42 supra.
147. See Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 264 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218, 235 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
148. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 265-66 (1973) (custodial arrest justifies full
search of arrestee's person even absent fear of officer for safety); United States v. Robinson,
414 U:S. 218, 235 (1973) (full personal search incident to custodial arrest not only an excep-
tion to warrant requirement, but also reasonable). See, e.g., United States v. Magana, 512
F.2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975) (where agents saw suspect
"throw something away" near scene of drug arrest in progress, seizure of heroin in plain
view valid as incident to'arrest); United States v. Heiden, 508 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1974)
(search in border checkpoint interrogation room while arrest forms filed valid as incident to
arrest); Busby v. United States, 296 F.2d 328,332 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 876 (1961)
(search prior to arrest disclosing illegal firearms upheld where plain view provided probable
cause to arrest prior to search).
149. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 236 (1973). Both Gustafson and Robinson involved the permissible scope of a search
incident to a full custody arrest for a traffic offense. In sustaining full body searches as
incident to arrest, the Robinson Court commented:
The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based
upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court
may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or
evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect.
414 U.S. at 235. Mr. Justice Powell, concurring, further observed that "a valid arrest justi-
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mediate control.1 50
An incidental search need not be subsequent to the underlying arrest;
it need only be substantially contemporaneous therewith. 151  In United
States v. Chatman, 52 for example, government-directed surveillance of
appellant revealed behavior suggestive of heroin importation. Appel-
lant carried, no identification and, when stopped for interrogation, he
repeatedly attempted to conceal a bulge in the pocket of his trousers.
After refusing to produce the bulging object on request, his trousers
were searched. As a result of this search, narcotics were discovered in
the bulging pocket, and appellant was placed under arrest. The Ninth
Circuit, concluding that probable cause to arrest the suspect existed at
the time the trousers were searched, reaffirmed that "[a]s long as proba-
ble cause to arrest exists before the search, a search substantially con-
temporaneous with the arrest is incident thereto.
'1 53
fies a full search of the person, even if that search is not narrowly limited by the twin ratio-
nales of seizing evidence and disarming the arrestee." Id. at 237 (emphasis added).
150. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,763 (1969). The Court in Chimelconstrued "the
area 'within. . .[the arrestee's] immediate control"' to mean "the area from within which
he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidefice." Id. The parameters of this
standard, however, have not been clearly defined. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 558
F.2d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978) (seizure and inspection of
paper bag alongside revolver on floorboard of suspect's vehicle proper as valid search inci-
dent to arrest conducted after suspect handcuffed outside vehicle); United States v. Marshall,
526 F.2d 1349, 1358 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 923 (1976) (search of closed suit-
case previously sold to another suspect and left behind produced evidence properly seized
incident to both seller's and other suspect's arrest); United States v. Mehciz, 437 F.2d 145,
147 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971) (post arrest search of suitcase seized during
arrest valid even after suspect handcuffed, on theory of mobility and lack of undue intru-
sion). The implementation of the Chimel standard by various lower courts is discussed in
Comment, The Permissible Scope of a Premises Search Incident to Arrest Under Chimel v.
California. Divergent Deinitions of "Immediate Control" Plague the Lower Courts, 9 Loy.
L.A.L. REv. 350 (1976).
151. See United States v. Murray, 492 F.2d 178, 188 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
942 (1974) ("[A] search immediately preceding an arrest is incident thereto if probable cause
for the arrest existed prior to the search."); United States v. Rogers, 453 F.2d 860, 862 (9th
Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (pre-arrest search disclosing marijuana valid where observations of
off-duty officer provided probable cause for arrest); United States v. Maynard, 439 F.2d
1086, 1087 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (search of suitcase prior to arrest proper where sus-
pect had offered officer bribe, thus establishing probable cause); Busby v. United States, 296
F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 876 (1961) (once probable cause to arrest
exists, immaterial that incidental search precedes arrest).
152. 573 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
153. Id. at 567. See, ag., United States v. Murray, 492 F.2d 178, 188 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 942 (1974).
A well-reasoned dissent in Chatman, however, argued that in order to justify an incidental
search conducted prior to the arrest itself, both probable cause to arrest and exigent circum-
stances threatening the destruction of evidence should exist. "To require otherwise might
. .. increase the possibility that evidence disclosed by a search would be considered as part
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2. Emergency or Exigent Circumstances
The courts have long recognized the validity of warrantless searches
based upon probable cause where immediate action is necessary to pre-
serve evidence1-4 or to protect police officers. 155 So long as the officer's
belief in the exigency is reasonable the search will be sustained, even if
the emergency is subsequently found to have been illusory.
1 56
In United States v. Spanier,1 57 for example, the arresting officers fol-
lowed several bank-robbery suspects to a nearby dwelling. The resi-
dence was surrounded, shots were exchanged, and the officers observed
smoke and sparks rising from the chimney. Although the officers soon
had control over five persons who had surrendered, there was no rea-
son to believe that all persons connected with the robbery had vacated
the premises. In order to check for additional confederates, the officers
immediately entered the dwelling, discovered no additional persons,
and refrained from conducting a thorough search until after a search
warrant had been procured. In upholding the validity of the warrant-
less entry and subsequent search, the Ninth Circuit reiterated that of-
ficers need not lay seige to a dwelling, pending the arrival of a proper
of the justification for a subsequent arrest." 573 F.2d at 571 (Takasugi, District J., sitting by
designation, dissenting). See also Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95, 98 & n.9 (9th Cir.
1965), af'd, 358 F.2d 709 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 826 (1966) (prior search valid as
incidental where probable cause to arrest and exigent circumstances suggested search neces-
sary to preserve evidence).
154. See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505 (1973) (warrantless seizure of obscene
film unreasonable since film scheduled regularly for public viewing) ("Where there are exi-
gent circumstances in which police action literally must be 'now or never' to preserve the
evidence of the crime, it is reasonable to permit action without prior judicial evaluation.");
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 615 (1961) ("inconvenience" and "delay" are "un-
convincing reasons" for warrantless seizure of "distillery" at request of landlord prompted
by whiskey mash odor) (" 'There are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the
need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be contended that a
magistrate's warrant for search may be dispensed with. But this is not such a case.' ") (quot-
ing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948) (warrantless seizure prompted by
odor of burning opium invalid since no evidence or contraband threatened with removal or
destruction)); Bouse v. Bussey, 573 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (warrantless
seizure of prisoner's pubic hair unjustified and intrusive since exigent circumstances nonex-
istent); United States v. Fulton, 549 F.2d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 1977) (warrantless entry up-
held where destruction of incriminating evidence of drug transaction was distinct
possibility); Hernandez v. United States, 353 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 1008 (1966) (warrantless search independent of arrest valid where contraband
"threatened with imminent removal or destruction").
155. See, ag., United States v. Hobson, 519 F.2d 765, 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
931 (1975) (warrantless dwelling search sustained where armed and dangerous confederate
believed to be inside and weapons in plain view).
156. United States v. Fulton, 549 F.2d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Spanier, No. 76-2174 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 1977).
157. No. 76-2174 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 1977).
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warrant, where to do so would substantially risk the destruction or re-
moval of evidence.158 Although it is continually emphasized that such
warrantless entries are solely for the narrow purpose of securing and
safeguarding the premises against the loss or destruction of evidence, 
159
an officer searching pursuant to this purpose may lawfully seize evi-
dence in plain view.16
3. Investigative Detention
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's reasoning in Terry v. Ohio,'6 1 a po-
lice officer may detain a suspect whom he reasonably believes is engag-
ing in or is about to engage in criminal activity and may conduct a
carefully limited warrantless search for weapons if he further concludes
that the suspect may be armed and dangerous. 162
The officer's decision to detain a suspect need not be based upon
probable cause, but may rest upon his "reasonable suspicion" that
criminal activity is afoot.163 The articulable facts underlying the of-
158. Id., slip op. at 2-3. See also United States v. Grummel, 542 F.2d 789, 791 (9th Cir.
1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1051 (1977) (seige unnecessary where warrantless
entry made to effect arrest and secure premises pending warrant); United States v. Mc-
Laughlin, 525 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 904 (1976) (delay unneces-
sary where to do so risks destruction of evidence).
159. United States v. Spanier, No. 76-2174, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 1977) ("officers
...had the right to make the house secure so that, when they returned with a warrant,
whatever evidence there was at the time of the arrest would still be there"); United States v.
Grummel, 542 F.2d 789, 791 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1051 (1977)
("[IThe warrantless entry... went no further than to. . .secure the premises to the extent
necessary to prevent destruction of the evidence until a warrant could be obtained."); United
States v. McLaughlin, 525 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 904 (1976)
("Mhese exigent circumstances justify an entry... to secure the premises to the extent
necessary to prevent the destruction or removal of the evidence. They, however, carry the
officers no further.').
160. See United States v. Fulton, 549 F.2d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Hobson, 519 F.2d 765, 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 931 (1975). For a discussion of
the doctrine of plain view seizures, see notes 184-89 infra and accompanying text.
161. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
162. Id. at 30. See also United States v. Homburg, 546 F.2d 1350, 1352-54 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 940 (1977) (following anonymous airport bomb threat, a strong
suspicion that suitcase contained explosives justified Terry-type search revealing heroin);
United States v. Hill, 545 F.2d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 1976) ("Terry does not.. . limit a
weapons search to a so-called 'pat down' search. Any limited intrusion designed to discover
guns, knives, clubs or other instruments of assault are [sic] permissible.").
163. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975) (roving-patrol stop for
illegal aliens permissible only where based on reasonable suspicion). The Ninth Circuit has
concluded that a "founded suspicion" is the functional equivalent of the standard enunci-
ated in Brtnoni-Ponce. United States v. Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476, 477 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 977 (1976) (marijuana smuggling conviction sustained where initial
vehicle stop based upon "founded suspicion" of alien smuggling). See also United States v.
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ficer's belief may be derived either from personal observation or an
informant's tip which, although insufficient to sustain an arrest or to
support a search warrant, carries sufficient indicia of reliability to jus-
tify interrogation."6 Of course, information may be gleaned during
the interrogation which elevates the officer's suspicion to the level of
probable cause, and a formal arrest or search may then be executed.1 6
An officer may properly display force to effectuate an investigative
stop when it becomes apparent that the suspect will not otherwise com-
ply,166 or when necessary to ensure the officer's safety. 67  Under such
circumstances, detention at gunpoint does not transform the "stop" into
Holland, 510 F.2d 453, 455 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1010 (1975) (suspect's activities
need not be wholly inconsistent with innocent behavior to give rise to founded suspicion);
United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 1973) (similar fourth amendment
standards apply to both vehicle and pedestrian stops); Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412, 415
(9th Cir. 1966) ("A founded suspicion is all that is necessary, some basis from which the
court can determine that the detention was not arbitrary or harassing.").
The court in Holland reiterated several factors to be considered in evaluating the propri-
ety of an investigatory stop:
The reasonableness of such on-the-scene detention is determined by all the circum-
stances. The seriousness of the offense, the degree of likelihood that the person de-
tained may have witnessed or been involved in the offense, the proximity in time and
space from the scene of the crime, the urgency of the occasion, the nature of the deten-
tion and its extent, the means and procedures employed by the officer, the presence of
any circumstances suggesting harassment or a deliberate effort to avoid the necessity of
securing a warrant---these and other factors will be relevant ....
510 F.2d at 455-56 (quoting Arnold v. United States, 382 F.2d 4, 7 (9th Cir. 1967)).
164. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1972) (Terry-type search valid when based
upon tip from known informant who had provided information in past). See also United
States v. McLaughlin, 525 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 904 (1976)
(attempted vehicle stop reasonable when based upon reliable informant's tip, officer's obser-
vation of package transfer, and vehicle's evasive action). But cf. United States v. DeVita,
526 F.2d 81, 82-83 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (vague tip from unreliable informant did not
constitute founded suspicion sufficient to support vehicle stop).
165. See United States v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 558 F.2d 956, 964-65 (9th Cir. 1977), cer.
denied, 434 U.S. 1050 (1978) (following valid investigatory stop of vehicle, marijuana odor
and contraband in plain view constituted probable cause to search); United States v.
Thompson, 558 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978) (search valid
when based on marijuana odor detected during interrogation); United States v. Bates, 533
F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1976) (seizure of smuggled contraband valid where officer's suspicion
elevated to probable cause during questioning).
166. See, eg., United States v. Thompson, 558 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 914 (1978) (officer drew weapon after vehicle lurched forward and began to move).
See also note 167 infra.
167. United States v. Coades, 549 F.2d 1303, 1305 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (initial
stop with drawn weapons reasonable when bank robbery suspects believed armed). See
also United States v. Russell, 546 F.2d 839, 841 (9th Cir. 1976) (Wright, J., concurring)
(initial vehicle stop with drawn weapons reasonable where officers suspected a possible am-
bush); United States v. Richards, 500 F.2d 1025, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 1974), cer. denied, 420
U.S. 924 (1975) (reasonable to draw weapon where suspects believed armed and officer's
order to stop aircraft engines ignored); McNeary v. Stone, 482 F.2d 804, 807 (9th Cir.), cert.
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an arrest for which probable cause would be required. 168
The interrogation, moreover, may be conducted at a location other
than that of the initial confrontation. In United States v. Chatman,1
69
the suspect, upon arrival at an airport, had been stopped for question-
ing concerning possible heroin trafficking. The suspect, who carried
no identification and who seemed extremely nervous, was escorted to
an interview room for interrogation. Concluding that no arrest had
taken place, the Ninth Circuit observed that "[flounded suspicion...
justified the interrogation, and it was not improper, in absence of pro-
test or coercive circumstances, to arrange that it take place free from
public view with its attendant embarrassment."' 70
4. Warrantless Vehicle Searches
Motor vehicle searches have historically fallen outside the purview of
the warrant requirement when based upon probable cause and con-
ducted under exigent circumstances. 7 ' Although the finding of exi-
gency rests upon the vehicle's mobility and the ease with which it may
denied, 414 U.S. 1071 (1973) (investigatory stop at gunpoint reasonable when robbery sus-
pects believed to be armed).
168. See notes 166-67 supra. But see United States v. Strickler, 490 F.2d 378, 380 (9th
Cir. 1974) (heavily armed approach to fully surrounded vehicle where occupants ordered to
raise hands constituted arrest).
169. 573 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1977).
170. Id. at 567 (citing United States v. Salter, 521 F.2d 1326, 1328-29 (2d Cir. 1975) (bus
station baggage room)). See also United States v. Scheiblauer, 472 F.2d 297, 299 (9th Cir.
1973) (by implication) (airport security office).
171. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (where warrantless highway search
proper, and removal of vehicle to station is reasonable, search conducted there is proper)
(citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (search of bootlegger's vehicle on
road proper on theory of mobility)) ("[A] search warrant [is] unnecessary where there is
probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the highway; the car is moveable, the
occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be found again if a warrant must be
obtained."). See United States v. Abascal, 564 F.2d 821, 828-29 (9th Cir. 1977) (officers
need not take action at instant probable cause ripens; vehicle search justified on exigent
circumstances when new probable cause appears); United States v. Gulma, 563 F.2d 386,
390 (9th Cir. 1977) (vehicle search immediately following lawful arrest justified by exigent
circumstances); United States v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 558 F.2d 956, 964-65 (9th Cir. 1977),
cer. denied, 434 U.S. 1050 (1978) (detection of marijuana odor during valid investigatory
stop, plain view sighting of contraband and exigent circumstances justified immediate war-
rantless search); United States v. Peterson, 549 F.2d 654, 660 (9th Cir. 1977) (corroborated
informant's tip and independent agent observation constitute probable cause for warrantless
search where exigent circumstances also present); United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353,
374 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977) (where real possibility that kidnapper's
confederate might attempt to destroy evidence in vehicle, immediate search following im-
poundment justified); United States v. McClain, 531 F.2d 431, 433-35 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 835 (1976) (search valid where vehicle accessible to "other people" but no evidence
confederates presented); United States v. Hickman, 523 F.2d 323, 328-29 (9th Cir. 1975),
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be moved from the jurisdiction, 172 a vehicle subject to search on the
highway may properly be removed to the stationhouse before the
search is conducted. 73  The Supreme Court has traditionally sustained
the warrantless search of vehicles under circumstances in which it
would otherwise invalidate the search of an office or dwelling as a vio-
lation of the fourth amendment. 74
Quite apart from searches designed to uncover contraband or other
instrumentalities of crime, the Supreme Court, in South Dakota v.
Opperman,175 upheld the warrantless inventory search of an im-
pounded vehicle.' 76  Such incursions must be conducted pursuant to
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976) (search of decoy boat externally identical to and bearing
same registration as suspect boat valid).
172. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1976) (warrantless inventory
search pursuant to standard police procedure valid); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51
(1970) (exigency based on mobility factor).
173. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).
174. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1976) (for purposes of fourth
amendment, vehicles distinct from dwellings); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590-91
(1974) (plurality opinion of Blackmun, J.) ('The search of an automobile is far less intrusive
on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment than the search of one's person or of a
building.') (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring)); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439-40 (1973) (warrantless search disclos-
ing murder weapon in trunk valid where vehicle necessarily left unguarded following acci-
dent); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 221 (1968) (insufficient probable
cause to justify search of vehicle apprehended in chase and containing fresh bullet hole in
trunk where vehicle description merely "old make model car").
In Opperman Mr. Chief Justice Burger explained the two-fold rationale for the lesser
fourth amendment protection afforded a vehicle:
First, the inherent mobility of automobiles creates circumstances of such exigency that,
as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossi-
ble. . . . [Second,] less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the expectation
of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to
one's home or office.. . [due to] pervasive and continuing governmental regulation
and controls. . . [and] the obviously public nature of automobile travel.
428 U.S. at 367-68 (footnotes and citations omitted). See United States v. Gibbs, 435 F.2d
621, 623 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971) (warrantless visual search of vehi-
cle underside based on informant's reliable tip valid where odor of marijuana strong).
175. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
176. Id. at 375-76. The Chief Justice, writing for the majority of five, isolated three con-
siderations underlying the propriety of routine inventory searches: safeguarding the owner's
property while it remains in police custody; shielding the police against claims of lost or
stolen articles; and protecting the police from potential danger. .d. at 369.
Rejecting the broad authorization proffered by the majority, however, Mr. Justice Mar-
shall argued in dissent for more stringent prerequisites:
[Tjhere must be spec /fc cause to believe that a search of the scope to be undertaken is
necessary in order to preserve the integrity of particular valuable property threatened
by the impoundment. . . [and] even where a search might be appropriate, such an
intrusion may only follow the exhaustion and failure of reasonable efforts under the
circumstances to identify and reach the owner of the property in order to facilitate
alternative means of security or to obtain his consent to the search ...
[Vol. 11
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the standard operating procedures of the relevant police agency 177 and
must be free from any "investigatory police motive."178  In United
States v. Hellman,179 for example, appellant's vehicle was partially
blocking a driveway at the time of his arrest. Pursuant to a standard
police department regulation, the vehicle was cited, impounded on the
spot and immediately searched, ostensibly for inventory purposes.
The search disclosed incriminating evidence. The impoundment regu-
lation, however, was silent as to both inventory and protective storage
of the vehicle's contents. Testimony of the impounding officer at the
supression hearing further revealed that one of his motives in citing
and impounding the vehicle had been to justify an investigatory search.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction, reasoning that the investiga-
tory police motive alone was sufficient to render the warrantless search
unreasonable. 180 As independent grounds for reversal the Hellman
court stressed the importance of the routine nature of an inventory
search, concluding:
It is the inventorying practice and not the impounding practice that, if
routinely followed ... could render the inventory a reasonable search
under Opperman. The fact that other police departments routinely fol-
low such a practice may give support to the proposition that such a prac-
tice, if locally followed, is reasonable. It does not, however, render
reasonable a search where the inventorying practice is not locally fol-
lowed and the search, thus, is a departure from local practice. A locally
followed practice gives some assurance that a particular car was not sin-
gled out for special searching attention. 81
The discovery of incriminating evidence need not coincide with the
Id. at 393-94 (Marshall, J., with Brennan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis added) (foot-
notes omitted).
177. Id. at 376.
178. Id.
179. 556 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1977).
180. Id. at 444.
181. Id. The Hellman court suggested, however, that even extraordinary procedures
might be reasonable under the fourth amendment when supported by "some special reason
for the taking of safeguarding or security precautions that are not customarily taken." Id
See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 366,369 (1976) (valuables in plain view
might provide incentive for theft); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 443 (1973) (un-
guarded pistol might fall into thieves' hands).
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Opperman, however, counsels that the rationale
dispensing with the warrant requirement may be absent in such situations. In the inventory
search, reasons Powell, "[t]he officer does not make a discretionary determination to search
based on a judgment that certain conditions are present. Inventory searches are conducted
in accordance with established police department ... policy and occur whenever an auto-
mobile is seized. There are thus no special facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate." 428
U.S. at 383 (Powell, J., concurring).
1978]
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initial vehicle inventory. The appellant in United States v. Jamerson18 2
was arrested in the early morning hours for possession of a stolen vehi-
cle. Immediately thereafter, at the scene of the arrest, officers inven-
toried the contents of the vehicle to preclude claims of lost or stolen
articles. Following a request from the owner late that afternoon for
the vehicle's release, an officer entered to remove the contents. Notic-
ing a protruding piece of newspaper under a mat behind the driver's
seat, the officer removed the mat and discovered incriminating evi-
dence wrapped in the paper. The Ninth Circuit summarily approved
the bifurcated inventory process observing that "the police were 'indis-
putably engaged in a caretaking search of a lawfully impounded vehi-
cle.' )9183
5. Seizure of Items in Plain View
The courts have sanctioned the warrantless seizure of evidence found
in "plain view" by an officer lawfully in the place where the discovery
occurs.1 4 The officer need not be present on the authority of a war-
rant, but may be acting pursuant to one of the recognized exceptions to
the warrant requirement. 18 5 "Plain view" seizures are valid, however,
182. 549 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1977) (Dyer Act defendant has automatic standing to chal-
lenge search of stolen vehicle).
183. Id. at 1271 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375 (1976)).
184. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (plurality opinion of
Stewart, J., joined by Douglas, Brennan & Marshall, JJ.) ("What the 'plain view' cases have
in common is that the police officer. . . had a prior justification for an intrusion in the
course of which he came inadvertently across. . . evidence incriminating the accused.");
United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 788 (9th Cir. 1974) (seizure of items in plain view
improper when dwelling entered without a warrant and under circumstances of insufficient
exigency to justify intrusion); United States v. Hood, 493 F.2d 677, 680 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 852 (1974) (seizure of pills valid when officer lawfully stopped defendant
for traffic violation and pill bottles visible with aid of flashlight); United States v. Glassel,
488 F.2d 143, 145 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 941 (1974) (seizure of objects in plain
view valid when officer justified under circumstances to misrepresent identity to gain en-
trance to dwelling); United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 7 n.3 (9th Cir. 1973),
cer. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974) ("It is well established that illegal entries vitiate subsequent
searches or seizures, even if the evidence is in plain view after the entry.").
Mr. Justice Stewart, in Coolidge, recognized the application of the doctrine under circum-
stances when the officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nevertheless
discovers incriminating items. 403 U.S. at 466. See also United States v. Brown, 470 F.2d
1120, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 1972) (seizure of illegal weapon in plain view valid during proper
inspection for vehicle registration.).
185. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (plurality opinion of Stewart,
J., joined by Douglas, Brennan & Marshall, J.) ("Where the initial intrusion that brings the
police within plain view of [the incriminating evidence] is supported.., by one of the
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the seizure is also legitimate."). See also
United States v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 558 F.2d 956, 964-65 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1050 (1978) (sight of marijuana in plain view during valid investigatory stop justified
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only when the officer inadvertently discovers,"8 6 and immediately rec-
ognizes, the inculpatory character of the objects seized.
187
During the survey period the Ninth Circuit applied the plain view
doctrine summarily and tended to focus upon the propriety of the of-
ficer's presence in the area where the evidence was discovered. In
United States v. Fulton,"'8 for example, the Ninth Circuit analyzed only
the justification for the presence of federal agents in the suspect's motel
room. The court found the circumstances to be sufficiently exigent to
sustain a warrantless entry and, hence, the plain view seizure.
189
6. Hot Pursuit
A police officer in hot pursuit of a suspect may lawfully enter prem-
ises and seize evidence without a warrant under circumstances in which
delay might result in destruction of the evidence or heightened danger
to the officer. 190 The entry must, of course, be based upon probable
search); United States v. Fulton, 549 F.2d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 1977) (seizure of items in
plain view proper following warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances that partner in
room would destroy evidence); United States v. Allende, 486 F.2d 1351, 1353 (9th Cir. 1973),
cer. denied, 416 U.S. 958 (1974) (objects in plain view during limited search incident to
arrest properly seized without warrant); United States v. Walling, 486 F.2d 229, 236 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 923 (1974) (seizure of items in plain view revealed by flashlight
proper following valid investigatory stop of vehicle).
186. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469-70 (1971) (plurality opinion of Stew-
art, J., joined by Douglas, Brennan & Marshall, JJ.) (plain view doctrine unavailable when
officers had ample time to obtain warrant, advance knowledge of description and location,
and intent to seize).
187. Id. at 466. ("[The seizure] is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the
police that they have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to
extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminat-
ing at last emerges."). See also United States v. Sedillo, 496 F.2d 151, 151-52 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 947 (1974) (seizure of forged check in envelope protruding from pocket
upheld even though check itself and endorsement not visible until after seizure and no pre-
seizure cause to suspect contraband); United States v. White, 463 F.2d 18, 21 (9th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972) (seizure of pill bottles in plain view during inves-
tigation of nondrug-related theft upheld when bottles lacked price tags, sales identification
or prescription labels, but bore warning that prescription required).
In his dissenting opinion to the Court's denial of certiorari in Sedillo, Mr. Justice Douglas
approved Ninth Circuit Judge Hufstedler's dissent, agreeing that the plain view doctrine is
inapplicable where the incriminating aspects of an object are not immediately apparent.
419 U:S. at 947-48 (Douglas, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
188. 549 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1977).
189. Id. at 1327. In Fulton, extensive surveillance of defendant's motel room coupled
with an informant's tip revealed the probable involvement of defendant and an unidentified
female in heroin importation. Although the defendant was arrested in the parking lot of the
motel, agents strongly believed that the female remained in the room. Fearing the destruc-
tion of incriminating evidence, agents effected a warrantless entry, secured the premises, and
seized items in plain view.
190. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976) (warrantless entry to effect arrest
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cause,191 and need not conform to the knock and announce statute 92
when compliance "would create palpable peril to the life or limb of the
. . . officers."'
193
7. Consent Searches
Searches undertaken by law enforcement officials with the consent of
the party or parties involved do not require a showing of probable
cause. 94 The burden is on the government to show that consent was
freely and voluntarily given' 95 and not the product of duress-either
express or implied. 96 The government must show the voluntary na-
ture of the consent from the "totality of the circumstances."
97
In 1977, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the long established rule 98 that
a person in custody may validly consent to a search, as long as there is
valid when arrest initiated in public place and delay realistically expected to result in de-
struction of evidence); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (delay in pursuit of
armed felon unnecessary where to do so would gravely endanger lives of officers or others).
The exemption provides relief from the warrant requirement even when the "pursuit" ends
almost as soon as it begins. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. at 43 (" 'Hot pursuit' means
some sort of a chase, but it need not be an extended hue and cry 'in and about [the] public
streets.' [T"hat the pursuit. . . ended almost as soon as it began did not render it any the less
a 'hot pursuit' sufficient to justify.. . warrantless entry.").
191. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 520 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1056 (1976) (knowledge that suspects not in first six of seven apartment units in which
they were most likely to be found contributed to sufficient probable cause for warrantless
search of seventh unit).
192. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1976) provides:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any
part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his
authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or
a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.
193. Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 922
(1967), 393 U.S. 985 (1968) (unannounced entry to execute warrant permissible where armed
murderer believed present). Compliance with the announcement statute, however, does not
per se render the hot pursuit exception inapplicable. United States v. Flores, 540 F.2d 432,
435-36 (9th Cir. 1976) (search following announced entry valid as hot pursuit where high
risk of destruction of evidence and suspect's escape); United States v. Scott, 520 F.2d 697,
700 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1056 (1976) (announced warrantless entry in hot
pursuit valid where armed robbers thought to be present).
194. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
195. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968).
196. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228-29, 248-49 (1973).
197. See 4. at 226-27, 229; United States v. Agosto, 502 F.2d 612, 614 (9th Cir. 1974) (per
curiam) (threat by law enforcement officers that in the absence of consent they would secure
the premises and procure a search warrant does not necessitate a finding of duress or coer-
cion; remanded in order to determine voluntariness from "totality of circumstances").
198. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976); United States v. Townsend,
510 F.2d 1145, 1146 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); United States v. Rothman, 492 F.2d 1260,
1265 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81, 83 (9th Cir. 1962) (en banc).
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no evidence of coercion or duress.199 The fact that a person is in cus-
tody when consent is given is simply one factor to be considered in
analyzing the totality of the circumstances."°
The voluntary nature of the consent is all that the government must
prove in order to justify a consent search °1 Unlike the fifth amend-
ment Mfiranda warnings,20 2 there is no requirement that a person being
asked to consent to a search be informed of his right to refuse such
consent. 3 Whether a person has been warned is but one factor to be
considered "within the totality of circumstances" when determining
whether the consent was voluntarily given.2" It has previously been
held in the Ninth Circuit that trial courts must enter specific findings as
to the circumstances surrounding a consent to search. 5
In United States v. Lemon,2 6 the Ninth Circuit rejected the argu-
ment that any evidence seized as a result of a consent search under-
taken after the Miranda warnings have been given is an "illegally
obtained statement" and is therefore excluded from evidence.2 7  The
court stated that "[a] consent to a search is not the type of incriminating
statement toward which the fifth amendment is directed" since it is
"not in itself 'evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature'
,,208
199. United States v. Thompson, 558 F.2d 522, 525 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
914 (1978); United States v. Lemon, 550 F.2d 467, 471 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Tolias, 548 F.2d 277, 278 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). Cf. United States v. Gulma, 563
F.2d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 1977) (third person with common authority over motel room con-
sented to search while under arrest).
200. See United States v. Tolias, 548 F.2d 277, 278 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (defend-
ant was given his Miranda rights, was in his own store, and knew from past experience that
he could refuse consent).
201. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228-29 (1973).
202. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda requires that an accused
who is subjected to "custodial interrogation" must be advised of his fifth amendment right to
remain silent. Id. at 467-68.
203. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231-33 (1973).
204. United States v. Heimforth, 493 F.2d 970, 972 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 908
(1974).
205. Id.
206. 550 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1977).
207. Id. at 472-73.
208. Id. at 472. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761-64 (1966) (withdrawal of
blood sample was not testimonial in nature and, therefore, did not involve fifth amendment
violation); Tremayne v. Nelson, 537 F.2d 359, 360-61 (9th Cir. 1976) (search conducted after
voluntary consent and which uncovered incriminating blood stain did not violate defend-
ant's fifth amendment rights). In Lemon, the court declined to decide whether the "fruits"
doctrine of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,484-86 (1963) (exclusion of "fruits" of
illegally obtained evidence in violation of the fourth amendment) applied to a violation of
Miranda, since the court found no Miranda violation. 550 F.2d at 472. The Supreme
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A consent to search may be given by any person who possesses
"common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises
or effects sought to be inspected.' ' 2°9 Thus, persons who share author-
ity over premises or effects assume the risk that one person may, on his
own, consent to a search of the common area which will prove detri-
mental to another.21 In 1977, the Ninth Circuit held that such com-
mon authority necessary to justify the consent need only rest on
"mutual use of the property by persons having joint access or control
for most purposes .. 21
8. Border Searches
The federal government has an inherent power to keep international
borders secure from the entry of contraband and illegal aliens.21 2 In
manifestation of this right, searches made at an international border, or
its "functional equivalent," 213 are exempt from the fourth amendment
requirement of probable cause.214 Thus, persons, packages, 215 and ye-
Court, in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974), had earlier declined to answer the
same question.
209. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S.
731, 740 (1969) (consent by defendant's cousin to search duffel bag which was used jointly
by them; focus on mutual control, use and access); United States v. Murphy, 506 F.2d 529,
530 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 996 (1975) (per curiam) (consent by employee to
search employer's warehouse). Cf. United States v. Bussey, 507 F.2d 1096, 1097 (9th Cir.
1974) (while first co-conspirator's consent to search jointly occupied motel room was valid,
her consent to search second co-conspirator's personal luggage was not).
210. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S.
731, 740 (1969); United States v. Canada, 527 F.2d 1374, 1378-79 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 867 (1976) (consent by companion of defendant permitting airport authori-
ties to search shared bag was valid when defendant did not object). The Canada case also
refuted the notion that third-party consent searches are upheld only in situations involving
absentee defendants. Id. at 1379.
211. United States v. Gulma, 563 F.2d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 1977). In Gulma, the defend-
ants gave a key to a motel room to a third person who was to find a buyer for the heroin that
was deposited in the room. The defendants did not want the key back from the third per-
son. The court found that the third person had been given complete control of the room,
hence his consent to a search thereof was valid. Id. at 389-90.
212. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977); Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, 272, 274 (1973); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-67 (1972);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925); Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805,
808 (9th Cir. 1967); Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 977 (1966).
213. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973); United States v. Pot-
ter, 552 F.2d 901,907(9th Cir. 1977). See also United States v. Tilton, 534 F.2d 1363, 1364-
65 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Solmes, 527 F.2d 1370, 1372 (9th Cir. 1975).
214. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886); United States v. Carter, 563
F.2d 1360, 1361 (9th Cir. 1977); Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. United States, 378 F.2d 256,258 (9th
Cir. 1967); Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 385 U.S.
977 (1966).
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hides crossing the border are subject to a full search based on little or
no suspicion.21 6 Furthermore, there is no requirement that Miranda17
warnings be given to a person crossing the border.218  The search, how-
ever, must meet the fourth amendment requirement of reasonable-
ness.
2 19
For the search to seriously intrude upon a person's dignity, however,
additional suspicion is required-dependent upon the degree of intru-
sion necessary. For example, in order to initiate a strip or "skin
search," there must be a real suspicion that the person to be searched
has contraband concealed on his or her body.' 2 This real suspicion
must be based on objective, articulable facts that bear some reasonable
relationship221 to the suspicion that something is concealed on the
body. In the recent case of United States v. Wilmot,222 the Ninth Cir-
215. Overseas mail entering the United States is subject to search when there is reason-
able cause to suspect that it contains contraband. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606,
611 (1977); United States v. Barclift, 514 F.2d 1073, 1074-75 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
842 (1975).
216. Klein v. United States, 472 F.2d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 1973). See Henderson v. United
States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967); Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966); Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 950 (1961).
217. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
218. Chavez-Martinez v. United States, 407 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
858 (1969). Miranda warnings need only be given to a person crossing the border when
there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed or that the person has
been arrested. Id. at 539.
219. Klein v. United States, 472 F.2d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 1973).
220. See United States v. Wilmot, 563 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1977) (object felt during
"pat-down" search supplied real suspicion to justify strip search); United States v. Leverette,
503 F.2d 269,270 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Holtz, 479 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Sosa, 469 F.2d 271, 272 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1973); United
States v. Gil de Avila, 468 F.2d 184, 186 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 958 (1972) (behav-
ior by companions of person subjected to skin search can supply real suspicion); United
States v. Shields, 453 F.2d 1235, 1236 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910
(1972); United States v. Johnson, 425 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 802
(1971); United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1970); United States
v. Summerfield, 421 F.2d 684, 685 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Henderson v. United States,
390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967).
221. See United States v..Leverette, 503 F.2d 269, 270 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Johnson, 425 F.2d 630,632 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 802 (1971); United States v.
Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1970). In Guadalupe-Garza, the court defined the
real suspicion necessary to justify the initiation of a strip search as "subjective suspicion
supported by objective, articulable facts that would reasonably lead an experienced, prudent
customs officer to suspect that a particular person seeking to cross our border is concealing
something on his body for the purpose of transporting it into the United States contrary to
law." Id. at 879.
222. 563 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1977).
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cuit reaffirmed previous decisions223 holding that a reasonable pat-
down search for weapons is not the equivalent of a strip search. In
Wilmot, the court also further defined its views as to strip-searches.
Such a search was upheld where the combined factors of a suspect's
behavior during a pat-down for weapons and the detection of a se-
creted object next to the skin gave rise to a "real suspicion."2 24
To initiate a search that involves a severe intrusion upon a person's
dignity, such as the search of a body cavity, there must exist a clear
indication 22- or plain suggestion 226 that contraband has been secreted
beyond the surface of the skin.' 2 The search of the body cavity must
be conducted in a reasonable manner as required by the fourth amend-
ment.228 In 1977, the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that the re-
moval of an artificial leg at the "functional equivalent" of an
international border constituted a body cavity search, holding that
forced removal of such a limb "in no way involves the same embarass-
ment and intrusion" as a body cavity search.229
223. United States v. Rivera-Marquez, 519 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 949
(1975). See United States v. Carter, 563 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1977).
224. 563 F.2d at 1300. On crossing the border, Wilmot had been subjected to a pat-down
search for the detection of weapons. He aroused the custom inspector's suspicions by refus-
ing to spread his legs, and ultimately a suspicious object was felt in his groin area. When
the object was again detected during a second pat-down after Wilmot emptied his pockets,
he was subjected to a strip search which revealed a packet of heroin.
225. Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945
(1967). See also United States v. Mastberg, 503 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Brown, 421 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam); United States v. Castle, 409 F.2d 1347,
1348 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 975 (1969); Morales v. United States, 406
F.2d 1298, 1299-1300 (9th Cir. 1969); Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366, 377 (9th Cir.
1968).
226. Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945
(1967). See United States v. Sosa, 469 F.2d 271, 272-73 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 945 (1973).
227. Defining the point at which a skin search turns into a body cavity search has been
problematic for the Ninth Circuit. It is settled that the "manual opening of the vagina" is a
body cavity search. Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967). See
United States v. Shields, 453 F.2d 1235, 1236 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
910 (1972). The weight of authority holds that the examination of spread buttocks is not a
body cavity search as only the skin around the anus is being inspected-therefore not requir-
ing the clear indication standard. See United States v. Summerfield, 421 F.2d 684, 685 (9th
Cir. 1970) (per curiam); United States v. Brown, 421 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam);
United States v. Castle, 409 F.2d 1347, 1348 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
975 (1969). Compare Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 945 (1967) (rectal exam constitutes body cavity search).
228. United States v. Cameron, 538 F.2d 254, 258 (9th Cir. 1976). See United States v.
Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 1970); Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366,
374-79 (9th Cir. 1968).
229. United States v. Carter, 563 F.2d 1360, 1361 (9th Cir. 1977). In Carter, the court
expressly left open the question whether the removal and search of an artifical leg at the
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In recent years, the trend in the Supreme Court has been to limit
congressional efforts"3 to expand the physical area within which a bor-
der search could be conducted. The Court has consistently held that
only searches conducted at the border"' or its "functional
equivalent"232 are exempt from the fourth amendment requirement of
probable cause.
This trend began with the decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States.'3 In Almeida-Sanchez, the Court held that searches conducted
by roving patrol units at a point removed from the border or its "func-
tional equivalent" must be based on probable cause 234 or a warrant
authorizing random searches in a given area.23s In 1975, the Court
extended the Aimeida-Sanchez holding to require that searches con-
ducted at permanent checkpoint stations removed from the border or
its "functional equivalent" be based on probable cause or consent.23 6
The trend continued with the Court's decision in United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce237 which held that a roving patrol unit may stop a vehi-
cle in close proximity to the border for questioning of the occupants
about their residence status only if there exists a reasonable suspicion
based on articulable facts that the vehicle contains illegal aliens.238  In
"functional equivalent" of the border constituted a strip search because the court had al-
ready found sufficient real suspicion to justify a strip search.
230. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1970) (war-
rantless searches of automobiles or other conveyances for aliens within a reasonable distance
of United States borders); 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a) (1975) (provides for reasonable border search
anywhere within 100 miles of border).
231. See United States v. Tutwiler, 505 F.2d 758, 759-60 (9th Cir. 1974) (search near
border justified by probable cause).
232. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973). See United States v.
Solmes, 527 F.2d 1370, 1373 (9th Ciri 1975) (domestic port functional equivalent of the
border); cf. United States v. Tilton, 534 F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1976) (port not functional
equivalent of border when no finding of articulable facts to support reasonably certain con-
clusion that boat crossed border). But f United States v. Morgan, 501 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir.
1974) (per curiam) (check point 65 miles from Mexican border not functional equivalent of
border).
233. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
234. Id. at 273.
235. Id. at 283 (Powell, J., concurring).
236. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 898-99 (1975). Ortiz adopted the Ninth Cir-
cuit's view in United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (en banc),
a.'d on other grounds, 422 U.S. 916 (1975) (search at permanent check point 49 miles from
the border held invalid because not functional equivalent of border).
237. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
238. Id. at 884. Those factors that the Court felt the border patrol could use as a basis for
establishing reasonable suspicion included: characteristics of the locality, proximity to the
border, the previous experience of the officer, usual traffic in the area, information of recent
border crossings, the behavior of the driver, characteristics of the vehicle itself, and the
clothing and haircut of the occupants of the vehicle.
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1977, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its position239 that the reasonable
suspicion standard established by the Supreme Court in Brignoni-
Ponce is basically the same as the founded suspicion standard applied
by the Ninth Circuit.24 The trend toward limitation, however, was
halted by the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte.24 ' The Court in Martinez-Fuerte held that routine traffic stops
for brief questioning at reasonably located permanent checkpoints need
not be based on "individualized suspicion"242 or authorized by war-
rant.243 Thus, the Court refused to extend the standard necessary to
justify a roving patrol unit stop for questioning at permanent check-
points.244
In 1977, the Ninth Circuit found the Oak Grove Border Station in
San Diego County to be a permanent checkpoint within the meaning of
Martinez-Fuerte.245 Although this checkpoint was not in constant op-
eration, it was clearly marked and in operation five days a week.246
Furthermore, Oak Grove was strategically located so as to ensure the
success of the other checkpoints.2 7 These characteristics were suffi-
cient to establish Oak Grove as "reasonably located [and] 'permanent'
.... ,24 Therefore, it appears that in at least a limited sense, the
Ninth Circuit may be willing to extend its definition of permanent
checkpoint to evade the Supreme Court restrictions on roving stops.
The trend in both the Supreme Court 4 9 and the Ninth Circuit2 ° has
239. See United States v. Gonzalez-Diaz, 528 F.2d 925 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 977 (1976); United States v. Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 977 (1976).
240. United States v. Avalos-Ochoa, 557 F.2d 1299, 1301 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
974 (1977); ("founded suspicion" and the "reasonable suspicion" of BrIgnoni-Ponce are es-
sentially the same) cf. United States v. Vasquez-Cazares, 563 F.2d 1329, 1331 (9th Cir. 1977)
(per curiam) (founded suspicion satisfies standard under Brignoni-Ponce).
241. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
242. Id. at 562.
243. Id. at 565.
244. In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court expressly noted that a vehicle may be stopped and its
occupants questioned based "largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry .... ." Id.
at 563. In Brignoni-Ponce, however, the Court held that roving-patrol stops based on the
factor of "Mexican descent," although a relevant factor, was not sufficient alone to supply
the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the stop. 422 U.S. at 885-87.
245. United States v. Vasquez-Guerrero, 554 F.2d 917, 920 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cer.
denied, 434 U.S. 865 (1977). For a description of various check point stations, see United
States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 409-15 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
246. 554 F.2d at 919.
247. Id. at 921.
248. Id.
249. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (Almeida-Sanchez not to be applied
retroactively).
250. See United States v. Torres-Rios, 534 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S.
[ ol. I I
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been to apply the border search cases prospectively. In United States v.
Escalante,251 the Ninth Circuit held that United States v. Ortiz
25 2
should not be applied retroactively. Thus, evidence seized at fixed
checkpoint searches that took place after the Supreme Court's decision
in lAmeida-Sanchez, but before the Ninth Circuit's holding that such
searches must be based on probable cause,253 need not be excluded.25 4
The court reasoned that the purpose of the exclusionary rule would not
be served by excluding such evidence because at the time "there was no
holding which gave law enforcement agencies adequate notice of the
unconstitutionality of fixed checkpoint searches conducted without
probable cause or consent."2 5
F Identfcations
That an accused has the right to the presence of counsel during post-
indictment lineups is well established. 56 Reasoning that the purpose
of this safeguard is to reveal prejudice which might otherwise go unno-
ticed at trial, the Ninth Circuit has, however, held that counsers pres-
ence is not essential at pre- or post-lineup conferences between a
witness and law enforcement personnel. 57
Further, the presence of counsel is not required during a photo-
graphic display identification.5 8 Such identifications, however, may
862 (1977) (deny retroactive treatment to Brignoni-Ponce); United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d
960, 975-81 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc), at'd, 422 U.S. 916 (1975) (Aimeida-Sanchez should
not be applied retroactively).
251. 554 F.2d 970 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 862 (1977).
252. 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
253. United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc), aft'd, 422 U.S.
916 (1975).
254. 554 F.2d at 973.
255. Id.
256. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
257. United States v. Parker, 549 F.2d 1217, 1223 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 971
(1977) (counsel's presence not required during post-lineup conversation); Doss v. United
States, 431 F.2d 601, 603-04 (9th Cir. 1970) (counsel unnecessary because "the ordinary
witness is capable of recalling and recounting conversations concerning the identity of a
suspect ... .
258. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (counsel unnecessary because of ability to
recreate photo spread and to confront witnesses at trial). The Ninth Circuit adopted this
view even prior to Ash. See, e.g. , United States v. Fowler, 439 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Williams, 436 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970). Cf. United States v. Higginbot-
ham, 539 F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1976) (although photo display lost and making reconstruction at
trial impossible, due process not necessarily violated; factors to consider are prosecutorial
good faith, importance of lost evidence, and sufficiency of other evidence at trial to sustain
conviction). See also United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971). But cf
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (whether prosecutorial suppression of evidence is
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be challenged as offensive to due process of law259 when the procedure
involved is "unnecessarily suggestive."260 Such a challenge requires
the court to examine the totality of the circumstances and to determine
whether the procedure used was conducive to "irreparable mistaken
identification '2 61 or created a "very substantial likelihood of irrepara-
ble misidentification." 262 In United States v. Lustlig,261 for example,
the witness-officer had observed the accused for thirty seconds to oneminute; the witness later selected the defendant's photograph from
among a group of five unidentified pictures. The Ninth Circuit failed
to find undue suggestiveness in this procedure.2 "
Also governed by the requirement of due process is the showup be-
tween witness and suspect. In United States v. Coades,265 for example,
the Ninth Circuit held that a showup at a bank shortly after a robbery
presented only a minimal possibility of mistaken identification. While
recognizing that a showup is more suggestive than a lineup because the
violative of due process depends not on prosecutorial good faith, but on whether suppression
in fact denies accused a fair trial).
259. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973). The due process requirement provides
protection for the accused in any identification situation when the presence of counsel is not
required.
260. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (bringing defendant to hospital to be
identified by critically injured witness not violative of due process).
261. Id. at 302.
262. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384-86 (1968) (photo display proper when
little suggestiveness in photos shown, need for their use great, and all witnesses positively
identified suspect). In evaluating the likelihood of misidentification, the Court stated in
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), that the inquiry should broadly focus on
the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness'
degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of
time between the crime and the confrontation.
Id. at 199 (Biggers held showup several months following crime proper when accused spoke
words similar to those spoken by criminal and witness identification positive). See, e.g.,
Greenfield v. Gunn, 556 F.2d 935 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 928 (1977) (showup at
emergency hospital proper when witness had previously identified accused at scene of crime
prior to arrival of police); United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150 (9th Cir.), ceri. dismissed,
414 U.S. 801 (1973) (where immediate action necessary to locate suspect and witnesses had
adequate opportunity to observe, photo display proper in which witnesses shown numerous
photos both before and after that of accused); McNeary v. Stone, 482 F.2d 804 (9th Cir.),
cer. denied, 414 U.S. 1071 (1973) (necessity for using particular procedure is to be stressed);
United States v. Gaines, 450 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 927 (1972)
(showup proper at bank 30 minutes following robbery).
263. 555 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045 (1978).
264. Id. at 749. See also United States v. Kimbrough, 528 F.2d 1242, 1243-47 (7th, Cir.
1976) (30 seconds viewing proper); United States v. Reid, 527 F.2d 380, 385 (2d Cir. 1975)
(10-15 seconds viewing sufficient).
265. 549 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1977).
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suspect is the only person to be viewed,266 the court concluded that the
return of the accused to the scene not only allows the witness to give a
fresh identification, but facilitates the quick release of innocent suspects
as well.
2 67
II. PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS
4. Grand Jury
Serving as a buffer between the accuser and the accused to ensure
that the ultimate charge is founded on reason, the function of the grand
jury is to inquire into crimes allegedly committed and to return an in-
dictment if warranted by the evidence.26
To ensure impartiality, the grand jury selection process must be free
from intentional discrimination against identifiable segments of the
community from which the juries are drawn.2 69  In federal grand jury
proceedings, the selection therefore must comply with the provisions of
the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968.270 The Act requires that
the grand jury be selected from a fair cross section of the community,
with no citizen being excluded because of race, color, religion, sex, na-
tional origin, or economic status.27
A problem, then, arises when a defendant claims that the grand jury
selection procedure did not utilize a fair cross section of the commu-
nity. The Ninth Circuit addressed this issue in the cases of United
States v. Potter 72 and United States v. Klefgen.273
In United States v. Potter, the defendant was convicted of importing
266. Id. at 1305.
267. Id. See also Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280, 1284 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 928 (1969) (although suggestive, on-the-scene identification not violative of due
process).
268. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) (because grand jury proceedings
not considered adversary in nature, scope of grand jury's inquiry is not to be narrowly re-
stricted). E.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
269. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 413 (1972) (defendant may not challenge
makeup ofjury merely because it contains no members of his race but must prove systematic
exclusion of his race). See generally Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208-09 (1965); Cassell
v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286-87 (1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1945); Ruthen-
berg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918). See also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266
(1973) in which the defendant, after pleading guilty to a charge of murder, challenged the
constitutionality of the grand jury selection. The Court held that the guilty plea constituted
a break in the chain of events which had preceded it in the criminal proceedings and that the
defendant could not, therefore, raise the claim of unconstitutionality.
270. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1874 (1976).
271. Id. §§ 1861, 1862.
272. 552 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1977).
273. 557 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1977).
1978]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
marijuana in violation of federal law.274 On appeal, he challenged the
district court's grand jury selection procedure contending that persons
between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four, persons with only a high
school education or less, and persons of black ancestry were under-
represented.275
Though 28 U.S.C. section 1867276 provides for a stay of proceedings
or dismissal of the indictment if there has been a substantial failure to
comply with the provisions of the Jury Selection Act of 1968, the Ninth
Circuit noted in Potter that the grand jury need not be a "statistical
mirror of the community. '277 "[Blefore the absence of a fair cross-
section is established and corrective measures are required, appellant
must establish a substantial deviation with respect to a cognizable
group. 27 8
The Ninth Circuit further recognizes that, as there is no precise defi-
nition of "cognizable group, ' 279 a static, fixed definition is undesir-
274. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(a)(1) (1976) (importation of narcotics).
275. The district court selected 7,436 names at random from voter registration lists as the
first step toward selecting a grand jury. Questionnaires were then mailed to 2,112 of these
individuals. The grand jury was selected from among the 1,449 questionnaires returned to
the clerk of the court. 552 F.2d at 903.
Defendant's expert presented figures compiled from an analysis of 311 questionnaires se-
lected at random from among those returned to the court. This analysis, together with
Census Bureau and Voter Registration statistics, indicated that: (1) whereas 41.2% of the
general adult population of the pertinent judicial division was between the ages of 18 and
34, persons between the ages of 18 and 34 comprised only 29.7% of the voter registration lists
and 28.6% of the random sample of the jury wheel; (2) 75.1% of the general adult population
had a high school education or less, while only 53.1% of the jury wheel sample had a high
school education or less; and (3) while blacks comprised 8.5% of the general population of
the district, they made up only 5.8% of the sample. Id.
276. 28 U.S.C. § 1867 (1976).
277. The court stated:
"There is no requirement that a grand jury be a statistical mirror of the community,
United States v. DiTommaso, 405 F.2d 385, 389 (4th Cir. 1968), or that it conform to the
proportionate strength of each indentifiable group in the total population, Simmons v.
United States, 406 F.2d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 1969)," United States v. Gast, 457 F.2d 141,
142 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 969, . . (1972), but "any substatntial deviations
must be corrected by use of supplemental sources." S. Rep. No. 981, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. at 17 (1967).
552 F.2d at 903.
278. Id.
279. The requirement of a cognizable group emanates from the language of Hernandez v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), where the Supreme Court held that the determination of a cog-
nizable group within a community is a question of fact. It must be demonstrated that the
laws, as applied, single out a distinct class for different treatment, not based on some reason-
able classification, thereby violating constitutional guarantees. Thus, systematic exclusion
based on economic, social, political, racial, religious or geographical grounds in the commu-
nity would violate the cross-section requirement. Id. at 478. See Thiel v. Southern Pacific
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able.28° Indeed, cognizability will vary with differences in the
composition of classes in geographically distinct communities.
281
"IT]he essence of the cognizability requirement is the need to delineate
an identifiable group which, in some objectively discernible and signifi-
cant way, is distinct from the rest of society, and whose interests cannot
be adequately represented by other members of the grand jury
panel. ' 282  Community attitudes and prejudices against a group are
therefore factors to be considered in determining the group's
cognizability.
283
Applying these concepts in Potter, the court concluded that with re-
spect to persons in the eighteen to thirty-four age group, the only com-
mon identifiable characteristic was that all members were between the
ages of eighteen and thirty-four.2 4 Such a characteristic provides no
reason to "arbitrarily single out a narrow group of 'young persons' as
opposed to 'middle aged' or 'old' persons for purposes of jury serv-
ice."
2 85
With respect to defendant's contention that blacks were substantially
underrepresented, the Ninth Circuit recognized race as a cognizable
factor286 but concluded that there was no substantial deviation in the
instant case.287 The meaning of "substantial" rests in the analysis of
Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). See also Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946)
(women may not be excluded from federal juries).
280. 552 F.2d at 903. For a thorough review of the cases, see the appendix to Judge
Goldberg's opinion for the Fifth Circuit in Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, 811-37 (5th Cir.
1975).
281. 552 F.2d at 903-04.
282. Id. at 904. See, e.g., United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 143-44 (S.D.N.Y.),
af'd, 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973) (18 to 21 year-olds have
no constitutional right to serve on juries; persons between the ages of 24-30 do not constitute
a cognizable group for jury selection purposes).
283. 552 F.2d at 904. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Robinson, 528 F.2d 1331, 1336 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 947 (1976) (attempt to include persons of better than average intelli-
gence on jury not proscribed by Constitution); Quadra v. Superior Court, 403 F. Supp. 486,
494-97 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (persistent underrepresentation of women and non-whites sufficient
to establish prima facie case of unconstitutionality).
284. 552 F.2d at 905. Numerous courts have reached similar conclusions. See United
States v. Olson, 473 F.2d 686 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 905 (1973) (18-20 not cogniza-
ble); United States v. Gast, 457 F.2d 141 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 969 (1972) (18-26
not cognizable); United States v. Kuhn, 441 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1971) (21-23 not cognizable);
United States v. Briggs, 366 F. Supp. 1356 (N.D. Fla. 1973) (21-29 not cognizable). But see
United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970) (21-34 cognizable).
285. 552 F.2d at 905. The less-educated, like the young, are a diverse group lacking
sufficient common characteristics or attitudes to set it apart from the rest of society. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 905-06.
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people and not percentages.1 8 The deviation in the Potter case, if cor-
rected, would have resulted in the addition of less than one black on a
grand jury of twenty-three. The deviation of 2.7% was therefore not
substantial.
289
Similarly, in United States v. Kleffgen2 9° the Ninth Circuit followed
its decision in Potter, holding that defendant failed to establish sub-
stantial deviation resulting in underrepresentation of a cognizable
group in the community.29'
After the grand jury is empaneled, the proceedings are usually con-
ducted by a United States Attorney. The appointment of a special
prosecutor to appear before the grand jury, however, has also been rec-
ognized as a proper procedure.2 92
Federal grand juries have the authority to call witnesses293 and com-
pel the production of documentary evidence.29 a The fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination applies only to individuals; it can-
not be utilized by, or on behalf of, any organization or corporate en-
tity.295 Thus, where an individual has the responsibility of carrying
out a corporation's obligations under a collective bargaining agree-
ment, and where such individual is acting as an agent of the corpora-
tion, records prepared by that individual for the corporation are
properly subject to subpoena by the grand jury. 96 The individual may
not assert the fifth amendment privilege against their production.
297
288. Id. See United States v. Armsbury, 408 F. Supp. 1130, 1138 (D. Ore. 1976).
289. Defendant maintained that 8.5% of the community population was black but only
5.8% of the jury wheel was black-a 2.7% disparity. The court pointed out that correction
of this deviation would add but one black per group of50jurors. A 4.3% disparity would be
required to result in the addition of one black to the average grand jury. The court there-
fore concluded that the 2.7% deviation was not substantial. 552 F.2d at 906.
290. 557 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1977).
291. Id. at 1297.
292. 28 U.S.C. § 515(a) (1976) allows for the special appointment of attorneys to conduct
any kind of legal proceeding which a United States Attorney may conduct. See United
States v. Crutchfield, 547 F.2d 496, 502 (9th Cir. 1977) (appointment of special prosecutor to
appear before grand jury not error); United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976) (government prosecutor properly before grand jury);
United States v. Zuber, 528 F.2d 981, 982 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) ("strike force" prose-
cutor appointed under § 515(a) is "attorney for the government" within meaning of FED. R.
CRaM. P. 6(d)).
293. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 571 (1976).
294. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75-76 (1906). While the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination does not protect corporate records, United States v. White, 322
U.S. 694, 699 (1944), the fourth amendment does extend to corporate entities and affords
protection from an unreasonably broad subpoena duces tecum.
295. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944).
296. In re Molina, 552 F.2d 898, 899-900 (9th Cir. 1977).
297. Id See also Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380-85 (1911) (president of cor-
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Similarly, a bank depositor does not have standing to enjoin the
bank from complying with or the government from enforcing a grand
jury's subpoena of bank records in an investigation of possible
crimes.2 9 Nor does a grand jury witness have a "supervisory-power"
right to an affidavit from the government that production of handwrit-
ing exemplars is relevant to an ongoing grand jury investigation.299
Finally, the government's failure to immediately notify the court,
counsel and grand jury that a government witness has committed per-
jury before the grand jury is not a denial of due process requiring dis-
missal of the indictment if the witness' testimony was immaterial and
was not relied upon by the grand jury in returning the indictment
against a defendant."°
poration required to produce corporate books containing copies of letters written by him as
president despite claim that letters were personally incriminating); United States v. Rodet-
sky, 535 F.2d 556, 568-69 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 820 (1976) (since patient records
of a professional corporation were not held by defendant physician individually, they were
not possessed as private property for purposes of self-incrimination privileges); Coson v.
United States, 533 F.2d 1119, 1120 (9th Cir. 1976) (corporate business records not protected
by fifth amendment from production before grand jury pursuant to subpoena); United
States v. Sourapas, 515 F.2d 295, 299 (9th Cir. 1975) (corporation has no fifth amendment
protection against self-incrimination and neither corporation nor officer can prevent produc-
tion of relevant corporate records). See generalo Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974)
(even small partnership has institutional identity; defendant held records in representative,
not individual, capacity).
298. United States v. Privitera, 549 F.2d 1317, 1318 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 930 (1977). See also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443-46 (1976) (no fourth
amendment interest in bank records).
299. In re Hergenroeder, 555 F.2d 686, 686 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). In Hergen-
roeder, defendant refused to produce a handwriting exemplar. The Ninth Circuit pointed
out that defendant had no fourth amendment right under United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19
(1973), nor fifth amendment right under United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), to so
refuse.
Defendant claimed a supervisory right to a government affidavit indicating the relevancy
of the exemplar to the grand jury investigation. Though such a proposition appears to be
supported by In re Schofield, 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973), the Ninth Circuit's approach to
grand jury supervision has been more narrow. See United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306,
1313 (9th Cir. 1977). Thus, the court held in Hergenroeder that the exculpatory affidavit
was unnecessary since it would not advance the administration of justice and would delay
grand jury investigations. See also In re Braughton, 520 F.2d 765, 766-67 (9th Cir. 1975)
(contempt order affirmed for defendant's refusal to provide handwriting exemplar for grand
jury).
300. United States v. Bracy, 566 F.2d 649, 654-56 (9th Cir. 1977) (witness' testimony was
so far removed from truth that it had nothing to do with return of indictment; furthermore,
extensive cross-examination resolved any doubt with respect to perjured testimony). See
United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 1974) (indictment dismissed because
based, in substantial part, on witness' perjured testimony).
On the issue of materiality with respect to prosecutor's duty to volunteer exculpatory mat-
ters to the defense, see United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-13(1976). See also United
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B. Indictments
1. Statute of Limitations
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution requires an
indictment by grand jury for all capital or otherwise infamous
crimes.3 01 This provision applies only to the federal government. A
state may therefore adopt the use of an information issued by a prose-
cutor as a form of accusation.0 2
An indictment must be returned within the time prescribed by the
applicable statute of limitations, 30 3 unless the prosecutor affirmatively
establishes that the subject of the indictment is a fugitive fleeing from
justice.3 4 Under 26 U.S.C. section 6531, when a federal income tax
violation action is instituted before a United States commissioner
within the statute of limitations, the time for returning an indictment is
extended an additional nine months from the date of filing the com-
plaint.3
0 5
In United States v. Towill, 3 6 for example, the defendant was sus-
pected of falsifying corporate tax returns. One day prior to the tolling
of the statute of limitations for the crime, with no indictment yet re-
turned, a complaint was filed against defendant before the I.R.S. com-
States v. Bowers, 534 F.2d 186, 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 942 (1976) (failure of
prosecutor to notify court of change in witness' testimony was harmless).
301. U.S. CONST. amend. V. An "infamous crime" has been held to be one which is
punishable by hard labor or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. FED. R. CRIM. P.
7. See United States v. Jordan, 508 F.2d 750, 753 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 842
(1975) (where offense not punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, fact that
defendant convicted of four counts and sentenced to consecutive terms totaling 15 months
does not convert offense into "infamous crime" for purposes of fifth amendment requisite of
indictment by grand jury).
302. Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 545 (1962).
303. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1976) provides that for most crimes, indictments must be returned
within five years after the offense was committed. When an indictment filed within the
prescribed time period is dismissed after the statute has been tolled, the Government may
refile within six months. Id. § 3288. If the first indictment, although properly filed, "runs
into legal pitfalls," then a second indictment may nevertheless be filed after the statute has
run so long as the same facts are alleged and a substantially similar offense is charged.
United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341, 354 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976)
(citing Mende v. United States, 282 F.2d 881, 883-84 (9th Cir. 1960), cerl. denied, 364 U.S.
933 (1961)).
304. 18 U.S.C. § 3290 (1976). See, eg., United States v. Wazney, 529 F.2d 1287, 1288-89
(9th Cir. 1976) (prosecutor must affirmatively prove that subject of indictment concealed
himself with intent to avoid arrest and prosecution in order to establish that subject is fugi-
tive fleeing from justice within meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3290).
305. 26 U.S.C. § 6531 (1976).
306. 548 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1977).
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missioner.0 7 Some time later, after the statute of limitations had
apparently run, an indictment was returned.
Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment. The government re-
sponded with an affidavit setting forth the following reasons for the
failure of the grand jury to return the indictment within the prescribed
time period: (1) the tax division of the Justice Department had author-
ized prosecution of defendant some six months prior to the tolling of
the statute; (2) but, the United States Attorney requested additional
consideration of the decision; (3) final authorization for prosecution
was not made until one day before the tolling of the statute at which
time the grand jury was not in session.308 Hence, the government filed
the complaint pursuant to 26 U.S.C. section 6531309 to preserve its
cause of action against the defendant.
The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss stating that
the purpose of section 6531 is to afford the government additional time
to indict a defendant where no grand jury is in session at the expiration
of the statute of limitations.31 ° Since the government had been author-
ized to indict defendant some six months prior to the tolling of the
statute, while the grand jury was still in session, the government had
had ample time to present its case to a grand jury. The delay in the
return of the indictment, according to the district court, was unjustified.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court's reasoning concluding
that the mere fact that a grand jury is empaneled does not preclude the
use of a section 6531 complaint.31 Only if the facts show that the
307. Id. at 1365.
308. Id. Furthermore, the government explained that it would be highly impractical to
summon a grand jury on two days notice prior to the tolling of the statute of limitations. Id.
309. See note 305 supra and accompanying text.
310. 548 F.2d at 1365.
311. Id. at 1366-67. The Ninth Circuit dismissed, as erroneous, the district court's con-
clusion that the § 6531 complaint procedures were unavailable to the prosecutor because the
government could have convened the grand jury prior to the tolling of the statute. Id. The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that the district court ignored the United States Attorney's practice
of giving the court clerk five days notice before summoning a grand jury. Id. The leading
case on this issue is Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214 (1965). The Ninth Circuit ex-
plained the Jaben holding as follows:
[B]ecause § 6531 is not intended to give the Government an automatic nine month
extension to make its case, the provision is available only "in the event that a grand jury
is not in session at the end of the normal limitation period... [and the Government]
cannot obtain an indictment because of the grand jury schedule." . . . The district
court's opinion [in Towill erroneously suggests that as long as a grand jury is empanel-
led, and regardless of its schedule, it is "in session" within the meaning of Jaben. A
close reading of Jaben convinces us that the Court meant to equate "session" with the
current "grand jury schedule," not with the theoretical possibility of summoning a
grand jury on short notice.
548 F.2d at 1366-67 (quoting Jaben v. United States, supra, at 219-20, 226). The Ninth
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government was dilatory in presenting its completed case to a grand
jury would a section 6531 complaint be precluded. 2
2. Sufficiency
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c) requires that an indictment
consist of a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essen-
tial facts comprising the offense charged.1 3  The language of the in-
dictment must apprise the defendant of the nature of the offense
alleged 3 4 and not operate so as to mislead the defendant. 5  In gen-
eral, an indictment is sufficient when it sets forth the offense in the
words of the statute itself, so long as the language clearly and unam-
biguously states all of the elements of the charged offense. 316
Circuit focused on the language of United States v. Smith, 371 F. Supp. 672 (M.D.N.C.
1973), wherein it was stated:
[W]hen a grand jury is not in actual session, the government may proceed by using the
tolling exception to the statute of limitations and have a complaint issued .... There
is no requirement that the government must call a special session of the grand jury
merely because a grand jury is available.
Id. at 674. See also United States v. Miller, 491 F.2d 638, 644-45 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 970 (1974) (mere fact that grand jury is sitting at time a complaint is issued does not
preclude activation of § 6531).
312. 548 F.2d at 1365, 1367. In the instant case, the facts clearly indicated that the gov-
ernment's case was not ready for presentation to the grand jury until two days prior to the
expiration of the statute. In the face of a sworn affidavit stating that the Government had
asked for reconsideration of the decision to prosecute, the district court was not justified in
finding that the case was ready for presentation to the grand jury six months prior to the end
of the statute. Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the indictment
because there existed no justifiable reasons for its finding. See, e.g., Campbell v. United
States, 373 U.S. 487, 493 (1963); United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81, 85 (9th Cir. 1962).
313. FED. IL CpmA. P. 7(c).
314. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763 (1962); United States v. Hamling, 481
F.2d 307, 312 (9th Cir. 1973), afjd, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974). See, e.g., United States v.
Charnay, 537 F.2d 341, 351-53 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976) (material mis-
representation adequately alleged where indictment described defendant's activities and
omissions; failure to allege specific intent to defraud in a separate count not fatal when
intent could be inferred from allegation of operation of scheme in deceitful manner).
315. United States v. Love, 535 F.2d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 847
(1976) (surplusage in indictment regarding requisite intent for mail fraud not misleading or
prejudicial where defendant represented by counsel chargeable with knowledge of intent
necessary to prove offense).
316. United States v. Anderson, 532 F.2d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839
(1976). See United States v. Chenaur, 552 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1976) in which defendant
alleged that the indictment, which closely followed the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. §
1006 (fraud against government institutions) was insufficient to adequately inform him of
the nature of the charges against him. The Ninth Circuit held the indictment to be sufficient
as it stated precise dates and amounts with respect to the fraudulent transactions. 552 F.2d
at 301. When an indictment is sufficient, it is within the trial court's discretion to decide
whether a bill of particulars is necessary. In Chenaur, there was no abuse of discretion in
denying defendant's motion for a bill of particulars. Id. at 302. See also Hamling v.
[Vol. I11
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Furthermore, the incorporation of counts by reference is permitted
by rule 7(c)(1) so long as the indictment, when read in its entirety, al-
leges the offense with precision. In United States v. Davison 317 the
Ninth Circuit held that an indictment which charged defendant with
felony murder without specifically charging him with robbery in a sep-
arate count was sufficient.31 Similarly, a count in an indictment is not
improper if it simply charges the commission of a single offense by dif-
ferent means. In United States v. Outpost Development Co., 319 the
Ninth Circuit held that when evidence in a mail fraud indictment is
sufficient with respect to a quoted fraudulent statement in each count,
conviction would be sustained despite the fact that multiple specific
acts have been alleged in each count.
3. Challenging the Indictment
Occasionally, the federal courts will dismiss indictments because of
the way in which the prosecution seeks and secures the charges from
the grand jury. 2 The rationale for such dismissals is to preserve judi-
United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117-18 (1972) (sufficiency of indictment defined); United States
v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483, 487 (1888) (language of statute may be used in the general sense so
long as accompanied by a statement of facts sufficient to inform accused of specific offense);
United States v. Camacho, 528 F.2d 464, 469 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 995 (1976)
(indictment which stated that object of conspiracy was that one or more of the conspirators
sold firearms not insufficient for failing to specifically state that defendant was charged with
selling); United States v. Markee, 425 F.2d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 847
(1970) (a distinction is to be drawn between an indictment which fails to state essential facts
and one which fails to state the theory upon which the facts will be proved).
317. 555 F. 2d 1376, 1377 (9th Cir. 1977).
318. Daton is distinguishable from United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483 (1888) and Or-
nelas v. United States, 236 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1956). In Ornelas, the indictment failed for
lack of allegations of premeditation or felonies in a first degree murder charge. 236 F.2d at
394. In Hess, the indictment was insufficient because it failed to state the particulars of the
crime charged. 124 U.S. at 488.
To avoid unnecessary repetition, one count may refer to matter in a previous count. See,
e.g., Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625, 633 (1896). See also United States v. Shavin, 287
F.2d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 1961); Wheeler v. United States, 77 F.2d 216, 218 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 295 U.S. 765 (1935).
319. 552 F.2d 868, 869-70 (9th Cir. 1977). See also United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d
128, 138-39 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972) (indictment charging four defendants
with interstate commerce violations without specifying each defendant's individual role in
the offense was duplicitous and not harmless error); United States v. Markee, 425 F.2d 1043,
1047 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 847 (1970) (court must distinguish between absence of
essential facts in an indictment and absence of the theory underlying prosecution).
320. See, ag., United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132, 1135-37 (2d Cir. 1972) (improper
use of hearsay evidence); United States v. Wells, 163 F. 313 (D. Idaho 1908) (prosecutor
entered grand jury room and offered opinion that accused was guilty before an indictment
was returned); United States v. Gallo, 394 F. Supp. 310, 315 (D. Conn. 1975) (prosecutor
had duty to inform second grand jury of hearsay quality of evidence).
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cial integrity and to prevent improper prosecutorial conduct.321  Tradi-
tionally, however, most courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have been
reluctant to dismiss indictments because of prosecutorial conduct. 22
The government's prosecutor has a duty to prosecute all offenses
against the United States.323 The power vested in the United States
Attorney under this principle gives him broad discretion in determining
which cases to file.3 24 However, reindictment of an accused for more
severe offenses subsequent to his exercise of a procedural right places a
heavy burden on the prosecution to show that the additional charges
are not vindictive in nature.3 s
Prosecutorial misconduct was found to have occurred in the case of
321. See United States v. Leibowitz, 420 F.2d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1969).
322. See United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825
(1977), in which the prosecutor read transcripts of sworn testimony instead of presenting live
witnesses. The court ruled that such conduct did not constitute fundamental unfairness to
defendant. Id. at 1311. See also Loraine v. United States, 396 F.2d 335, 339 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 933 (1968) (indictment not invalid merely because of Government's failure
to produce all evidence in its possession tending to undermine the credibility of witnesses
appearing before the grand jury); Laughlin v. United States, 385 F.2d 287, 292 (D.C. Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968) (indictment valid despite prosecutor's gratuitous
characterization of grand jury witness as a prostitute); United States v. Bruzgo, 373 F.2d 383,
387 (3d Cir. 1967) (indictment valid despite prosecutor's threats to grand jury witness).
323. 28 U.S.C. § 547(1) (1976).
324. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974); United States v. Alessio,
528 F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976).
325. United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir. 1976). The concept
of retaliatory prosecution was examined in the case of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711 (1969), where the Court held that due process prohibits a judge from increasing a sen-
tence in retaliation for defendant's exercise of his statutory right to challenge his original
conviction. Id. at 725. This principle was extended to prosecutorial vindictiveness in
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974).
In United States v. Thurnhuber, 572 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1977), the court noted that while
a defendant's motion for a mistrial is a procedural right for purposes of the Blackledge rule,
the mistrial which was declared in Thurnhuber was not granted in response to defendant's
motion. .d. at 1310. See United States v. Preciado-Gomez, 529 F.2d 935, 937-41 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 953 (1976). Rather, the court, on its own motion, had declared
the mistrial. 572 F.2d at 1310. Thus, since defendant did not attempt to assert any proce-
dural right, the prosecutor's addition of two counts to the indictment could not be character-
ized as a retaliatory response to an assertion of a procedural right by the defendant. ld.
The burden is on the defendant to show improper prosecutorial conduct. Id. at 1311.
See, eg., United States v. Oaks, 527 F.2d 937, 940 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 952
(1976) (defendant's burden to prove discriminatory prosecution). Accord, United States v.
Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 54 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925 (1976); United States v. Scott,
521 F.2d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976).
Similarly, a defendant's motion for dismissal of an indictment on no grounds other than
the "interest of justice" will be denied. United States v. Hall, 559 F.2d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978). See United States v. DeDiego, 511 F.2d 818, 824
(D.C. Cir. 1975) ("A trial judge has no discretion to end prosecutions unless there are legal
grounds for the exercise of discretion.").
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United States v. DeMarco,326 and the indictment was consequently dis-
missed. The defendants in DeMarco were charged as a result of an
investigation into the preparation of former President Nixon's tax re-
turns. They were granted a change of venue to the district of their
residence.327 The district court found that the prosecutor had told one
of the defendants that more counts would be added to the indictment if
he successfully exercised his right to change venue. Upon the district
court's granting of the motion to change venue, a new indictment with
an additional charge was returned against that defendant. The Ninth
Circuit, adopting the district court's reasoning, held that the trial
court's dismissal of the indictment was clearly warranted in light of the
government's action.32
The Ninth Circuit has further held that bad faith on the part of the
government in destroying or suppressing evidence prior to trial requires
dismissal of the indictment. In United States v. Hawk,329 the govern-
ment's intentional destruction of dynamite resulted in a due process
violation requiring dismissal of an indictment charging defendants
with three counts relating to the transportation of destructive de-
vices-despite the good faith on the part of the government.
4. Joinder of Offenses
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) provides that two or more
offenses may be charged in the same indictment if the offenses charged
are: (1) similar in character, or (2) based on the same act or transaction;
or (3) based on two or more acts or transactions arising out of a com-
mon plan or scheme.330  Accordingly, the government may have two
326. 550 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977).
327. Id. at 1226. The motion for change of venue was made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3237(b) (1976); FED. R. CRIM P. 21(b).
328. 550 F.2d at 1226-27. Upon defendant's successful motion, another indictment based
on facts substantially similar to those underlying the first indictment was returned. An
additional charge was included, the facts of which were known to the Government prior to
the returning of the first indictment. The district court found such action to be squarely
within the rule of Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974). See note 323 supra. The
government, on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, argued that Blackledge was not controlling in
that the second indictment was not based on facts identical to those of the first indictment.
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding the only difference to be that severance resulted from
defendant's exercise of his venue rights. 550 F.2d at 1226-27.
329. Nos. 76-1906, 76-2127 (9th Cir. July 26, 1977). See, e.g., United States v. Gerard,
491 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968).
330. FED. R. CRim. P. 8(a). United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1333-34 (9th Cir.
1977) (activities in applying for and illegally obtaining money from federally insured bank
for purpose of funding purchase of insurance business held to be part of a series of transac-
tions calculated to carry out a common plan). See United States v. Goldberg, 549 F.2d
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indictments outstanding against an accused at one time. Thus in
United States v. Holm,33" ' the government's use of the word "super-
seded" in a December indictment did not preclude the trial of defend-
ant on a November indictment.
Where a criminal statute provides an exclusive remedy for conduct
within the statute's coverage, the government's attempt to circumvent
that statute by indictment under another theory may result in reversal
of a conviction based upon that theory. In United States v. Snell,332
defendants' conduct fell within a bank robbery statute which provided
an exclusive remedy for conduct in violation of the statute. The gov-
ernment indicted defendants for attempted extortion rather than at-
tempted bank robbery, thereby exposing them to potential fines and
terms of confinement in excess of that provided for in the bank robbery
statute. Since defendants were exclusively chargeable under the bank
robbery statute, the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction for attempted
extortion.
5. Duplicity
A general verdict of guilty will not reveal the charge upon which the
jury finds a defendant guilty. An indictment is duplicitous when it
charges two or more distinct offenses in a single count thereby preclud-
ing the jury from convicting or acquitting the defendant on each sepa-
rate charge.333 In order for a defendant to reverse a conviction or
dismiss an indictment on the grounds of duplicity, substantial prejudice
must be shown. In United States v. Buck,334 defendant claimed that
the indictment was duplicitous in that it charged him with two separate
statutory violations for the same acts. Defendant was charged with
1334, 1335 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (government entitled to join in one indictment five
counts charging defendant with willful infringement of copyright and conversion of motion
pictures from interstate shipment).
331. 550 F.2d 568, 569 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 856 (1977). See also
Thompson v. United States, 202 F. 401, 404 (9th Cir. 1913).
332. 550 F.2d 515, 517-18 (9th Cir. 1977). Accord, United States v. Beck, 511 F.2d 997,
1000 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975).
333. See, ag., United States v. Hicks, 529 F.2d 841, 843 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cer.
denied, 429 U.S. 856 (1976) ("the spector of double jeopardy is raised by the jury's inability
to find the defendant innocent of one of the charges in the duplicitous count").
334. 548 F.2d 871, 876-77 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977).
The concept of duplicity should not be confused with the concept of multiplicity. A mul-
tiplicitous indictment is one which charges a single offense in various counts. This may
result in prejudice to a defendant if multiple sentences result from the single offense. See
United States v. Chrane, 529 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1976), wherein the Fifth Circuit
found that an indictment charging two counts of failure to ifie income tax returns and two
counts of failure to supply information to the I.R.S. was multiplicitous.
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furnishing false information in connection with the acquisition of am-
munitions in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 922(a)(6) and making a
false statement with respect to information required to be kept by a
licensed firearm dealer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 924. The
Ninth Circuit, in affirming the district court's conviction, noted that
section 924(a) creates an offense separate from section 922(a)(6). Fur-
thermore, even assuming that the charges were duplicitous, defendant
showed no prejudice since the district court's instructions emphasized
that each acquisition by defendant was a violation of two separate stat-
utes. Any error to defendant was harmless as the sentences imposed
by the court were concurrent.
6. Pre-Indictment Delay
The due process clause of the fifth amendment requires dismissal of
an indictment if a defendant establishes (1) that preindictment delay
has resulted in substantial prejudice to his right to a fair trial and (2)
that the delay was an intentional device designed to give the govern-
ment a tactical advantage over the defendant.335
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Seawell,336 recently held that
an unsupported claim that the memories of witnesses have dimmed as a
result of pre-indictment delay does not in itself constitute substantial
prejudice. "Mere speculation cannot serve as the grounds for a finding
of substantial prejudice." '337
The Ninth Circuit has not made it clear whether the elements of sub-
stantial prejudice and intentional delay by the government for an im-
proper purpose are to be applied conjunctively or disjunctively.3 8 In
335. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971) (construing U.S. CONST.
amend. V); United States v. Manning, 509 F.2d 1230, 1234 (9th Cir. 1974) (same); United
States v. Andros, 484 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Erickson, 472 F.2d 505,
507 (9th Cir. 1973) (same).
336. 550 F.2d 1159, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (six month delay).
337. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Finkelstein, 526 F.2d 517, 526 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 960 (1976); United States v. Griffin, 464 F.2d 1352, 1354-55 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1973).
338. In United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670, 675 n.7 (9th Cir. 1977), the court pointed out
that:
Some Ninth Circuit cases have stated the two elements in the disjunctive. E.g., United
States v. Sand, 541 F.2d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Manning, 509 F.2d
1230, 1234 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 ... (1975); United States v.
Erickson, 472 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1973). Others have stated that both elements
must be shown. United States v. Cordova, 532 F.2d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 1976); United
States v. ndros, 484 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Griin, 464 F.2d
1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 ... (1973). It is noted that in
none of the above cases was the prejudice found to be "actual" or "substantial."
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United States v. Mays,339 the court rejected both the disjunctive and
conjunctive interpretations and opted instead for an ad hoc balancing
approach as the best means to accommodate the fair administration of
justice.340 The factors the Ninth Circuit considered in applying the bal-
ancing approach were: (1) the existence of actual prejudice resulting
from the delay;341 (2) the length of the delay;342 and (3) the reason for
the delay.343  "The greater the length of the delay and the more sub-
stantial the actual prejudice to defendant becomes, the greater the rea-
sonableness and the necessity will have to be to balance out the
prejudice."
34
While the balancing approach speaks of only three factors, the Mays
court also stated that dismissal of an indictment because of delay must
be accompanied by some culpability on the government's part either in
the form of intentional misconduct or negligence. The facts of Mays
centered around defendant's alleged misapplication for bank funds.
The alleged offenses occurred in 1969, yet the indictments were not re-
turned until some four and one-half years later. It was found that re-
ports of the alleged offenses were made known to the FBI shortly after
their commission. The United States Attorney concluded that there
was not sufficient evidence to indict defendants, and a three year period
of governmental inactivity resulted. The investigation accelerated in
1973, and an indictment was filed in 1974. By this time three key wit-
nesses had died. Furthermore, the testimony of witnesses before the
grand jury suggested that memories had dimmed. The district court
found that the delay was unnecessary; that death of witnesses consti-
tuted actual prejudice; and that the dimming of memories contributed
to prejudice. The district court dismissed certain counts of the indict-
339. 549 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1977).
340. Id. at 677.
341. Id. at 677-78. Actual prejudice will inevitably be either the loss of witnesses and/or
physical evidence or the dimming of witnesses' memories. Id. at 672. The initial burden of
presenting evidence of prejudice is on the defendant. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin,
464 F.2d 1352, 1354-55 (9th Cir. 1972), cer. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1973) (burden on defend-
ant to show prosecutorial vindictiveness); United States v. Hauff, 395 F.2d 555, 557 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 843 (1968) (defendant failed to show that two-year pre-indict-
ment delay was prejudicial). "To establish actual prejudice sufficient to warrant a dismissal,
the defendant must show not only the loss of the witness and/or evidence but also [must]
...demonstrate how that loss is prejudicial to him." 549 F.2d at 677. This may be a
difficult showing for the defendant to make in light of the problems inherent in establishing
the nature of the testimony of a missing witness. Id. at n.12.
342. 549 F.2d at 678.
343. Id.
344. Id.
[Vol. I11
CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY
ment. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's treatment of
the case except for the final element regarding actual prejudice.
In reversing the district court's dismissal of the indictment, the Ninth
Circuit noted that while defendants described the general involvement
of the decedents in the case, they did not provide any information as to
the usefulness of the decedents' testimony to defendants' case. Self-
serving affidavits made by defendants in an attempt to show to which
facts decedents would have testified are speculative and are not suffi-
cient to show actual and substantial prejudice.
Similarly, while the record was replete with examples of the wit-
nesses' inability to remember certain aspects of key transactions, the
defendants failed to show how these witnesses would have testified had
their memories not been impaired. Because of such failure, no actual
prejudice was demonstrated. 5
C. Guilty Pleas
A defendant's guilty plea, as distinguished from an admission or an
extrajudicial confession, is itself considered a conviction.346 A plea of
guilty need be followed only by the court's entry of judgment and im-
position of sentence.347 A guilty plea also results in the waiver of such
constitutional rights as the privilege against self-incrimination,34 8 the
345. Judge Ely, in dissent, argued with respect to actual prejudice that
[t]he question for the trial Judge should not be whether the record, viewed in light of
independently proved testimony of now deceased witnesses, indicates that a defendant
is either guilty or innocent as charged. Rather, the inquiry should be whether that
determination can be made, ultimately, in a forum wherein the Judge has confidence
that the pertinent transaction can be reconstructed accurately.
Id. at 682. The test according to the dissent is not whether the independent evidence dem-
onstrates that the missing or impaired witness intended to exculpate the defendant, but
rather whether the "witness had a material bass upon which to provide significantly excul-
patory information." Id. See United States v. Barket, 530 F.2d 189, 196 (8th Cir. 1976)
(dismissal of indictment affrmed where missing witnesses might have been able to demon-
strate validity of transaction). Cf. United States v. Lovasco, 451 U.S. 785 (1977) (prosecu-
tion of defendant following delay caused by ongoing investigation does not constitute denial
of due process, even if defendant's case "somewhat prejudiced" by lapse of time); United
States v. Quinn, 540 F.2d 357, 361-63 (8th Cir. 1976) (dismissal of indictment not warranted
where missing informant clearly had no basis for providing information material to de-
fense).
With respect to the dimming of memories, see United States v. Clardy, 540 F.2d 439, 441-
42 (9th Cir. 1976) (five-month delay not prejudicial to defendant); United States v. Naftalin,
534 F.2d 770, 773 (8th Cir. 1976) (where recorded statements exist, memories of witnesses
not critical).
346. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
347. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
348. See United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
923 (1978) ("A voluntary guilty plea does not waive the right against self-incrimination for
1978]
LOYOL4 OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
right to trial by jury, and the right to confront accusers.34 9
The entering of a guilty plea must be preceded by procedures which
ensure that the defendant's waiver of his rights is voluntarily, intelli-
gently, and knowingly made" 0 with a full understanding of its conse-
quences.3 5'
In Bunker v. Wise,352 the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the principle pre-
all prior activities of the defendant; it waives the privilege only with respect to the crime
which is admitted. The defendant retains his privilege as to crimes for which he may still be
liable."). See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 503 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1113 (1975); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1209-10 (1st Cir. 1973);
United States v. Romero, 249 F.2d 371, 375 (2d Cir. 1957); Burbey v. Burke, 295 F. Supp.
1045, 1049 (E.D. Wis. 1969). In Pierce, the court rejected the Government's argument that
the defendant, simply by accepting probation conditions which required him to disclose
certain financial information, waived his fifth amendment privilege with regard to such con-
ditions. 561 F.2d at 739. Cf. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 262-66
(9th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (search of defendant's home pursuant to a federal probation condi-
tion that defendant submit to search of his person or property at any time held invalid).
349. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969). Nevertheless, in Moroyoqui v.
United States, 570 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1651 (1978), the Ninth
Circuit stated that a defendant does not waive the right to raise the double jeopardy issue on
appeal by entering a guilty plea. Id. at 864.
See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63 (1975) (per curiam) (guilty plea "does not
waive a claim that-judged on its face-the charge is one which the State may not constitu-
tionally prosecute."). See also United States v. O'Donnell, 539 F.2d 1233, 1236-37 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960 (1976) (Constitution protects accused from convictions by
trial but not from convictions by way of guilty plea).
350. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). Note, however, that there seems to be
a discrepancy between the Ninth Circuit decisions and FED. R. CruM. P. 11. While the
Ninth Circuit has held that no formal procedure is required in explaining to an accused that
he waives rights by pleading guilty (so long as the record demonstrates that he did so volun-
tarily and knowingly), rule 11 now requires that the judge specifically inform the accused of
the rights he waives prior to the court's acceptance of the plea. Compare Fruchtman v.
Kenton, 531 F.2d 946, 948 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 895 (1976) (court's failure to
specifically advise accused that guilty plea constituted waiver of rights to confrontation and
compulsory process not violative of rule 11) and Wilkins v. Erickson, 505 F.2d 761,763 (9th
Cir. 1974) (Boykin does not require specific articulation of these rights in state proceeding)
with FED. R. Cimt. P. 1(c). But see McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 463-64
(1969) (district courts must strictly comply with rule 11). The Ninth Circuit has concluded
that strict compliance with rule 11 does not require adherence to formal procedures.
Fructman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d at 947-48.
351. See Arndell v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, 549 F.2d 1284, 1285-86 (9th Cir. 1977)
(on writ of habeas corpus, district court properly reviewed transcript of all state proceedings
and justifiably concluded that guilty plea voluntarily made with full understanding of its
consequences and that no promises of probation were made). See also Dyer v. Wilson, 446
F.2d 900, 901 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (federal court may rely upon state court's findings
in habeas corpus petition only after independent review has been made of transcript of the
state hearing); FED. R. CRAM. P. ll(cXl) (court must advise defendant of mandatory mini-
mum penalty provided by law and any maximum possible penalty).
352. 550 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1977).
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viously established in United States v. Harris"'3 that when a guilty plea
is taken, rule 11 requires that defendant be advised that a mandatory
special parole term will be appended to the sentence.35 4 The critical
issue in Bunker was whether the principle should be given retroactive
effect.3
55
The first step in determining retroactive application of a principle is
to establish whether a new rule has been announced. 5 6 If a new rule
is established, then the propriety of retroactivity must be tested under
the traditional three-pronged analysis.357 If no new rule is established,
then "no such testing is necessary as, by definition, without a new rule
there is no change in the law and the question of retroactivity is imma-
terial."
358
The Bunker court's examination of the Harris principle revealed that
prior decisions had foreshadowed the results in Harris and had, thus,
minimized the novelty of the principle. 5 9
353. 534 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1976).
354. Id. at 141-42. In Bunker, the district court judge failed to mention that a finding of
guilt under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (conspiracy to distribute heroin and cocaine) carried with it a
three-year special parole term. Arguing that he was a drug addict who, if placed on special
parole, would return to drugs and crime, defendant claimed that he would have preferred
confinement rather than the special parole and would not have pled guilty had he known of
the special parole term. Concluding that defendant had been prejudiced by the court's
failure to mention the special parole term, the Ninth Circuit, applying Harris, stated that
rule II requires the court to advise a defendant of such a special parole term. 550 F.2d
1155, 1156 (9th Cir. 1977).
355. Id. at 1157. The guilty plea entered by defendant in Bunker was made prior to the
Harris decision and the amendment to rule 11.
356. United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960, 975 (9th Cir. 1974), a f'don other grounds, 422
U.S. 916 (1975). See also Bracco v. Reed, 540 F.2d 1019, 1020 (9th Cir. 1976) (to constitute
new rule, decision must either overrule clear past precedent or disrupt long accepted, widely
recognized practice).
357. The analysis has evolved from a line of cases beginning with Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618 (1965). The test requires an analysis of: (1) the purpose of the new rule; (2) the
extent of reliance upon the old rule; and (3) the effect retroactive application would have
upon the administration ofjustice. Id. at 629. See, e.g., Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 51
(1973); Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 832 (1969).
358. United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960, 975 (9th Cir. 1974).
359. 550 F.2d at 1157. The court's analysis of the precedents dealing with voluntariness
and consequences of pleas reveals the evolution of the Ninth Circuit's opinion on the sub-
ject:
Four years before Bunker entered his plea, the Court in McCarthy v. United States, 394
U.S. 459 (1969) ... .held that no guilty plea is proper without strict adherence to the
procedures and language of Rule 11 in "determining that the plea is made voluntarily
with understanding of. . .the consequences of the plea. . ....
Moreover, prior decisions of this circuit made clear the need to advise Bunker of the
mandatory special parole term as a direct, and not a collateral, consequence of the plea.
[A defendant must be informed of all direct consequences of his plea, but need not
necessarily be informed of collateral consequences. Collateral consequences include
civil proceedings leading to commitment, loss of good time credit, loss of the right to
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Thus, since Harris and Bunker represented logical extensions of
prior decisions, they required no retroactivity analysis.360  The court in
Bunker noted the Second Circuit's decision in Ferguson v. United
States36' where, under identical circumstances, the court decided not to
limit the rule 11 extension to prospective application.362  Thus, in
Bunker, the court reversed the conviction allowing defendant to plead
anew, holding that Harris should not be limited to prospective applica-
tion because that decision "merely applied an existing rule, and not a
new one, to a variant fact situation." 363 Therefore, while a defendant
need not be informed of all conceivable consequences "such as when
he may be considered for parole or that, if he violates his parole, he will
again be imprisoned,"364 the nature and operation of mandatory spe-
travel abroad, loss of the right to vote, possibility of dishonorable discharge from the
armed services. See Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946,948-49 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 895 (1976). Most recently, the Ninth Circuit in Sanchez v. United States, 572
F.2d 210, 211 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), held that revocation of parole is a collateral
rather than a direct consequence of a guilty plea. See also Michel v. United States, 507
F.2d 461,465 (2d Cir. 1974) (potential deportation of an alien defendant was deemed a
collateral consequence).]
One year later we held that, where the maximum penalty was less than six years and
the defendant entering the plea was eligible for sentencing under the Federal Youth
Corrections Act, he must be advised of this fact and the terms that attached to such a
sentence, Freeman . United States, 350 F.2d 940, 942 (9th Cir. 1965).
In Combs v. United States, 391 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1968), we held that Rule 11 re-
quired that a defendant be informed of the maximum allowable sentence he could re-
ceive.
Three years later in United States v. Myers, 451 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1972), a plea under
Rule I I was held invalid because the defendant was not aware that any sentence the
federal court might impose would not begin until he was received in federal custody.
In so holding, the panel reviewed previous cases in our circuit and concluded: "that any
factor that necessarily affects the maximum term of imprisonment is a consequence of
the plea within the meaning of Rule 11." Id. at 404.
The same year, we recognized that Rule 11 was violated when the court failed to
inform the defendant of the range of allowable punishments to which the plea subjected
550 F.2d at 1157-58 (footnotes omitted).
360. 550 F.2d at 1157.
361. 513 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1975), cited in Bunker, 550 F.2d at 1158.
362. Id. at 1012-13. Quoting Ferguson, the Bunker court stated:
[D]efendants who plead guilty to charges under the Drug Control Act must be informed
of the mandatory term of special parole at the taking of the plea. . . . "[This principle]
does not reach the threshhold of novelty which must be crossed before one enters upon
the now familiar tripartite retroactivity analysis. . . . Retroactivity analysis is appropri-
ate for cases departing radically from precedent. . . or announcing new rules which
conflict with well-established prior practice.. . . But it is irrelevant to that application
of well-established principles to varying fact situations which represents the bulk of
judicial decision-making."
550 F.2d at 1158 (quoting Ferguson v. United States, 513 F.2d 1011, 1012-13 (2d Cir. 1975)).
363. 550 F.2d at 1159.
364. Id. at 1158. See Roberts v. United States, 491 F.2d 1236, 1237-38 (3d Cir. 1974)
(mandatory special parole term is a direct consequence of the plea).
1978] CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY
cial parole terms under the Drug Control Act are direct consequences
of the plea and, thus, must be disclosed to the defendant.
D. Disco very
Discovery motions or subpoenas for pre-trial, pre-indictment, and
pre-arraignment discovery require notice and hearing or opportunity to
respond in writing. 6 A defendant will not be allowed to embark
upon discovery "fishing expeditions." '366 Thus in United States v.
Spagnuolo,367 the Ninth Circuit held that a trial court properly denied
a defendant's discovery motion where no evidence existed to support
365. United States v. Castaneda, 571 F.2d 444, 448 (9th Cir. 1977) (Interim Report).
366. Ogden v. United States, 303 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1962). See FED. R. CRAM. P.
16(a)(1), (2).
367. United States v. Spagnuolo, 549 F.2d 705,712-13 (9th Cir. 1977). In Brady v. Mary-
land, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), however, the Supreme Court held that due process is denied where
a prosecutor fails, following defendant's request, to disclose evidence favorable to the de-
fense. Id. at 87. See also United States v. Palmer, 536 F.2d 1278, 1280-81 (9th Cir. 1976)
(no due process violation where information sought not exculpatory).
Tempering Brady is the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976), which precludes discovery of
statements made by government witnesses until the witnesses have testified on direct exami-
nation. The Jencks Act grew out of Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668-72 (1957), in
which the Supreme Court held that after a prosecution witness has testified at trial, any
previous statement made by the witness relating to his testimony shall be turned over to
defendant for his inspection and use in cross-examination or impeachment of the witness.
See also Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 870-71 (1966), where the Court commented
upon
the growing realization that disclosure, rather than suppression, of relevant materials
ordinarily promotes the proper administration of criminal justice. This realization is
reflected in the enactment of the so-called Jencks Act,. . . responding to this Court's
decision in.. . [Jencks]. . . which makes available to the defense a trial witness' pre-
trial statements insofar as they relate to his trial testimony.
See United States v. Hickok, 481 F.2d 377, 380 (9th Cir. 1973) (constitutional validity of the
Jencks Act upheld); United States v. Wood, 550 F.2d 435, 440 (9th Cir. 1976) (denial of
discovery of notes of interview between Government witness and United States Attorney
proper where material sought did not relate to subject of direct examination); United States
v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir. 1976) (Jencks Act violated where law enforcement
agents destroyed notes taken during interview with potential witnesses); United States v.
Carrasco, 537 F.2d 372, 376 (9th Cir. 1976) (police may not destroy notes given to them by
informant where notes constitute "statement" within meaning of Jencks Act).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17 allows a defendant who cannot pay fees for witnesses the right of
compulsory process to obtain favorable witnesses at government expense upon a showing
that the witness is necessary to an adequate defense. Id. at 17(b). Although actual pres-
ence may be preferable to stipulation, defendant must show that actual presence is necessary
to an adequate defense where the testimony would be received without cross-examination.
United States v. Martin, 567 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1977). In Martin, the Ninth Circuit stated,
"A motion to have a witness produced is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court,
and an indigent defendant has no absolute right to subpoena all witnesses at Government
expense." Id. at 852. See, ag., United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir.
1973).
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the defendant's contention that F.B.I. investigative files would reveal a
taint that would support a fruit of the poisonous tree argument.
Granting discovery motions is within the trial court's discretion.368
When a defendant's discovery request is nonspecific, the government's
duty to respond "must derive from the obviously exculpatory character
of the certain evidence in the hands of the prosecutor." 369 When a
general request is made, the proper standard of materiality370 is
whether the sought after evidence would create a reasonable doubt. In
United States v. Lasky,371 defendant requested Brady material; how-
ever, the Ninth Circuit, in Lasky, found the record to show that any
further evidence sought by defendant to attack a witness' credibility
would not create a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. The
record clearly revealed that other testimony, standing alone, estab-
lished defendant's guilt.
When a discovery motion is denied, a clear showing of prejudice to
the defendant is required to warrant reversal by the appellate court.372
368. See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 532 F.2d 1279, 1284-85 (9th Cir. 1976).
369. United States v. Augurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976).
370. When a defendant makes a request for information, he must show that the request is
material to the preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable. See, e.g.,
United States v. Clardy, 540 F.2d 439, 442 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 963 (1976);
United States v. Marshall, 532 F.2d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 1976). "Materiality" refers to evi-
dence that would allow a defendant to substantially alter the quantum of proof in his favor.
532 F.2d at 1285. "Reasonableness" requires that the request be specific and not overly
burdensome on the government. Id.
371. 548 F.2d 835, 840 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 821 (1977).
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), held that a prosecutor must disclose, at defend-
ant's request, evidence favorable to the defense. See note 367 supra. Such evidence may
include all information regarding police records, arrests, convictions, and deals, promises, or
communications with government witnesses regarding possible benefits they may receive or
have received for testifying on the Government's behalf. See also Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972). Accord, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976).
372. See United States v. Fulton, 549 F.2d 1325, 1328-29 (9th Cir. 1977), in which hand-
written notes differed from witness' testimony. These notes were not supplied to defendant
until it was time for cross-examination by the defense. Defendant, however, failed to show
any prejudice. Similarly, defendant failed to show that late delivery of grand jury testi-
mony resulted in prejudice. However, the trial court, under Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 16(d)(2), has broad discretion in handling discovery requests. Thus, it was proper in
Fulton to recess the trial to allow the defense time to prepare its cross-examination. This
was necessary in light of a witness' late revelation of unrecorded statements made by the
defendant to the witness subsequent to defendant's arrest, and the prosecution's representa-
tion that it had just become aware of these unrecorded statements. There was, therefore, no
abuse of discretion by the trial court. Finally, the defendant's contention that the prosecu-
tion intentionally withheld unrecorded statements to use for subsequent impeachment with-
out factual support. Id. See United States v. Garcia, 555 F.2d 708, 710 (9th Cir. 1977)
(government's failure to provide discovery of one piece of paper not prejudicial error where
defense given time to view the paper subsequent to discovery of the oversight); United States
v. Hendrix, 549 F.2d 1225, 1230 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818 (1977) (refusal of de-
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Thus, even when the trial court unjustifiably denies a discovery request,
such a denial will not be reversed absent a clear showing of
prejudice.
373
Such a showing of prejudice was made by the defendant in United
States v. ]Roybal.374 In that case, the defendant sought the disclosure
of information which the government intended to elicit from its in-
formant witnesses. Although the prosecution learned the subject mat-
ter of the informant's testimony one month prior to trial, it made no
effort to disclose the information. Instead, the prosecution, without
warning the defendant, waited until trial to produce the testimony.
The Ninth Circuit held such action to be a violation of the discovery
order resulting in serious prejudice to the defendant. 375  " hile the
evidence in question does not come within the rule of Brady v.
Maryland. . . , as it is not an exculpatory statement, and it is not a
statement under the Jencks Act . . . , its introduction under circum-
stances such as these is a matter that we cannot ignore. '376  The
Roybal decision indicates the Ninth Circuit's willingness to reverse a
conviction in cases of patent disregard of fair discovery procedures.
In affirming the trial court's dismissal of an indictment, the Ninth
fendant's discovery request of "subsequent similar act" to mitigate specific intent was not
error. "The probative value of the proffered evidence was at best minimal; the danger of
confusion of the issues and undue waste of time was great."); United States v. Lewis, 511
F.2d 798, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (error for prosecutor to refer to defendant's statement that he
was addicted to drugs at the time of his arrest because statement impeached defendant's
credibility and undermined a significant element of his defense).
373. In United States v. Brown, 562 F.2d 1144, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 1977), defendant moved
for discovery of Bureau of Prison records claiming access under the Freedom of Information
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976) (FOIA). Defendant's request was made pursuant to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(C) rather than the procedure provided for by the Bu-
reau of Prisons. The district court denied the motion on the grounds that the FOIA was not
applicable to criminal trial discovery. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, noting that to require a
defendant to engage in a separate civil action for disclosure under the FOIA would be need-
lessly burdensome and time consuming. Judicial economy, therefore, mandated that the
district court hear and rule upon the claim under the FOIA. 562 F.2d at 1151-52. See, e.g.,
United States v. Wahlin, 384 F. Supp. 43, 47 (W.D. Wis. 1974). Upon concluding that the
records should have been produced, the Ninth Circuit found that defendant had made no
showing of prejudice. Thus, the district court's error was harmless. 562 F.2d at 1152.
374. 566 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1977).
375. Id. at 1110. The court pointed out that the surprise testimony was used to implicate
defendant in a narcotics sale that was not the subject of the indictment. "Without this
evidence the jury would only have heard that [the defendant] had been seen in the company
of other codefendants, that he had been using narcotics, and that he had made statements
that might be construed as indicating that he was aware of the codefendants' trafficking."
id.
376. Id. at 1111 (citations omitted).
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Circuit in United States v. Hawk377 held that prejudice to a defendant is
presumed upon the government's intentional destruction of evi-
dence.378 Concluding that the destruction of potentially relevant evi-
dence was constitutionally offensive, the Ninth Circuit observed that
[g]overnmental participation in withholding, destroying, or causing the
loss of evidence in a criminal case always has due process implications.
The extent of the due process violation ... involves consideration of a
number of subjective and objective factors, including the deliberateness of
the governmental conduct, the good or bad faith of the governmental
agent, and the importance of the evidence to the defense of the case.
379
The intentional destruction of evidence by the government results in
a due process violation even without any showing by a defendant that
the challenged evidence would have helped his defense. 380  While the
government's bad faith will result in automatic reversal of a criminal
conviction, or dismissal of an indictment,381 the prosecution's good
faith does not preclude a due process violation.8 2
Discovery is also controlled by the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person
...shall be compelled.., to be a witness against himself. '383 Com-
pelled production of documents falls within the scope of the privilege
against self-incrimination. 384  The Ninth Circuit has traditionally ap-
377. Nos. 76-1906, 76-2127 (9th Cir. July 26, 1977).
378. Id., slip op. at 1694-95. Defendants were charged with various counts relating to
possession and transportation of dynamite. The majority found federal government partici-
pation in all stages of the search and destruction activities. Id., slip op. at 1693.
379. Nos. 76-1906,76-2127, slip op. at 1694 & n.10. See also Comment, JudicialResponse
to GovernmentalLoss or Destruction ofEvidence, 39 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 542,563-65 (1972). See
generally Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in
Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. Rnv. 713, 829, 841-48 (1976).
380. Nos. 76-1906, 76-2127, slip op. at 1694-95. See, eg., United States v. Tsutagawa,
500 F.2d 420, 423 (9th Cir. 1974) (deporting alien witnesses without giving defendant oppor-
tunity to interview them constituted a denial of due process); accord, United States v. Men-
dez-Rodriguez, 450 F.2d 1,5(9th Cir. 1971). The Hawk court viewed the destruction of the
evidence which formed the substantial foundation of the charges as presumptively prejudi-
cial. "A presumption of prejudice in favor of appellees is the only means available to pro-
tect them from the unfairness that inheres in the Government's unilateral choice in placing
that evidence completely beyond the appellees' and the court's reach." No. 76-1906, slip op.
at 1696. Cf. id., slip op. at 1702-03 (Trask, J., dissenting) (a case-by-case examination for
prejudice is the established practice of this circuit). For cases which lend support to Judge
Trask's position, see United States v. Heiden, 508 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Sewar, 468 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973).
381. See United States v. Gerard, 491 F.2d 1300, 1306-07 (9th Cir. 1974) (prosecutorial
vindictiveness requires dismissal of indictment). See also United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d
138 (2d Cir. 1968).
382. United States v. Tsutagawa, 500 F.2d 420, 422 (9th Cir. 1974).
383. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
384. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886) (production of an invoice on goods
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plied this principle to cases involving the production of tax records.38 5
It is thus within the scope of the fifth amendment protection against
self-incrimination for a defendant to refuse to produce his books and
records during an Internal Revenue Service criminal investigation.
38 6
The deposition is a useful pretrial discovery technique as it allows for
oral examination and cross-examination of the deponent, thereby per-
mitting counsel to exact precise evidence and information in prepara-
tion for trial. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15(f) governs
objections to deposition testimony and requires that the grounds for an
objection be stated at the time the deposition is taken.38 7 Unjustified
absence by a defendant from the deposition may constitute a waiver of
all objections to the taking and later use of the deposition.
388
belonging to defendants could not be compelled under the fifth amendment proscription
against self-incrimination).
385. See, eg., United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 471-72 (9th Cir. 1967) (where tax
records are prepared by an accountant from information supplied by the taxpayer, fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination is applicable). See also Garner v. United
States, 501 F.2d 228, 236 (9th Cir. 1972), aft'd, 424 U.S. 648 (1976) (defendant should claim
his fifth amendment rights prior to filing his tax returns); United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d
460, 464-65 (9th Cir. 1963) (attorney who had retained client's tax records had right to in-
voke fifth amendment privilege on client's behalf).
386. United States v. Helina, 549 F.2d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1977). Although the Ninth
Circuit adopts this principle, the court notes that two recent Supreme Court decisions may
intimate a different result. Id. at 716 n.3. In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976),
the Court held that an attorney's production of his client's tax records pursuant to a lawful
summons did not violate the client's fifth amendment privilege. Id. at 396-401. The ration-
ale is that enforcement of the summons against the attorney does not have the effect of
compelling any action on the part of the client. 549 F.2d at 716 n.3.
Similarly, in Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), the Court held that the search
and seizure of an individual's business records and their subsequent introduction into evi-
dence did not violate the individual's fifth amendment privilege. Id. at 470-77.
The Ninth Circuit, however, distinguished Helina from the Supreme Court decisions that
"[a] party is privileged from producing the evidence but not from its production." 549 F.2d
at 716 n.3. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913). For further treat-
ment of this issue, see Garner v. United States, 501 F.2d 228, 236 (9th Cir. 1972), art'd, 424
U.S. 648 (1976) (defendant should claim fifth amendment privilege prior to filing tax re-
turn); Smith v. United States, 236 F.2d 260, 265-66 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 909
(1956) (in prosecution for tax evasion, Government allowed to produce tax records of part-
nership of which defendant was a partner); Beard v. United States, 222 F.2d 84, 91 (4th
Cir.), cer. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955) (bank records prepared by defendant bookkeeper for
corporation admissible against defendant); United States v. Mousley, 210 F. Supp. 510, 512
(E.D. Pa. 1962), afrdmem, 311 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1963) (failure of taxpayer to furnish
records is a proper subject of comment by trial court).
In Helina, the appeal focused upon certain prosecutorial comments concerning defend-
anes invocation of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination by refusing to
produce his tax records.
387. FED. R. CriM. P. 15(f).
388. 18 U.S.C. § 3503(b) (1976). See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (Court
defines waiver as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privi-
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. Right to Jury Trial
An individual charged with an offense has a constitutional right to
trial by an impartial jury.389 Despite the all-inclusive language of the
Constitution, it has been held that a person accused of a petty offense
has no such right to a jury trial.3"'
It has been consistently held that an offense is petty when the impris-
onment authorized by law does not exceed six months.3 91 The Ninth
Circuit has extended this principle by adopting the position of a federal
statute which defines petty offenses as those which carry a punishment
of imprisonment for no more than six months or a fine of not more
than $500.00 or both.39 2 Thus, a defendant is entitled to a jury trial
lege"). The Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 843-44, 846-47
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 855 (1977), discussed the scope of § 3503(b), and con-
cluded that since objections under the confrontation clause are dependent upon the right to
be present, defendant had waived objections to the taking and use of testimony. Id. at 843-
44. However, the court further noted that a § 3503(b) waiver may not be broad enough to
procedurally eliminate all other objections. Id. at 847.
In United States v. Kearney, 560 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1977), defendant contended that the
district court erred in failing to entertain objections at trial regarding the admissibility of
portions of a videotape deposition taken after defendant had left the country. The Ninth
Circuit stated that were it shown that the district court gave clear notice that objections must
be made during the deposition, failure to so object might constitute a waiver. Id. at 1364.
The court in Kearney decided that even if the objection should have been allowed, any error
was patently harmless in view of substantial evidence against defendant. Id. See, e.g.,
United States v. Miller, 508 F.2d 444,450-51 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. King, 472 F.2d
1, 5 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
389. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See, eg., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72-74 (1970)
(right to jury trial extends to all individuals charged with an offense that carries potential
imprisonment in excess of six months). See generally Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,
349-63 (1966) (pretrial publicity denied defendant fair trial); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,
721-22 (1961) (publicity that intimated that defendant had confessed to offense denied de-
fendant fair trial).
390. Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148-152 (1969); Cheffv. Schnackenberger, 384
U.S. 373, 379 (1966) (plurality opinion). In United States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276 (9th
Cir. 1977) (per curiam), the court noted that, although the sixth amendment states that an
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, at the time the
amendment was adopted, the common law practice in England and the Colonies was to try
persons accused of certain "petty offenses" without a jury. Id. at 278.
391. See, ag., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1970); Frank v. United States,
395 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968). Thus, if the
potential term of imprisonment is greater than six months, the offense becomes a minor
offense and the right to a jury trial inures to the defendant. See United States v. Marcyes,
557 F.2d 1361, 1366 (9th Cir. 1977) (where possible jail sentence greater than six months,
defendants permitted to have jury trial).
392. United States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276, 278 (9th Cir. 1977). See 18 U.S.C. § 1(3)
(1976). In Hamdan, the Ninth Circuit noted that while the United States Supreme Court
has declined to adopt the $500.00 maximum of§ 1(3) as an invariable criterion for determin-
ing those offenses triable without a jury, the Court has not stated that a fine can never be of
sufficient magnitude to require a jury trial. Id. at 279. See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S.
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where a finding of guilt would result in a fine of not more than
$1,000.00 or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both.393
The Ninth Circuit has further held that a defendant charged with a
minor, rather than a petty, offense must be specifically advised by the
magistrate of his right both to jury trial and to trial before a district
court judge.
394
Once a defendant exercises his right to a jury trial in federal court, he
is entitled to a jury of twelve persons.3 95 Rule 23(b) provides, however,
that at any time prior to the verdict, the parties may stipulate in writ-
ing, with court approval, that the jury shall be comprised of fewer than
twelve members.396 Once such a stipulation has been made, it may be
effectuated without any further consent by defendant.397
454, 475-77 (1975). The Ninth Circuit justified its adoption of § 1(3) by citing the need for
objective standards in the law. 552 F.2d at 279-80.
The dissenting opinion of Judge Wallace noted that the Supreme Court in Muniz declined
to grant a defendant labor union a jury trial in a criminal contempt proceeding for which
defendant was fined $10,000.00. Id. at 281. Wallace pointed to the difference in severity
between a fine in excess of $500.00 and imprisonment in excess of six months and concluded
that in determining whether a defendant has a constitutional right to a jury, the seriousness
of the potential punishment must be ascertained. Only a potential fine which constitutes a
serious deprivation of liberty triggers the right to a jury trial. Id. at 282. The reasoning of
the majority, argued Wallace, established a rigid standard inconsistent with Muniz. Id.
The majority, however, argued that the fine imposed on the union in Muniz amounted to
a penalty of about $.75 per member. Id. at 279. "It is not unrealistic to treat any fine in
excess of $500.00 as a serious matter to all individuals. . . ." Id. at 280. "Nothing in...
[Muniz] suggests that a jury trial would not have been required if the fine imposed had had
the impact of the $500.00 fine upon each of the 13,000 individuals who were members of the
union." Id. See generally Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 (1972) (Powell, J., con-
curring) (deprivation of property can have serious impact on individual); Tate v. Short, 401
U.S. 395, 399 (1971) (a'non-indigent who refuses to pay a fine can be imprisoned); United
States v. Goeltz, 513 F.2d 193, 195-96 (10th Cir. 1975) (definition of petty offense).
393. 552 F.2d at 280. See also United States v. Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1977)
(jury trial allowed for possible jail sentence exceeding 6 months).
394. United States v. Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361, 1368 (9th Cir. 1977). In Marcyes, defend-
ant was charged with possession of dangerous fireworks. The offense carried a punishment
of imprisonment in excess of six months. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b)(1976), the magistrate
is required to inform the defendant charged with a minor offense that he, the defendant, has
the right to both a trial before the district court judge and to a trial by jury. In Marcyes, no
mention was made of defendant's right to a jury, thus reversal of defendant's conviction was
necessary. Id. at 1368. See United States v. Miller, 468 F.2d 1041, 1043-44 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 935 (1973) (literal compliance with § 3401(b) is required).
395. FED. R. CIuM. P. 23(b).
396. Id.
397. United States v. Stolarz, 550 F.2d 488, 493 (9th Cir. 1977) (where pretrial stipulation
specified that deliberation would proceed in the event one juror became disabled, rule 23(b)
did not require defendant's consent when stipulation put into effect). See United States v.
Smith, 523 F.2d 788, 791 (5th Cir. 1975), cer. denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976) (signed stipula-
tions not required for compliance with rule 23(b); oral stipulation will suffice if defendant
intelligently and personally consents).
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The Constitution further requires that grand and petit juries be
drawn from a representative cross-section of the community.398 A de-
fendant may, therefore, be able to challenge jury selection procedures
on the ground that they are not productive of a representative cross-
section.399
In Carmical v. Craven' the petitioner, on a writ of habeas corpus,
claimed that the jury panel which tried his case was discriminatorily
selected on the basis of race and financial status.4° 1 The state selection
process there involved required prospective jurors to submit to a
"clear-thinking test," the purpose of which was to determine whether
prospective jurors met acceptable standards of innate intelligence.40 2
Relying on a lower court decision, ° petitioner asserted that the use
of the "clear-thinking test" to select the jury in his case had resulted in
"unconstitutionally gross discrimination along racial, economic and
cultural lines."' The district court disagreed, ruling that even if the
test resulted in discrimination against blacks and persons of lower eco-
nomic status, there was no evidence that such discrimination was the
object of the test, and that it was administered to all persons regardless
of race or income."° The Ninth Circuit initially reversed, holding that
effect, rather than purpose, is determinative in establishing a prima fa-
cie case of invidious discrimination. The court observed, "[w]hen a
jury selection system actually results in master jury panels from which
identifiable classes are grossly excluded, the subjective intent of those
who develop and enforce the system is immaterial."4
' 6
Upon remand, the district court ruled that the petitioner would bear
398. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 524, 528, 531 (1975) (Court upheld male defend-
ant's challenge to state practice of excluding females unless they volunteered for jury duty).
See also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 516-18, 521-22 (1968) (in capital case, auto-
matic exclusion of prospective jurors having conscientious or religious objections to capital
punishment constitutes denial of impartial jury).
399. Defendant may allege a violation of either the Jury Selection and Service Act of
1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1874 (1976) or the United States Constitution, particularly the four-
teenth amendment. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410-11 (1972); Whitus v. Geor-
gia, 385 U.S. 545, 550-52 (1967).
400. 547 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1977).
401. Id. at 1381.
402. Id. The test consisted of 25 questions which were to be answered in ten minutes.
To qualify for jury duty, 20 correct answers were required. The test was created under the
auspices of a special committee of judges and attorneys. Id.
403. People v. Craig, No. 41750 (Superior Court of Alameda County, 1968) (further use
of "clear-thinking test" prohibited on ground that it resulted in disproportionate exclusion
of blacks from jury panel).
404. 547 F.2d at 1381.
405. See Carmical v. Craven, 314 F. Supp. 580, 582 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
406. Carmical v. Craven, 457 F.2d 582, 587 (9th Cir. 1971).
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the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of exclusion based
on racial considerations, and that once this burden was met, the state
would bear the burden of proving the validity of the test.
4 °7
After a hearing, the district court denied petitioner relief, concluding
that there was evidence from which some disproportion might be in-
ferred but that the comparative test results from the "small, select, ra-
cially homogeneous areas, do not establish gross and unequivocal
exclusion of identifiable classes" from the county from which the
panels were drawn.4 8 The district court concluded that educational
levels, not race, were responsible for the exclusion. 4° 9
In affirming, the Ninth Circuit in Carmical/I recognized that exclu-
sion from jury duty on the basis of race or financial status is unconstitu-
tional. 4 10 However, the court also acknowledged that states are
permitted to prescribe relevant qualifications for their jurors.41'
The Ninth Circuit was reluctant to adopt the trial court's finding that
educational levels were responsible for the exclusion in question.412
Instead, the appellate court found that the evidence produced by the
petitioner fell far short of that necessary for a prima facie showing that
the exclusion stemmed from racial or economic discrimination.4 3 The
court thus avoided a decision on the issue of the validity and appropri-
ateness of the "clear-thinking test" and offered little guidance as to the
future use of similar tests.
Juror bias or misconduct may constitute a denial of the defendant's
407. Carmical v. Craven, 547 F.2d 1380, 1381-82 (9th Cir. 1977).
408. Id. at 1382.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id. See Carter v. Jury Commissioner, 396 U.S. 320, 332 (1970) (states are free to set
specified age and educational qualifications).
412. 547 F.2d at 1382-83.
413. Id. at 1383. Petitioner sought to establish discrimination by means of a statistical
analysis. The petitioner isolated five of a total of 25 jury panels selected during the years in
which the "clear-thinking test" was administered. The study was designed to determine
how a total of 2,127 individuals fared in the test or preceding screening process. Of the
2,127, 1,024 were blacks from low-income backgrounds. Of the 1,024, 297 were rejected by
the written test while 95 passed, a failure rate of 75.8%. The remaining 1,103 individuals
came from "white, middle and upper-income" areas. Of these individuals, 92 were rejected
while 409 passed, a failure rate of 18.4%. Noting that petitioner offered no information as to
the test results of blacks and whites with comparable economic and educational levels, the
court correctly reasoned that such evidence fell short of a prima facie showing of exclusion
based on race and economic status. In fact, respondent submitted evidence showing that
blacks and whites with comparable educational levels produced similar statistics with re-
spect to the pass/fail rates of the test. Furthermore, petitioner's study considered only 7% of
the approximately 30,000 people called to form the five panels selected by the petitioner for
the study. Id. at 1382.
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sixth amendment right to an impartial jury41 4 It is within the trial
court's broad discretion, however, to give meaning to this guarantee.
415
In United States v. Hendrix,1 6 the Ninth Circuit considered whether
the trial court had abused its discretion in denying defendant's request
for an investigation into juror bias.417  The appellate court ruled that it
is within the trial judge's discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing on
such allegations.
418
The extent and nature of the investigative hearing, if ordered, is also
within the judge's discretion.419  The character and seriousness of the
alleged misconduct or bias and the credibility of the source are factors
for the judge to consider in determining the scope of the investigative
hearing.
4 20
There are two purposes served by an evidentiary hearing. 42' First, it
enables the court to determine the truthfulness of the allegations ofju-
414. See, e.g., Tillman v. United States, 406 F.2d 930, 937 (5th Cir.), vacatedper curiam on
other grounds, 395 U.S. 830 (1969) (improper influence by communications with juror);
Stone v. United States, 113 F.2d 70, 77-78 (6th Cir. 1940) (outside influence on jurors re-
sulted in prejudice to defendant).
415. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562-67 (1976) (district court
judge required to assess probable publicity of murder trial and effect on prospectiye jurors);
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 338-45, 358-63 (1966) (pretrial publicity denied defend-
ant right to fair trial); United States v. Doe, 513 F.2d 709, 711-12 (1st Cir. 1975) (harmless
private communication between juror and third party); Tillman v. United States, 406 F.2d
930, 937 (5th Cir.), vacatedper curiam on other grounds, 395 U.S. 830 (1969) (private com-
munication between juror and third person possibly prejudicial); United States v. Miller, 381
F.2d 529, 539 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 929 (1968) (no denial of due process
where juror informed at social gathering that outsider did not like what was going on at the
trial); United States v. Flynn, 216 F.2d 354, 372 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 909
(1955) (juror communication with third party). For additional discussion of trial court dis-
cretion in this area, see notes 625-26 infra, and accompanying text.
416. 549 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818 (1977).
417. The allegedly biased statement was the following:
Well, I really shouldn't be serving today because my husband is on vacation, and he
asked me to get excused so I could join him, because I have served on jury duty several
times. But we just had a case where a policewoman was tried for selling narcotics and
the damned Judge let her go. And she was absolutely guilty. And I am here to see
that they put some of these people away. These Judges are absolutely too lenient and
they are letting too many people run around.
Id. at 1227.
418. Id. See United States v. Doe, 513 F.2d 709, 711-12 (1st Cir. 1975).
419. 549 F.2d at 1227. See United States v. Doe, 513 F.2d 709, 712 (Ist Cir. 1975); Till-
man v. United States, 406 F.2d 930, 938 (5th Cir.), vacatedper cur/am on other grounds, 395
U.S. 830 (1969); note 415 supra.
420. See United States v. McKinney, 429 F.2d 1019, 1026 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 922 (1971) (formulation of rigid rules requiring trial judge, where bias is alleged, to
conduct full investigation to determine whether misconduct has occurred and was prejudi-
cial, and to set forth his findings if prejudice did not occur).
421. 549 F.2d at 1228-29.
1978] CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY
ror bias or misconduct.4 2 2 Second, if the allegations are true, the hear-
ing enables the court to determine whether the bias has been so
substantial as to deprive defendant of his fifth amendment due process
rights or his sixth amendment right to trial by an impartial jury.423
In applying these principles to Hendrix, the Ninth Circuit noted that
reversal of a district court's procedural decisions should occur only if
there has been a clear abuse of discretion.424 In Hendrix, given the
content of the allegations, there was no such abuse of discretion by the
district court.425 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit found that the alleged
bias was not prejudicial to defendant and did not deny defendant his
right to a trial by impartial jury.42 6
Similarly, the appellate court will not interfere with the procedure
employed by the trial court in conducting voir dire examinations unless
there has been a clear abuse of discretion.427  The peremptory chal-
422. Id.
423. Id. at 1229. See United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394,396 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 835 (1974) (the test is whether or not misconduct has so prejudiced defendant that he
has not received fair trial). See also Cavness v. United States, 187 F.2d 719, 723 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951).
424. 549 F.2d at 1229. See, e.g., Tillman v. United States, 406 F.2d 930, 938 (5th Cir.),
vaeatedper curiam on other grounds, 395 U.S. 830 (1969); United States v. Miller, 381 F.2d
529, 539 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 929 (1968); United States v. Flynn, 216 F.2d
354, 372 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 909 (1955).
425. 549 F.2d at 1229.
426. Id. at 1229-30. The court pointed out that it is more likely to infer from the juror's
statement that she was referring to those individuals who are "absolutely guilty" as being the
ones who "should be put away." A juror's desire to convict those who are absolutely guilty
is not inconsistent with her duty as a juror. Furthermore, the juror's statement came before
she was examined and prior to her swearing to impartiality. "[J]urors are presumed to have
performed their official duties faithfully." Id. at 1230. See Cavness v. United States, 187
F.2d 719, 723 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951) (no prejudice to defendant where
juror, accompanied by marshall, made two telephone calls during jury deliberations).
Finally, the court pointed out that the nature of the alleged bias was different from that
which courts have traditionally viewed as involving high risks of prejudice. 549 F.2d at
1230. Hendrix did not involve a private communication or tampering with a juror during
trial about a matter pending before the jury, nor did the alleged statement involve the influ-
ence of the press upon the jury. Id. See United States v. Shahane, 517 F.2d 1173, 1178-79
(8th Cir.), cer. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975) (failure of juror to disclose views against long
hair and drug abuse not prejudicial to defendant's case); United States v. K.lee, 494 F.2d 394,
396 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 835 (1974) (premature discussion among jurors not
prejudicial). See generall United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313, 324-26 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976) (court's refusal to question prospective jurors individually dur-
ing voir dire regarding pretrial publicity not reversible error absent clear abuse of discre-
tion); United States v. Chiarizio, 525 F.2d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 1975) (ambiguous comment by
prospective juror, overheard by other jurors, held insufficient to warrant reversal based on
jury prejudice).
427. United States v. Perry, 550 F.2d 524, 528 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977).
See also United States v. Silverthorne, 430 F.2d 675, 678 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
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lenge is one of the most important rights reserved to an accused.428
Although the district court is given broad discretion with respect to the
procedures by which a peremptory challenge may be made, the proce-
dures chosen by the district court must not unduly restrict a defendant's
use of such a challenge, and defendant must be given adequate notice
of the method to be implemented by the district court.429 In United
States v. Turner,430 the Ninth Circuit reversed a conviction where the
trial court had treated the defendant's acceptance of the jury panel,
prior to the prosecution's challenges, as a waiver of his peremptory
challenge rights.43 Notwithstanding that notice of the challenge pro-
cedures had been given to the defendant, such a waiver was held to be
an undue restriction on defendant's challenge rights.4 32  Any error re-
sulting in a restriction of the exercise of a defendant's peremptory chal-
lenge requires automatic reversal and no actual prejudice need be
shown.
433
F Plea Bargain Agreements
Plea bargain agreements have been recognized as a viable tool in the
administration of the criminal justice system.434 Federal Rule 11 (e)
43
-
allows prosecutors and defense attorneys to negotiate a guilty plea
4 36
which, when pled by the defendant, requires the government to dismiss
U.S. 1022 (1971) (minimal knowledge by prospective juror of pendency of criminal proceed-
ings not sufficient to establish prejudice to defendant).
428. FED. R. CRiM. P. 24(b). See United States v. Sams, 470 F.2d 751, 755 (5th Cir.
1972) (where defense counsel unaware of jury selection procedure, court abused discretion
in denying defendant right to challenge juror after having failed to challenge same juror
earlier in selection process). But cf United States v. Rowe, 435 F.2d 1298, 1299 (9th Cir.
1970) (per curiam) (counsel responsible for knowing challenge procedure of court).
429. United States v. Stilson, 250 U.S. 583, 586-87 (1919) (neither number of peremptory
challenges nor manner of their exercise is constitutionally secured).
430. 558 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977).
431. Id. at 538.
432. Id. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (function of peremptory chal-
lenge requires that its use not be subject to inquiry).
433. 558 F.2d at 538.
434. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971) (plea bargaining wide-
spread; practice should be encouraged where properly administered to ensure fairness). But
see Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977) (ability to plea bargain not a constitu-
tional right). It should be noted also that the provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 1 (e) permitting plea bargaining are not mandatory, and the federal courts may refuse
to allow any presentation of plea agreements. H.R. Rm. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 6,
reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 674, 678.
435. FED. R. CraM. P. 11(e).
436. Id. at 11(e)(1).
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or reduce the charges, or make specific sentence recommendations.437
In the alternative, the U.S. Attorney may agree that a specific sentence
is the proper manner in which to dispose of the case.438
All successful negotiations must be disclosed to the court,439 which
must then inform the defendant of its acceptance or rejection of the
agreement. Acceptance binds the court to the terms of the agree-
ment,440 whereas the defendant must be informed of a rejection and
allowed to withdraw the plea." Statements made in connection with
437. Id. at ll(e)(1)(B). The court, however, is not bound by any sentence recommenda-
tions offered by the U.S. Attorney. Id. at 1l(e)(1).
438. Id. at 11(e)(1)(C).
439. Id. at I l(e)(2). See, e.g., United States v. Maggio, 514 F.2d 80, 89 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1032 (1975). See also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 79 (1977) (sug-
gestion made that court inform defendant that bargain may be disclosed without jeopardy to
agreement).
440. FED. R. CiUM. P. 1 l(e)(3) (court must, upon acceptance, embody negotiated disposi-
tion in judgment and sentence).
441. Id. at 1l(e)(4). The court must, in addition, inform the defendant that the plea, if
maintained, may result in a sentence less favorable than that provided for in the agreement.
Id. A rejected agreement does not render a guilty plea invalid; the court must, however,
inform the defendant of and sentence him within the maximum permissible sentence, and
make certain that the defendant was aware that any negotiations did not bind the court.
United States v. Thompson, 541 F.2d 794, 795 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (where defendant
received sentence in excess of that recommended, plea not void since defendant aware judge
not bound and sentence within maximum allowable).
In United States v. Henderson, 565 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1977), the Ninth Circuit adhered to
a strict interpretation of the language of rule 11(e). Henderson had received a promise from
the United States Attorney concerning the disposition of the case: "4 years maximum, con-
current with other charge to which I have made guilty plea. Possible I will receive lesser
sentence, including probation." The court, however, imposed consecutive sentences totaling
nine years. Noting that the defendant clearly had understood that the actual sentence was
to be solely within the judge's discretion, the Ninth Circuit did not accept defendant's con-
tention that the court had rejected the agreement while failing to offer defendant an oppor-
tunity to withdraw the plea.
Defendant had argued that subsections (e)(3) and (e)(4) of rule 11, regarding acceptance
and rejection of the plea agreement were applicable to (e)(1)(A), (B), and (C) type agree-
ments. The court, however, found that the language of (e)(3) and (e)(4) failed to support
defendant's contention. Subsection (e)(3) does not mention a recommendation as does
(e)(1)(B) but rather speaks only of a disposition which "tracks" the language in (e)(t)(C).
The court pointed out that it would have been easy for the draftsmen to insert into (e)(3) the
word "recommendation" or similar phraseology to (e)(1)(B). Similarly, it would have been
easy for draftsmen to insert into (e)(4) the words "recommended sentence" or some similar
language that referred to (e)(1)(B). "Moreover, if we were to read them into. . . [(e)(3)] or
[(e)(4)], we would make. .. [(e)(1)(B)] surplusage, by turning all (1)(B) agreements
into (1)(C) agreements, so far as their effect is concerned." Id. at 1122. Accord, United
States v. Sarubbi, 416 F. Supp. 633, 636 (D. NJ. 1976). See also United States v. Futeral,
539 F.2d 329, 331 n.1 (4th Cir. 1975) (dictum).
The appellate court construed the agreement to provide a nonbinding recommendation of
disposition rather than a rule ll(e)(1)(C) specific sentence. In so concluding, however, the
Ninth Circuit suggested that in cases in which the trial court intends to impose a sentence
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a plea later withdrawn because the court rejected the underlying agree-
ment are inadmissible in any proceeding against the defendant.
442
III. PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
A. Right to Counsel
1. The Right to Appointed Counsel
The sixth amendment guarantees to the accused the assistance of
counsel in all criminal prosecutions.4 This guarantee binds the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.444 If the
accused is indigent, he is entitled to have counsel appointed by the
court."4 In the view of the Supreme Court, "There can be no equal
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of
money he has."" The accused bears the burden of proving that he is
"substantially more onerous" than that recommended in a type (e)(1)(B) agreement, the
court should offer the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea. This procedure, rea-
soned the court, would guard against misunderstanding in cases where the defendant
considered the warnings of total judge discretion as "ritual incantations, not to be taken
seriously." 565 F.2d at 1123.
442. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1l(e)(6). However, a statement made by defendant under oath in
connection with a plea later withdrawn, is admissible in a criminal proceeding for perjury or
false statement. Id.
443. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The amendment provides, in part: "In all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."
444. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
445. Id. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (assistance of counsel re-
quired before an accused can be "imprisoned for any offense"); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 467-68 (1938) (appointment of counsel necessary in all federal cases where defendant
unable to obtain counsel and has not intentionally and competently waived his right to
counsel); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (failure of state trial court to appoint coun-
sel in a capital case was a denial of due process).
446. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). The Court has made several efforts to
equalize the advantages enjoyed by indigent and non-indigent defendants in criminal prose-
cutions. In Grffin, the Court held that an indigent defendant must be furnished with a free
copy of trial transcripts where an appeal without them would be ineffectual. Id. Griffin
provided the foundation for the Court's decision in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963), wherein it was held that an indigent must be provided with counsel on any appeal to
which he is entitled as a matter of right. Cf. Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 609-10 (1974)
(indigent defendant has no right to counsel on appeal which is discretionary). See also
Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969) (transcript for appealing a violation of a
municipal ordinance); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969) (transcript of evidentiary
hearing in habeas corpus proceeding for use in de novo application to higher court); Roberts
v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) (transcript of preliminary hearing); Draper v. Washington,
372 U.S. 487 (1963) (screening in forma pauperis cases for appeal); Smith v. Bennett, 365
U.S. 708 (1961) (conditioning collateral attack of a conviction on a filing fee); Burns v. Ohio,
360 U.S. 252 (1959) (conditioning direct appeal on payment of a filing fee).
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financially unable to retain counsel." 7 A defendant cannot be impris-
oned for any length of time if he has been denied the assistance of
counsel at trial." 8
In 1977, the Ninth Circuit restated its position" 9 that a trial court
does not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow a defendant to substi-
tute counsel "on the eve of trial" absent a compelling reason.450
2. Critical Stages-The Scope of the Right to Counsel
The Supreme Court has held that the sixth amendment right to coun-
sel attaches upon the initiation of a criminal adversary proceeding, 1 e.,
upon the filing of formal charges against the accused.45 Subsequent
to that point, there is a right to counsel at all critical stages where the
substantial rights of the accused are affected.452  Thus, there is a crucial
distinction between mere investigation45 3 and the initiation of a crimi-
447. The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1976) reads in part: "Unless
the defendant waives representation by counsel, the United States magistrate or the court, if
satisfied after appropriate inquiry that the defendant is financially unable to obtain counsel,
shall appoint counsel to represent him." Id. § 3006A(b). See United States v. Ellsworth,
547 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 931 (1977) (denial of assistance of coun-
sel not improper where defendant failed to prove his alleged indigency by refusing to com-
ply with court's request that he complete a standard financial affidavit form). See also
United States v. Schmitz, 525 F.2d 793, 795 (9th Cir. 1975) (defendant's conclusionary affi-
davit of poverty not "sufficient to entitle him to a free transcript" pursuant to the Criminal
Justice Act).
448. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). "[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent
waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misde-
meanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." Id. at 37.
449. See United States v. Shuey, 541 F.2d 845, 857 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1092 (1977); United States v. Harris, 501 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Price, 474
F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1973). Cf. Loton v. Procunier, 487 F.2d 434, 436 (9th Cir. 1973) (de-
fendant cannot be coerced into accepting ineffective counsel).
450. United States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567 (9th; Cir. 1977).
451. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,206 (1964). The right to counsel prior to the
filing of an indictment or information is covered by the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (right to have counsel present at
custodial police interrogation).
452. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (preliminary hearing to determine
probable cause constitutes critical stage). See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975)
(right to counsel at summation of trial); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135-37 (1967) (sen-
tencing constitutes critical stage when defendant's rights substantially affected); White v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (initial appearance before magistrate constitutes critical
stage when non-binding plea could be used as evidence against defendant at trial). Cf.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119-20 (1975) (judicial hearing after arrest to determine
probable cause does not require adversary hearing or participation of defense counsel);
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (pretrial arraignment where defenses must be
pleaded or lost).
453. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (no right to have counsel present at
post-indictment photo identification session); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (no
19781
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nal proceeding4 4
In Brewer v. Williams,455 the Supreme Court stated that the "clear
rule of Massiah [v. United States]456 is that once adversary proceedings
have commenced against an individual, he has a right to legal
representation when the government interrogates him."457 In 1977, the
Ninth Circuit relied on Brewer to hold that the government, in making
a secret tape recording of an incriminating conversation that had oc-
curred within the defendant's jail cell, did not violate her sixth amend-
ment right to counsel because no governmental interrogation---either
formal or surreptitious-had been involved.458
3. Effective Assistance of Counsel
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the sixth amendment
right to counsel constitutes a right to effective counsel.459 While thus
implying that the sixth amendment requires some minimum level of
right to counsel when having blood taken or being fingerprinted); United States v.
DeVaughn, 541 F.2d 808 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 954 (1976) (defendant
who made statements to government informant after charges had been dismissed did not
have to be warned of right to counsel since no longer under indictment).
454. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1967) (right to have counsel pres-
ent at post-indictment line-up); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 309-10 (1966) (right to
counsel after defendant taken into custody and charged); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,
490-91 (1964) (right to counsel when suspect taken into custody and is focus of investiga-
tion); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (right to counsel attaches when in-
dicted). Cf. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972) (no per se exclusionary rule
applicable to testimony based on a police station show-up where counsel not present).
The government apparently possesses the power to determine when the right to counsel
will attach in a given case inasmuch as it controls the point in time at which "mere investiga-
tion" gives way to a prosecutorial proceeding. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310
(1966), in which the Court stated.
There is no constitutional right to be arrested. The police are not required to guess at
their peril the precise moment at which they have probable cause to arrest a suspect,
risking a violation of the Fifth Amendment if they act too soon, and a violation of the
Sixth Amendment if they wait too long. Law enforcement officers are under no consti-
tutional duty to call a halt to a criminal investigation the moment they have the mini-
mum evidence to establish probable cause, a quantum of evidence which may fall far
short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction.
Id. See also United States v. King, 472 F.2d 1, 5 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864
(1973) (defendants who have been neither indicted nor arrested have no right to be warned
of their right to counsel prior to speaking to a federal informant).
455. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
456. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
457. 430 U.S. at 400-01 (emphasis added).
458. See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1347-48 (9th Cir. 1977).
459. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 771 (1970); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955); Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 76 (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444,446 (1940); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 53 (1932).
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competency on the part of counsel, the Court has yet to articulate any
standards to be used in assessing such competency. Rather, the Court
has expressly left the determination of the "proper standards of per-
formance of attorneys" to the "good sense and discretion of the trial
courts." 460
Within the Ninth Circuit, three alternative standards for reviewing
the effectiveness of counsel have been formulated: whether "defend-
ant's representation has been so inadequate as to make his trial a farce,
sham, or mockery of justice;' 461 whether counsel has rendered "reason-
ably effective" assistance;" 2 or whether counsel's ineffectiveness has re-
sulted in a denial of fundamental fairness to the defendant. 463
Although there is some overlap between the standards,4 4 a majority of
the Ninth Circuit cases in the area of counsel effectiveness have
adopted the "farce or mockery of justice" standard and have either
found the counsel to be effective" 5 or have refused to "second guess"
counsel with respect to trial tactics." 6
460. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). See Annot., 26 A.L.R. Fed. 218
(1976) for a compilation of the standards adopted by the various circuits.
461. United States v. Stem, 519 F.2d 521, 524 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033
(1975). See, e.g., Gardner v. Griggs, 541 F.2d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Martin, 489 F.2d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 948 (1974); United States v.
Ortiz, 488 F.2d 175, 177 (9th Cir. 1973); Parker v. United States, 474 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1973)
(per curiam); United States v. Miramon, 470 F.2d 1362, 1363 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 934 (1973).
462. See, e.g., United States v. Elksnis, 528 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Miramon, 470 F.2d 1362, 1363 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 934 (1973); United
States v. Steed, 465 F.2d 1310, 1317 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1078 (1972); Leano v.
United States, 457 F.2d 1208, 1209 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972); United States
v. Smith, 446 F.2d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 915 (1974); Pinedou v.
United States, 347 F.2d 142, 148 (9th Cir. 1965); Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, 37 (9th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963).
463. See, e.g., United States v. Bradford, 528 F.2d 899, 900 (9th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Stem, 519 F.2d 521, 524 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975); Mengarelli v.
United States, 476 F.2d 617, 619 (9th Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Craven, 432 F.2d 418, 419 (9th
Cir. 1970); Pinedou v. United States, 347 F.2d 142, 148 (9th Cir. 1965).
464. See Gardner v. Griggs, 541 F.2d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Miramon,
470 F.2d 1362, 1363 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 934 (1973); United States v. Le-
ano, 457 F.2d 1208, 1209 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972).
465. See, eg., United States v. Stem, 519 F.2d 521, 524 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1033 (1975); Krutchen v. Eyman, 406 F.2d 304, 312 (9th Cir. 1969), vacated on other grounds,
408 U.S. 934 (1972); Borchert v. United States, 405 F.2d 735, 758 (9th Cir. 1968), cert
denied, 394 U.S. 972 (1969); Dalrymple v. Wilson, 366 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1966) (per
curiam).
466. See, ag., United States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1977); De Kaplany v.
Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977);
United States v. Stem, 519 F.2d 521, 524-25 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975)
(counsel declined to raise insanity defense because would have been counterproductive);
United States v. Martin, 489 F.2d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 948 (1974)
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In 1977, the Ninth Circuit decided in Cooper v. Fitzharri467 that the
appropriate standard is whether "trial counsel failed to render reason-
ably effective assistance." 8  The Cooper court expressly disapproved
of the use of the "farce or mockery of justice" standard within the
Ninth Circuit.469 The case was remanded to the district court for a
factual determination of whether the petitioner had been deprived of
the effective assistance of counsel, without regard to whether the peti-
tioner had been prejudiced.4 70
Specific prejudice must be shown, however, when a defendant claims
that his attorney's representation of a codefendant at trial resulted in a
conflict of interest and, consequently, a denial of the effective assistance
of counsel.4 71 In United States v. Eaglin,472 the court rejected peti-
tioner's claim that he had been prejudiced by his counsel's joint repre-
sentation of a coconspirator where the record revealed that the trial
judge had "meticulously" inquired of both petitioner and his counsel
whether there would be a conflict of interest and had been assured by
defendant both in an affidavit and in open court that there was no con-
ffict.4 73
(withdrawal of motion to suppress heroin seized in warrantless search where probable cause
existed); United States v. Ortiz, 488 F.2d 175, 177 (9th Cir. 1973); Mengarelli v. United
States, 476 F.2d 617, 619 (9th Cir. 1973) (retrospective finding that trial tactics were unwise
does not usually "rise to the level of a deprivation of a constitutional right").
467. 551 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1977).
468. Id. at 1166.
469. Id. "ITMhe farce or mockery standard today is little more than a metaphor indicat-
ing that the petitioner has a relatively heavy burden to prove ineffectiveness of counsel."
Id.
470. Id. at 1165, 1166. The court's holding that a conviction could not stand regardless
of prejudice once a defendant had met the burden of showing that he had been denied
effective assistance of counsel was based on two recent Supreme Court cases: Herring v.
New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (denial of opportunity to make a summation at the conclu-
sion of trial violates right to counsel regardless of nature of case or strength of prosecution's
evidence) and Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (refusal to allow a defendant to
consult with counsel during an overnight recess was a denial of right to counsel even though
prejudice not claimed). Id. at 1165.
471. See United States v. Kutas, 542 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073
(1977) (defendant failed in her burden of showing that actual conflict of interest existed
which prejudiced her case); United States v. Nystrom, 447 F.2d 1350, 1351 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 993 (1971); Davidson v. Cupp, 446 F.2d 642, 643 (9th Cir. 1971) (per
curiam). See also Carlson v. Nelson, 443 F.2d 21, 22 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
472. 571 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1977).
473. Id. at 1085-86. "[W]here a defendant appeals his conviction on the ground that his
counsel represented more than one defendant, we will, absent unusual circumstances, reject
such an argument if it appears that the trial court made sufficient inquiry of the parties and
counsel concerning possible conflict of interest." Id. at 1086. See United States v. Home,
423 F.2d 630, 631 (9th Cir. 1970); Kaplan v. United States, 375 F.2d 895, 897-98 (9th Cir.
1967). Eaglin claimed that counsel had slighted his defense in an effort to obtain an acquit-
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B. Right to Speedy Trial
1. Pre-Accusatorial Delay
The Supreme Court has held474 that the sixth amendment right to a
speedy trial attaches only after an indictment or information has been
filed against the accused or after an arrest has been made.475 There-
fore, the validity of a delay in bringing charges against an accused must
be determined under the due process clause of the fifth amendment.476
The role of the due process clause, however, is limited in "protecting
against oppressive [pre-indictment] delay"47 7 because of the primary
statutory protection "against the bringing of overly stale criminal
charges" found in the applicable statutes of limitation.478
It is settled that the government is not constitutionally required to'file
charges either at that point in time at which probable cause to arrest
has been established479 or upon the collection of evidence sufficient to
prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.480
tal for his codefendant, Kutas. Kutas had previously lost her own claim that she had been
denied effective assistance of counsel because of her attorney's alleged conflict of interest.
See United States v. Kutas, 542 F.2d 527, 529-30 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073
(1977). The failure by one codefendant to establish a claim of denial of effective assistance
of counsel "does not, of course, foreclose [another codefendant retaining the same counsel]
from arguing... that his defense was the one which was slighted." 571 F.2d at 1085 n.23.
474. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
475. Id. at 313, 320. Marion also held that FED. P- C im. P. 48(b), which allows for the
dismissal of indictments by the district court due to the pre- or post-indictment delay, is
"limited to post-arrest situations." Id. at 319. See United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670,
674 n.4 (9th Cir. 1977) and cases cited therein.
476. Id. at 324. In Marion, Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall felt that the sixth
amendment right to a speedy trial should apply during both the pre- and post-indictment
stages. Id. at 331-32 (Douglas, J., concurring in result). See generaly Note, Right to
Speedy Tria Maainaining a Proper Balance Between the Interest of Society and the Rights of
the Accused, 4 U.C.L.A. ALAs. L. Rnv. 242, 243-46 (1974); Note, Effective Guaranty of a
Speedy Trialfor Convicts in Other Jurisdictions, 77 YALE L.J. 767, 780-83 (1968).
477. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977).
478. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S.
116, 122 (1966)).
479. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320, Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293,
310 (1966). In Hoffa, the Court declared:
inhere is no constitutional right to be arrested. The police are not required to guess at
their peril the precise moment at which they have probable cause to arrest a suspect,
risking a violation of the Fifth Amendment if they act too soon, and a violation of the
Sixth Amendment if they wait too long. Law enforcement officers are under no duty to
call a halt to a criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum evidence to
establish probable cause, a quantum of evidence which may fall far short of the amount
necessary to support a criminal conviction.
Id.
480. 431 U.S. at 792.
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The Supreme Court, in United States v. Marion,481 established the
rule that the due process clause of the fifth amendment does not require
that an indictment be dismissed unless the accused shows that the pre-
indictment delay "caused substantial prejudice" to his right "to a fair
trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain [a] tactical
advantage over the accused."48 Cases within the Ninth Circuit have
split on the question of whether Marion requires the accused to show
that there has been both actual prejudice and a tactical advantage
gained483 or whether a showing of either is sufficient.484
In United States v. Mays,4 85 the Ninth Circuit declined to adopt ei-
ther the disjunctive or conjunctive standards that had been adopted by
the earlier cases.486 Rather, the approach adopted by the Mays court
involved an evaluation of the circumstances surrounding each individ-
ual case.487 The court identified three factors in particular that should
be balanced in assessing the validity of a pre-indictment delay: (1) the
actual prejudice resulting from the delay, as demonstrated by the de-
fendant, on the one hand;4 88 and (2) the length of the delay; and (3) the
reason for the delay on the other hand.489 In any case, regardless of
the degree of actual prejudice resulting from the delay, a criminal pros-
ecution should not be dismissed absent "some culpability on the gov-
ernment's part either in the form of intentional misconduct or
negligence.449°
481. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
482. Id. at 324. In Marion, the Court found that there had been no showing of any
prejudice to the defense and that there had been no showing that the government intention-
ally delayed the filing of the indictment to gain some tactical advantage. Id. at 325.
483. See United States v. Cardova, 537 F.2d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Andros, 484 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Griffin, 464 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1973).
484. See United States v. Sand, 541 F.2d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Manning, 509 F.2d 1230, 1234 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975); United
States v. Erickson, 472 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1973).
485. 549 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1977).
486. Id. at 677.
487. Id.
488. Id. The court noted that "[t]o establish actual prejudice sufficient to warrant a dis-
missal, the defendant must show not only the loss of [a] witness and/or [physical] evidence
but also [m]ust demonstrate how that loss is prejudicial to him." Id. (footnote omitted).
Such a showing must be "definite and not speculative." Id. See also United States v.
Galardi, 476 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 839 (1973) (allegation that
missing witnesses "might have been useful" not sufficient showing of actual prejudice).
489. 549 F.2d at 678.
490. Id See also United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 789-90; United States v. Marion,
404 U.S. at 324-25. The burden is on the government to justify the length of the pre-indict-
ment delay. 549 F.2d at 678.
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2. Post-Accusatorial Delay
a. Sixth Amendment Protection
The right to a speedy trial "is as fundamental as any of the rights
secured by the Sixth Aniendment."491  In Barker v. Wingo,4 92 the
Court established a test by which claims of speedy trial violations are to
be evaluated. The test is essentially an ad hoc balancing of the con-
duct of the government against the conduct of the defendant.493 Pur-
suant to Barker, four factors are to be considered by the trial court: (1)
the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the
defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to
the defendant.494  None of the four factors is a "necessary or sufficient
condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial."
495
Rather, the factors are related and "must be considered together with
such other circumstances as may be relevant. '496  The length of the
delay is considered by both the Supreme Court49 7 and the Ninth Cir-
cuit498 to be the "triggering mechanism" which, when "presumptively
prejudicial,' 49 9 requires inquiry into the other factors.
In 1977, the Ninth Circuit repeatedly balanced the Barker factors in
favor of the government, rejecting all sixth amendment claims of denial
of a speedy trial."°°
491. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967).
492. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
493. Id. at 530-33.
494. Id. at 530.
495. Id. at 533.
496. Id. In Barker, the Court identified three interests of the defendant that the speedy
trial clause is designed to protect: "(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to
minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the de-
fense will be impaired." Id. at 532 (footnote omitted). The most serious of the three is the
defendant's interest in not having his defense impaired because "the inability of a defendant
adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system." d.
497. Id. at 533.
498. See United States v. Simmons, 536 F.2d 827, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1976) (six-month delay
sufficient to trigger further inquiry); United States v. Geelan, 520 F.2d 585, 587 (9th Cir.
1976) (six-year delay between indictment and arraignment presumptively prejudicial).
499. United States v. Simmons, 536 F.2d 827, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1976). "Unless there is a
delay that is presumptively prejudicial, there is no need to inquire into the other factors of
the balancing process." Id. at 831.
500. See Blackburn v. United States District Court, 564 F.2d 332, 334 (9th Cir. 1977 ) (per
curiam) (delay of 14 weeks, 2 days between declaration of mistrial and final rescheduling of
a retrial not unconstitutional where accused was free on bond and acquiesced in most of the
delay, and there was no showing that defense had been impaired); United States v. Gaines,
563 F.2d 1352, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1977) (delay of 137 days between indictment and trial not
unreasonable especially where no claim of prejudice); United States v. Robles, 563 F.2d
1308, 1309 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (delay of three years between offense and retrial
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LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW.REVIEW
Although none of the four factors is controlling,01 the Ninth Circuit
has tended to focus on the factor involving prejudice to the defend-
ant."°2 In United States v. Gaines,5 °3 the Ninth Circuit held that a de-
lay of 137 days was not unreasonable, particularly in light of the fact
that the defendant made no claim that he had been prejudiced by the
delay.504 The prejudice-to-defendant factor, however, is not essential
to a successful claim of denial of the right to a speedy trial.505
In 1977, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its position"° that conclusion-
ary allegations of prejudice are not sufficient to demonstrate actual
prejudice. 7 When a defendant alleges that he has suffered anxiety
and depression due to the delay, the court will require him to demon-
strate that his suffering is more severe than that experienced by crimi-
nal defendants in general.50 8  The burden of proving such
anxiety--especially for a defendant who is not being held in cus-
tody-is very difficult.
5 9
b. Statutory Protection
In an effort to reduce crime and "the danger of recidivism,"510 Con-
gress enacted the Speedy Trial Act of 197451 which imposes specific
time periods within which an accused must be brought to trial.51 2
following remand not violative of sixth amendment where original trial was speedy); United
States v. Holm, 550 F.2d 568, 569 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) ("A weighting of the factors
suggested in Barker v. Wxgo... comes out heavily in favor of the Government.").
501. See notes 488-89 supra and accompanying text.
502. See United States v. Graham, 538 F.2d 261, 266 (9th Cir. 1976) (prejudice factor is
"by far the most important variable").
503. 563 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1977).
504. Id. at 1356-57.
505. Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26 (1973) (per curiam) (showing of prejudice not
essential to establish claim of denial of right to speedy trial).
506. See United States v. Simmons, 536 F.2d 827, 831-32 (9th Cir. 1976).
507. Blackburn v. United States District Court, 564 F.2d 332, 334 (9th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam) ("No showing has been made that any witness' memory as to given matters has been
dimmed or that the presentation of petitioner's defense has been otherwise impaired as a
result of this delay.").
508. See United States v. Simmons, 536 F.2d 827, 831-32 (9th Cir. 1976) (general anxiety
and depression constitute "minimal prejudice of a type normally attending criminal prose-
cution"); cf. Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439 (1973) ("The speedy trial guarantee
recognizes that a prolonged delay may subject the accused to an emotional stress" as a result
of uncertainties which can be minimized by a prompt trial.).
509. See, ag., Blackburn v. United States District Court, 564 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam).
510. [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7402.
511. Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§
3161-3174 (1976)).
512. The Act requires that an indictment or information be filed within 30 days from the
[Vol. I11
CRIMINAL L.4W SUR VEY
The Act requires that if a defendant is being held in custody "solely
for the purpose of awaiting trial," then he must be brought to trial
within ninety days from the beginning of such continuous detention.
51 3
In 1977, the Ninth Circuit held that a violation of the ninety-day period
does not require dismissal but requires only that the defendant be re-
leased from custody for the remainder of the time necessary to bring
him to trial.5 14 This holding is consistent with previous Ninth Circuit
decisions.5  Continuances granted at the request of the defendant are
excluded in calculating the ninety-day period. 6 In United States v.
Lemon,517 the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant who is being de-
tained pending a determination as to his mental competency is not in
detention "solely" for the purpose of awaiting trial.1' Consequently,
such a detention is excluded in calculating the ninety-day period under
the Act. 19
date of an individual's arrest. Id. § 3161(b). The arraignment "shall be held within ten
days from the filing date" of the information or indictment. Id. § 3161(c). Ifa plea of not
guilty is entered, then defendant's trial must "commence within sixty days from arraignment
... ." Id. Thus, from the date of arrest, a defendant must be brought to trial within 100
days. Effective July 1, 1979, any violation of defendant's rights under § 3161(b) or (c) will
require dismissal of the indictment. Id. §§ 3161, 3163(c). Until July 1, 1979, the transition
provision of the Act requires that if the accused is being held in custody solely for the pur-
pose of awaiting trial, he must be brought to trial within 90 days from the commencement of
such continuous detention. Id. § 3164(b). If the accused is not brought to trial within the
90-day period and this delay is not attributable to the fault of the accused or his attorney,
then he must be released from custody for the remainder of time necessary to bring him to
trial. Id. § 3164(c).
513. Id. at § 3164(b).
514. See United States v. Gaines, 563 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Lemon,
550 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1977). Cf. Blackburn v. United States District Court, 564 F.2d 332
(9th Cir. 1977) (no dismissal required for failure to retry defendant within sixty days as
prescribed by 18 U.S.C. § 3161(e) (1976)).
515. See United States v. Carpenter, 542 F.2d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Simmons, 536 F.2d 827, 835 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Tirasso, 532 F.2d 1298, 1299-
1301 (9th Cir. 1976). Section 3164(c) of the Act clearly requires release of the defendant
even when there is a substantial possibility that he will flee from the jurisdiction.
516. See United States v. Lemon, 550 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Tirasso,
532 F.2d 1298, 1299 (9th Cir. 1976) (dictum). Any delays that are attributable to the "fault
of the accused or his counsel" are excluded in calculating the 90-day period. 18 U.S.C. §
3164(c)(1976).
517. 550 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1977).
518. Id. at 470; see Moore v. United States, 525 F.2d 328, 329 (9th Cir. 1975).
519. See 550 F.2d at 470-71.
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IV. CONFESSIONS
A. In General
In Miranda v. Arizona,2" the Supreme Court established procedural
safeguards to protect the rights of defendants who are subjected to cus-
todial interrogations. 21 In general, the compulsive atmosphere inher-
ent in the custodial questioning"m of defendants requires that a
defendant be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that anything
he says may be used against him, and that he has the right to the pres-
ence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. 23
B. When Miranda Warnings Are Required
Although Miranda only applies to custodial interrogations con-
ducted or instigated by law enforcement officials, 24 the Ninth Circuit
has suggested that warnings might be required if a private investigator
acts as the agent of, or at the suggestion of, such officials.5 2s Further,
all questioning by the police is not considered to be "custodial." The
police may ask investigatory questions without having given the
Miranda warnings.5 26 Recently, in United States v. Gaines,s27 the
Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that police officers are not required to give the
520. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
521. "Custodial interrogations" is a term of art which describes the point in criminal pro-
ceedings at which the Miranda safeguards become necessary to protect the defendant's privi-
lege against self-incrimination. This point is reached "when [an] individual is first
subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 477. See also Developments in Criminal
Law and Procedure in the Ninth Circuit, 1976. A Survey, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 855, 916-17
nn.495-503 (1977) and accompanying text.
522. See, eg., 384 U.S. at 445-46 (discussion of police interrogation practices).
523. Id. at 444.
524. See United States v. Parr-Pla, 549 F.2d 660 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972
(1977) (Miranda warnings not required when interrogation conducted by investigator em-
ployed by hotel); United States v. Birnstihl, 441 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam)
(Miranda does not apply to purely private interrogation).
525. See also Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33-34 (1929) (the "substance" of the
transaction determines whether a constitutional right has been violated); United States v.
Birnstihl, 441 F.2d 368,370 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (Miranda warnings may be required
if court finds that private party acting as actual or ostensible police agent); Corngold v.
United States, 367 F.2d 1, 4-5 (9th Cir. 1966) (constitutional protections apply when airport
official opens suitcases at request of government agent); Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d
262, 266 (9th Cir. 1961) ("violation of a constitutional right by subterfuge cannot be justi-
fied").
526. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (Miranda does not apply in set-
ting of voluntary interview between defendant and agents of Internal Revenue Service);
United States v. Walker, 538 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiarn) (Miranda does not apply
when defendant voluntarily meets with government agents).
527. 563 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1977).
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Miranda warnings before asking routine investigatory questions in
connection with a lawful vehicle stop.52 The Ninth Circuit has also
held that Mfiranda-type warnings are not required at a probation revo-
cation hearing,5 29 although other constitutional protections may be nec-
essary.53°
C. Compliance with Miranda-Waiver of Miranda Protection
After proper Miranda warnings have been given, the defendant may
waive his rights to consult with an attorney and to remain silent.
5 3 1
The waiver must, however, be intelligent, voluntary and knowing.
532
Moreover, a "heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate
that the defendant.. . waived his privilege against self-incrimination
and his right to retained or appointed counsel. 533
In determining whether there has been a knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent waiver of Miranda rights, the focus is on the ability of the
defendant to understand his constitutional protections. 534  In United
States v. Bowler,535 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the defendant's convic-
- tion of fraud by wire. In so doing, the court held that the evidence
supported the finding that the defendant "not only understood his
[Miranda] rights but exercised them intelligently, freely and volunta-
rily, answering some questions while refusing to answer others.
536
528. Id. at 1358. The court denied relief in United States v. Hickman, 523 F.2d 323 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976), holding that investigatory questions could be
posed to the occupants of a stopped automobile. The Gaines court, quoting United States v.
Jones, 543 F.2d 1171, 1173 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 957 (1977), stated that
"several courts including this one have ruled that routine inquiries into the ownershp of a
stopped vehicle, the identity of its driver or occupants, and other such matters by law en-
forcement personnel do not constitute custodial interrogation. .. " 563 F.2d at 1359 (em-
phasis in original).
529. See United States v. Hill, 548 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir. 1977) (warnings on privilege
against self-incrimination not required at probation revocation hearing since no additional
punishment could be imposed as the result of an admission).
530. Id. See also United States v. Segal, 549 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
919 (1977) (analysis of due process rights accorded to a defendant after a probation revoca-
tion hearing).
531. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 475.
532. Id.
533. Id. See also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n.14 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458 (1938).
534. See, e.g., United States v. Indian Boy X, 565 F.2d 585, 591-92 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Bowler, 561 F.2d 1323, 1326 (9th Cir. 1977).
535. 561 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1977).
536. Id. at 1326. The court upheld the district court's finding of a valid waiver, which
finding involved "a determination of the credibility of conflicting testimony and considera-
tion of Bowler's age, education, mental condition and articulateness, as well as the particular
setting in which the statements were given." Id.
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In United States v. Ford,5 37 the government demonstrated a valid
waiver where the defendant had been informed of her Miranda rights
in both English and Thai, her native language. 38 In United States v.
Indian Boy X,539 the Ninth Circuit upheld a juvenile's waiver of his
Miranda rights since it appeared that "the examining officers were...
scrupulously fair and deliberate in ascertaining that both 'X' and his
parents understood his rights under Miranda."40
A waiver is not irrevocable. A defendant may cut off questioning at
any point, even after having initially waived his Miranda rights.541
Also, the mere refusal to answer some questions is not necessarily an
assertion of the right to remain silent or a revocation of an earlier
waiver. In United States v. Ford,42 the court found that "intermittent
silences in response to certain questions did not effect a revocation of
the waiver" where the record showed that defendant's "right to cut off
questioning" was "scrupulously honored."543
D. Use of Evidence Obtained in Violation of Miranda
Although Miranda established the rule that evidence obtained dur-
ing the interrogation of a defendant not properly informed of his rights
is inadmissible, 5" the use of statements obtained in violation of
Miranda does not always necessitate a reversal of the conviction. In
United States v. Lemon,545 the Ninth Circuit affirmed a bank robbery
conviction despite some question as to whether statements of the de-
fendant admitted into evidence were made before or after he was ad-
vised of his Miranda rights. The court stated that it did not believe
that "any of the statements made by [defendant] contributed in any
537. 563 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1977).
538. Id. The district judge found, after observing defendant in the courtroom, that she
had a sufficient command of English to have understood her rights and that she voluntarily
waived them.
539. 565 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1977).
540. Id. at 591-92. The court quoted DeSouza v. Barber, 263 F.2d 470,476-77 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 989 (1959) regarding the competency of an infant to admit or waive his
right to counseh "Whether the confession of admission is competent depends not alone upon
the infant's age, but also upon his intelligence, education, information, understanding and
ability to comprehend." 565 F.2d at 592. The court further held that a waiver of Miranda
rights is also a waiver of the right to prompt arraignment enunciated in McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). Id. at 591.
541. 384 U.S. at 473-74.
542. 563 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1977).
543. Id. at 1366-67 (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975)).
544. 384 U.S. at 479.
545. 550 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1977).
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way to his conviction"' 4 and held that the admission of the statements,
even if they were obtained in violation of Miranda, was "harmless error
beyond a reasonable doubt.
547
Further, as established in Brown v. Illinois,548 the giving of Miranda
warnings following an illegal arrest does not render admissible incrimi-
nating statements obtained as a result of the illegal arrest.5 49 The
Ninth Circuit followed this holding in United States v. Sanudo-
perez,550 in which it concluded that the government had failed to meet
its burden of proving that incriminating statements made after a
Mfiranda warning were not the product of defendant's illegal arrest.55 '
V. TRIALS
A. Elements of Crimes
1. Intent
The prosecution must establish criminal intent as an element of vir-
tually every federal crime."' If direct evidence is not available to
prove the defendant's state of mind, then circumstantial evidence, from
which the jury may draw inferences, may be introduced to prove the
requisite criminal intent.553
The degree of intent which the prosecution is required to prove var-
546. Id. at 471.
547. Id. See also Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972); Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967); United States v. Casimiro-Benitez, 533 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 926 (1976); United States v. Hatcher, 496 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1974).
548. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
549. Id. at 603. See also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) (gov-
ernment not permitted to use defendant's admissions obtained as the result of an illegal
arrest or detention unless it is demonstrated that the admissions were made under circum-
stances "sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint").
550. 564 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1977).
551. Id. at 1291.
552. See, eg., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959); Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 500 (1951) (requirement of intent is rule rather than exception). Failure to allege
the requisite intent in the indictment warrants dismissal of the complaint. United States v.
Morrison, 536 F.2d 286, 289 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Pollack, 503 F.2d 87, 91 (9th
Cir. 1974).
553. See, eg., United States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d 1069, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 1977) (jury is free
to infer from circumstantial evidence that defendant was aware that person he aided was
escaped prisoner); United States v. Raftery, 563 F.2d 965, 966 (9th Cir. 1977) (knowledge
that hashish oil was being manufactured on premises inferred from evidence establishing
defendant's general knowledge about drugs); United States v. Ramos, 558 F.2d 545, 547 (9th
Cir. 1977) (defendant's intent to steal coffee inferred from facts surrounding theft and testi-
mony of witness connecting defendant therewith); United States v. Humphrey, 549 F.2d 650,
653 (9th Cir. 1977) (intent to distribute inferred from strength of heroin and defendant's
unemployed status).
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ies according to the crime charged, and the degree required for any
particular crime may be determined by examining the language of the
statute and its legislative history.5 4
Federal statutes often require, as an element of the crime, proof that
the defendant knowingly performed the act.5 5 Last term, in United
States v. Jewell,556 the Ninth Circuit approved an interpretation of the
term "knowingly." The Jewell court concluded that a defendant's de-
liberate avoidance of knowledge may be equated with actual knowl-
edge upon a showing that the defendant acted with "an awareness of
the high probability of the existence of the fact in question."
557
The Ninth Circuit in 1977 clarified the necessary elements of the
"deliberate ignorance" doctrine as adopted in Jewell.5 58 A two-prong
test must now be met before the doctrine will apply. There must be:
(1) a subjective 59 awareness by the defendant of a high probability of
the existence of the fact in question, and (2) a conscious or deliberate
disregard of that probability by the defendant in order to remain igno-
rant of the fact.5"°
554. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 613-14 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
555. See United States v. McDaniel, 545 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1976) (conviction re-
versed since jury not properly instructed that aiding and abetting firearm transportation
must have been knowing).
556. 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
557. Id. at 700-04.
558. Compare United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 913-14 (9th Cir. 1977) and
United States v. Esquer-Gamez, 550 F.2d 1231, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1977) with United States v.
Eaglin, 571 F.2d 1069, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 1977).
559. Subjectivity is required because a defendant, despite his awareness of the high
probability of the fact in question, cannot be convicted if he actually believes that the fact in
question does not exist or, in the case of possession of contraband, that the contraband was
not present. United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 913 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977) citing
United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 704 n.21 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976)).
560. See United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911,913-14 (9th Cir. 1977). In this case,
the court reversed defendant's conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) for possession
of marijuana with intent to distribute. The trial court had issued the following instruction
to the jury.
The government has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defend-
ant had actual knowledge that marijuana was contained in the vehicle. It can meet that
burden by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant acted with a con-
scious purpose to avoid learning the truth of the contents of the vehicle.
554 F.2d at 913. The court held this jury instruction to be deficient in that it included the
first prong of the "deliberate ignorance" test-defendant's deliberate avoidance of learning
the truth of what was in the vehicle-but failed to include the second prong of the
test-defendant's awareness of a high probability that the marijuana was present in the car.
The effect of this omission was to allow the jury to convict the defendant even though it had
not been proven that he possessed the marijuana "knowingly" as that word was interpreted
in the Jewell case. The instruction constituted reversible error. Id. at 914.
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2. Conspiracy
"Conspiracy is established when there is an agreement to accomplish
an illegal objective, coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance
of the illegal purpose and the requisite intent necessary to commit the
underlying substantive offense." '561 Thus the elements of conspiracy
are: (1) an agreement between two or more persons to commit an un-
lawful act, (2) an overt act in furtherance of that agreement, and (3)
intent. Once these elements have been established, only slight evi-
dence is required to connect the defendant with the conspiracy.5 62
Such "slight evidence," however, must be sufficient to establish the de-
fendant's knowledge of the conspiracy and his knowing acts in further-
ance thereof; evidence which merely establishes the defendant's
association with conspirators is insufficient.563
The conspiracy may be prosecuted as a crime, separate and distinct
from the substantive offense,5" but "when knowledge of a fact is re-
quired to convict for a substantive offense, knowledge is also required
to convict for conspiracy to commit the substantive offense. '565 The
"deliberate ignorance" doctrine566 may therefore be employed in a con-
spiracy prosecution.5 67
When a conspiracy indictment charges one conspiracy and the proof
at trial shows several independent conspiracies, the resulting conviction
may be reversed if such variance between allegations and proof
prejudices the substantive rights of the defendant. 68 In 1977, the
Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its position that one single conspiracy may be
found when there is a general agreement among several defendants to
561. United States v. Orpeza, 564 F.2d 316, 321 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing United States v.
Monroe, 552 F.2d 860, 862 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977)). See also United
States v. Thompson, 493 F.2d 305, 310 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974).
562. United States v. Kearney, 560 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 841
(1977); United States v. Peterson, 549 F.2d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 1977). See also United States
v. Carpio, 547 F.2d 490, 492 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Cruz, 536 F.2d 1264, 1266 (9th
Cir. 1976); United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 856 (9th Cir. 1974).
563. United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 793 (9th Cir. 1974), questioned on other
grounds, 566 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1977) (mere association and activity with marijuana smug-
glers insufficient to support conspiracy allegation). See also Ong Way Jong v. United
States, 245 F.2d 392, 394 (9th Cir. 1957) (to infer conspiracy solely from association is classic
non sequitur).
564. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 11 (1954); United States v. Ohlson, 552 F.2d
1347 (9th Cir. 1977).
565. United States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting United States v.
Bekowies, 432 F.2d 8, 14 (9th Cir. 1970)).
566. See notes 556-60 supra and accompanying text.
567. See cases cited in note 564 supra.
568. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 767-77 (1946).
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perform various functions in carrying out the conspiratorial objec-
tives.5 69 The existence of an overall scheme may be established upon
proof that each defendant knew, or had reason to know, that others
were involved in a broad project with an illegal purpose, and that his
benefits were probably dependent upon the success of the entire opera-
tion.
570
3. Lesser Included Offenses
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permit the jury to find a
defendant guilty of a crime not alleged in the indictment if the non-
alleged crime is necessarily included in the charged offense. 71 In
United States v. Whitaker57 2 the District of Columbia Circuit devel-
oped the "inherent relationship" test for determining whether a crime
may be considered a lesser included offense. Under this test, when two
crimes relate to a violation of the same interests and are related in such
a way that proof of the lesser crime is presented as part of the greater,
the requisite inherent relationship is satisfied. 3
The inherent relationship test was adopted by the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Stolarz.5 74  Defendant was indicted for assault with
intent to commit murder575 but found guilty of assault With a danger-
ous weapon with intent to do bodily harm. 6  Reasoning that both
569. United States v. Kearney, 560 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Perry, 550
F.2d 524 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977).
570. United States v. Kearney, 560 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1977) (where evidence indi-
cated defendant knew or had reason to know of broad project to transport narcotics, con-
spiracy allegation sustained). See also United States v. Monroe, 552 F.2d 860, 862-63 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977); United States v. Perry, 550 F.2d 524, 528-29, 532-33
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977); United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150, 158 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974). The government, moreover, need not prove
that an alleged co-conspirator knew all the purposes of and all of the participants in the
conspiracy. United States v. Kearney, 560 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Hobson, 519 F.2d 765, 775 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 931 (1975).
571. FED. R. CaiM. P. 31(c).
572. 447 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
573. Id. at 319.
574. 550 F.2d 488 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 851 (1977).
575. Defendant was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a) (1976), which provides:
Whoever, within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, is
guilty of an assault shall be punished as follows:
(a) Assault with intent to commit murder or rape, by imprisonment for not more
than twenty years.
576. The conviction was pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1976), which provides:
Whoever, within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, is
guilty of an assault shall be punished as follows:
(c) Assault with a dangerous weapon, with intent to do bodily harm, and without
just cause or excuse, by fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment for not more than
five years, or both.
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offenses related to the same interest in preventing and punishing as-
saults, and that proof of the lesser crime was presented as part of the
greater, 77 the Stolarz court concluded that the defendant could prop-
erly be convicted of the lesser included offense.578
4. Crimes Involving Federal Regulation of Firearms
Congress, through the Gun Control Act of 1968,579 has provided a
comprehensive plan for the regulation and control of firearms. Section
922(h) of the Act makes it illegal for a felon to receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been transported in interstate commerce.- 80 In
several 1977 cases, the Ninth Circuit construed the words "firearms"
and "receive . . .in interstate commerce" as those terms are used in
section 922(h).
The defendant in United States v. Mitchell,5 81 convicted under sec-
tion 922(h), contended that the word "firearm" excluded rifles and
shotguns used for hunting or sporting purposes. While recognizing
that other sections of the Gun Control Act not dealing with felons may
provide exemptions for hunting guns, the Ninth Circuit held that sec-
tion 922(h) contains no such exemption.58 2 The court's examination of
the legislative history and the language of the Gun Control Act indi-
cated that the purpose of section 922(h) is to remove all firearms from
the possession of felons.5 83  Felons are "persons Congress classified as
potentially irresponsible and dangerous. These persons are
comprehensively barred by the [Gun Control] Act from acquiring fire-
arms by any means.' '5""
577. The court recognized that since an assault with intent to murder may be committed
without the use of a dangerous weapon, an assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to
do bodily harm is not always a lesser included offense. 550 F.2d at 491. In Stolarz the
assault was committed with a dangerous weapon, namely a knife.
578. 550 F.2d at 492. The Ninth Circuit also discussed notice to the defendant of the
lesser offense. Such notice is required to prevent undue surprise. The court indicated that
the notice requirement is satisfied if the indictment reveals sufficient facts to alert the de-
fendant that a lesser charge clearly exists. Id.
579. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1976).
580. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (1976) which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person-
(1) who is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any court of, a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year... to receive any firearm
or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign com-
merce.
581. 557 F.2d 1290 (9th Cir. 1977).
582. Id. at 1291.
583. Id. at 1291-92.
584. Id. at 1292 (quoting Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212 (1976)) (emphasis added).
See also United States v. Haddad, 558 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1977).
1978]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
The Mitchell court also addressed the issue of when the receipt of a
firearm by a felon has a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce to
warrant the application of section 922(h). Relying on the reasoning of
a recent United States Supreme Court decision,58 5 the Ninth Circuit
held that the nexus with interstate commerce is satisfied if the firearm
has at somepoint in time been transported interstate.586 Thus, the fire-
arm need not be received directly from the stream of interstate com-
merce. Section 922(h) is applicable to a felon's receipt of a firearm
even when the interstate movement of that firearm occurred prior to
the passage of the Gun Control Act.587 The felon's knowledge of the
movement of the firearm in interstate commerce at some point in time
is not, however, an element of the crime. It is the felon's receipt of the
weapon which is the central element of a section 922(h) violation. 88
5. Crimes Involving the Illegal Entry of Aliens
The Immigration and Nationality Act 89 governs the admission and
deportation of persons who are not United States citizens or nationals.
The Act provides penalties for actions deemed to be subversive of con-
gressional intent.5 ° Section 1324(a)(2) of Title 8, United States Code,
for example, proscribes the knowing transportation of an alien in fur-
therance of the alien's unlawful presence in the United States.5 91
Charged with a violation of section 1324(a)(2), the defendant in
United States v. Moreno5 92 contended that employment situations and
incidents thereof were automatically outside the scope of the Act. Al-
though it reversed defendant's conviction, the Ninth Circuit rejected
any such blanket exemption for employment-related transportation of
585. See Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212 (1976).
586. 557 F.2d at 1292. See Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977) (the nexus
with interstate commerce requirement does not require "contemporaneous" interstate move-
ment for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1) (1976), which prohibitspossession of firearms by
felons). Prior to Scarborough, there had been a conflict within the Ninth Circuit whether
proof of prior movement in interstate commerce was sufficient to establish a nexus.
Compare United States v. Malone, 538 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1976) (movement of weapons 6
and 18 months prior to defendant's possession thereof was insufficient nexus) and United
States v. Cassity, 509 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1974) (shipment of rifle 7 years prior to defendant's
purchase thereof was insufficient nexus) with United States v. Bums, 529 F.2d 114 (9th Cir.
1975) (shipment of gun 11 months prior to defendant's possession thereof was sufficient
nexus).
587. 557 F.2d at 1292.
588. United States v. Haddad, 558 F.2d 968, 974 (9th Cir. 1977).
589. 8 U.S.C.,§§ 1101-1503 (1976).
590. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1330 (1976).
591. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (1976).
592. 561 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1977).
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illegal aliens.593 After considering the probable legislative intent, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that to fall within the scope of the Act the
transportation of an undocumented alien must bear a direct and sub-
stantial relationship to the furtherance of the alien's unlawful presence
in this country.5 94 The defendant's transportation of aliens, as a part
of his employment duties, had only a tangential connection with the
alien's domestic presence; such an attenuated relationship is insufficient
to fall within the proscriptions of section 1324(a)(2).5 95
B. Severance
The primary purpose of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b),
596
which governs joinder of defendants, is the promotion of efficiency in
the administration of justice.597 Proper joinder pursuant to rule 8(b)
requires that the charges against the defendants arise out of "the same
series of... transactions constituting an offense .... "598 Applying
593. The statutory language specifically excludes employment situations from the
harboring proscription of § 1324(a)(3); the exclusion, however, is limited to harboring only
and does not apply to the transportation proscriptions of § 1324(a)(2). See United States v.
Moreno, 561 F.2d 1321, 1322 (9th Cir. 1977).
594. 561 F.2d at 1322. Last term, in United States v. Gonzalez-Hemandez, 534 F.2d
1353 (9th Cir. 1976), the Ninth Circuit indicated that the following five factors must be
present before a conviction under § 1324(a)(2) is proper: (1) defendant transported alien in
the United States; (2) alien was not lawfully admitted into or entitled to enter the United
States; and (3) this was known by defendant; (4) defendant knew alien's entry was within the
last three years; and (5) defendant acted willfully in furtherance of alien's violation of the
law. Id. at 1354. The court in Moreno did not acknowledge the existence of this five-prong
test, other than to mention that "[t]his court in Gonzalez-Hernandez ... left open exactly
what constitutes in furtherance of the alien's violation of the law under § 1324(a)(2)." 561
F.2d at 1323.
595. Id. at 1322-23.
596. FED. R. CRIm. P. 8(b) provides:
Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if they
are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of
acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants may be
charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not
be charged in each count.
597. United States v. Gaines, 563 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1977); Parker v. United States,
404 F.2d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1004 (1969).
598. United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 898 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924
(1971) (quoting FED. L CRIM. P. 8(b)). See United States v. Kearney, 560 F.2d 1358, 1362
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 826 (1977) in which the court rejected appellants' contention
that the Government had erred by joining several "discrete" conspiracies into a single con-
spiracy count, thereby prejudicing them by guilt transference. The court stated that "[tihe
standard for determining the existence of a single conspiracy... is whether there was one
overall agreement among the various parties to perform various functions in order to carry
out the objectives of the conspiracy ... ." Id. See also Williamson v. United States, 310
F.2d 192, 197 n.16 (9th Cir. 1962) (each count must arise out of the same series of acts or
transactions).
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this standard the Ninth Circuit most often requires a showing that
"substantially the same facts . . . be adduced to prove each of the
joined offenses."59 9 That the violations charged are merely similar in
character is insufficient to warrant joinder.6°°
In United States v. Satteo-ield,6 °1 for example, appellant and a code-
fendant were joined in a single indictment charging five bank robber-
ies. Both defendants were alleged to have committed two of the
robberies, but the codefendant alone was charged with commission of
those remaining. The government, moreover, did not allege that ap-
pellant was involved in these latter offenses. Although claiming im-
proper joinder, appellant's rule 8(b) motion for severance was denied.
Focusing upon the evidence presented at trial, which pertained largely
to those offenses alleged to have been committed by the codefendant
alone, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that had separate trials occurred, this
evidence would have been largely irrelevant as to appellant.60 2 As
substantially the same facts would not have been adduced at separate
trials, the requisite "nexus between each offense. . . was absent" and
joinder was, therefore, improper.6 3
A defendant properly joined under rule 8(b) may, however, move for
severance pursuant to rule 14604 where prejudicial joinder may deny
him a fair trial.60 5 Such motions to sever must be timely made and
599. United States v. Satterfield, 548 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1977).
600. Id. (quoting United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 898 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 924 (1971)).
601. 548 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1977).
602. Id. at 1345.
603. Id.
604. FED. R. CrIuM. P. 14 provides:
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or
of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together, the
court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants
or provide whatever other reliefjustice requires. In ruling on a motion by a defendant
for severance the court may order the attorney for the government to deliver to the
court for inspection in camera any statements or confessions made by the defendants
which the government intends to introduce in evidence at trial.
605. See 8 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 14.02, at 14-3 (2d ed. 1948). The leading case
in this area is Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). In Bruton the trial court was
held to have violated the defendant's constitutional rights by denying severance. Evans and
Bruton were indicted for armed postal robbery. At their joint trial a postal inspector testi-
fied that Evans had confessed that both he and an unnamed accomplice had committed the
crime. Bruton was therefore implicated. The trial court admonished the jury that this
statement was inadmissible hearsay against Bruton and should therefore be disregarded.
Although the confession was competent evidence against Evans, the Supreme Court, in re-
versing Bruton's conviction, held that "because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite
instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extra-judicial statements in deter-mining [Bruton's] guilt, admission of Evans' confession in this joint trial violated [Bruton's]
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preserved through renewal at the conclusion of trial.6 °6 Unlike a rule
8(b) motion, which raises misjoinder as an issue of law, 60 7 a motion
pursuant to rule 14 is within the sound discretion of the trial court.60
The defendant, moreover, bears the heavy burden of demonstrating
that the court abused its discretion by denying severance.6 °9 In this
connection, "the test is whether a joint trial is so prejudicial to one
defendant as to require the exercise of that discretion in only one way,
that is, by ordering a separate trial."
610
The Ninth Circuit found this discretion clearly abused in United
States v. Vi'gil.611  Appellant and his codefendant were indicted for
heroin importation. The codefendant claimed he was unaware of the
presence of heroin in the vehicle at the time of his arrest, asserting in
addition that he hardly knew appellant. Seeking appellant's corrobo-
ration, codefendant moved for severance in order that appellant might
testify for him. The trial court was also informed that, although appel-
lant would not testify at a joint trial, he would be willing to testify at a
separate trial. While recognizing the importance of appellant's poten-
tially exonerating testimony, the court nonetheless denied the motion,
assuming instead that appellant might later decide to testify at the joint
trial. Concluding that the trial court should have relied upon the "rea-
right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment."
Id. at 126.
Defendants may base assertions of prejudicial joinder upon various allegations, although
reversal requires a clear showing of abuse of the trial court's discretion. See United States
v. Garrett, 565 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1977) (no severance required in joint trial of husband and
wife where the court was informed that codefendant husband would, if necessary, exercise
marital privilege to prevent wife from testifying and wife did not testify); U.S. v. Gaines, 563
F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1977) (disparity in proofs not sufficient to allow severance if jury can
reasonably be expected to compartmentalize the evidence as it relates to separate defend-
ants); United States v. Nace, 561 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1977) (evidence admissible against one
of two defendants did not demonstrate prejudice requiring severance).
606. United States v. Kaplan, 554 F.2d 958, 965-66 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); United
States v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir. 1972).
607. See United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
958 (1971).
608. Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 575 (1960). See United States v. Oropeza,
564 F.2d 316, 326 (9th Cir. 1977) (reversal proper only where defendant can demonstrate
abuse of discretion); United States v. Gulma, 563 F.2d 386, 391 (9th Cir. 1977) (reversal
proper only if discretion abused).
609. United States v. Cella, 568 F.2d 1266, 1288 (9th Cir. 1977). See also United States v.
Oropeza, 564 F.2d 316, 326 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Wood, 550 F.2d 435, 439 (9th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 359 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1050 (1976).
610. United States v. Kaplan, 554 F.2d 958, 966 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 483
(1977); accord, United States v. Cella, 568 F.2d 1266, 1288 (9th Cir. 1977).
611. 561 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1977).
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sonable representation" that appellant would testify, the Ninth Circuit
observed that "[w]hen the reason for severance is the asserted need for
a codefendant's testimony, the defendant must show that he would call
the codefendant at a severed trial, that the codefendant would in fact
testify, and that the testimony would be favorable to the moving de-
fendant."6 2  Having satisfied this burden, the defendant in Vigil
should have been granted a separate trial.
C Conduct of the Trial
1. Conduct of the Trial Judge
The important responsibility of the trial judge to promote a fair trial
has been consistently recognized by both the United States Supreme
Court and the Ninth Circuit.613 In the execution of this responsibility,
the court has necessarily been afforded a wide latitude of discretion
both to regulate and to participate in the trial proceedings. 614 The trial
judge may, for example, grant or deny continuances615 and mistrials,
616
612. Id. at 1317; accord, United States v. Kaplan, 554 F.2d 958, 966 (9th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 483 (1977); United States v. Wood, 550 F.2d 435,439 (9th Cir.
1977).
613. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 86 (1976) (court conduct unreasonable where
defendant prevented from consulting with attorney during 17 hour recess) ("[t]he judge is
not a mere moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper
conduct... .') (quoting Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933)); United States
v. Trapnell, 512 F.2d 10, 12 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (pro se defense does not allow court
to assume exclusive responsibility of witness examination) ("The trial judge is charged with
the responsibility of conducting the trial as fairly and impartially as possible."); Smith v.
United States, 305 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962) (court participa-
tion in witness examination not error where cumulative effect does not deny fair trial) ("A
federal trial judge. . . has the responsibility to preside in such a way as to promote a fair
and expeditious development of the facts unencumbered by irrelevancies.").
614. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 86-87 (1976). Mr. Chief Justice Burger suc-
cinctly observed that "[t]he trial judge must meet situations as they arise and to do this must
have broad power to cope with the complexities and contingencies inherent in the adversary
process .... If truth and fairness are not to be sacrificed, the judge must exert substantial
control over the proceedings." Id. (citations omitted). See also United States v. Marshall,
532 F.2d 1279, 1286 (9th Cir. 1976) (refusal to allow defense counsel in summation to read
into record portions of unrelated court opinions not error); United States v. Larson, 507 F.2d
385, 389 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (court participation in witness examination insuffi-
ciently prejudicial to warrant reversal); Robinson v. United States, 401 F.2d 248, 252 (9th
Cir. 1968) (court questioning of witness did not approach outer limits of broad discretion to
manage trial); Smith v. United States, 305 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 371 US. 890
(1962) (court participation in examination not error if cumulative effect does not deny fair
trial).
615. United States v. Jones, 564 F.2d 1315, 1316 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (not abuse of
discretion to deny continuance where calendar long established and no acceptable justifica-
tion for delay submitted); United States v. Thompson, 559 F.2d 552, 553 (9th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977) (denial of continuance for production of absent
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institute necessary security precautions,61 7 exclude cumulative evi-
dence,618 or restrict the scope 19 and extent620 of cross-examination.
witness permitted where testimony cumulative and no reasonable assurance that witness
could be secured); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 745 n.7 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1045 (1978) (not error to deny continuance where request was product of lack of
due diligence).
616. United States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d 1069, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Hodges, 566 F.2d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (not error to deny mistrial for im-
proper prosecutorial remarks, where curative instruction given and no appearance of im-
proper jury influence); United States v. Gulma, 563 F.2d 386, 390-91 (9th Cir. 1977) (not
error to deny mistrial where weapon, not admitted into evidence, was seen by jury on prose-
cution table but evidence relevant to conviction was distinct and cautionary instruction
given). See also Illinois v. Sommerville, 410 U.S. 458, 462 (1973) (trial judge has broad
discretion, unfettered by mechanical formula, to declare mistrial); Tisnado v. United States,
547 F.2d 452, 460-61 (9th Cir. 1976) (mistrial decisions lie within discretion of court). The
burden falls upon the defense to establish abuse of discretion in the denial of a mistrial.
United States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d at 1085. See also Corley v. Cardwell, 544 F.2d 349, 351
(9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1048 (1977) (mistrial decisions within
discretion of court; defendant has burden of proving abuse when pleading double jeopardy);
Oelke v. United States, 389 F.2d 668, 671 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968)
(defendant pleading double jeopardy has burden of proving abuse of discretion).
617. United States v. Bracy, 566 F.2d 649, 659 (9th Cir. 1977) (not error to permit plain-
clothes marshalls within courtroom at narcotics trial where case involved testimony of
threatened witness). See also United States v. Clardy, 540 F.2d 439, 442-44 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 963 (1976) (not error to permit plainclothes marshalls within courtroom
where terrorist attack possible and cautionary instruction given).
618. United States v. Henry, 560 F.2d 963, 965-66 (9th Cir. 1977) (limitation on number
of character witnesses permitted where no showing made that additional witnesses would
offer new evidence). See also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 127 (1974) ("The
District Court retains considerable latitude even with admittedly relevant evidence in re-
jecting that which is cumulative. - . ."); United States v. Fernandez, 497 F.2d 730, 735-36
(9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975) (needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence may be excluded at discretion of trial judge); Loux v. United States, 389 F.2d 911, 917
(9th Cir.), ceri. denied, 393 U.S. 867 (1968) ("It]he court needs the right to impose some
limitation on the number of witnesses testifying about a particular fact. Decision as to how
many must be left to the sound discretion of the judge.").
619. Skinner v. Cardwell, 564 F.2d 1381, 1388-89 (9th Cir. 1977) (not error to refuse de-
fense cross-examination on collateral matter for impeachment purposes where information
only marginally relevant and jury otherwise possesed sufficient information to appraise bias
and motives of witness). See also United States v. Wood, 550 F.2d 435, 440 (9th Cir. 1976)
(not error to restrict cross-examination of prosecution informant witness); United States v.
Trejo, 501 F.2d 138, 140 (9th Cir. 1974) (court has broad discretion to curtail cross-examina-
tion on collateral matters); United States v. Haili, 443 F.2d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir. 1971) (court
discretion to curtail scope of cross-examination not abusive unless right of confrontation
denied); Enciso v. United States, 370 F.2d 749, 751 (9th Cir. 1967) (curtailment of cross-
examination of drug informant witness not error).
620. Skinner v. Cardwell, 564 F.2d 1381, 1388-89 (9th Cir. 1977). See, e.g., Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (court has broad discretion to curtail repetitive examina-
tion); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694 (1931) (extent of otherwise relevant cross-
examination within discretion of court); Un'ted States v. McGregor, 529 F.2d 928, 931 (9th
Cir. 1976) (conditioning continued enforcement of prior evidentiary stipulation upon limita-
tion of cross-examination may constitute error).
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In Skinner v. Cardwell,621 the Ninth Circuit enunciated for the first
time the standard to be used in evaluating the trial court's discretion to
curtail otherwise relevant cross-examination. Recognizing the need to
balance the right of the defendant to cross-examine adverse witnesses
against the need to exclude marginally relevant and unnecessary testi-
mony, the Skinner court concluded:
The test for whether cross-examination about a relevant topic was ef-
fective, i.e., whether the trial court has abused its discretion, is whether
the jury is otherwise in possession of sufficient information upon which to
make a discriminating appraisal of the subject matter at issue. When the
refused cross-examination relates to impeachment evidence, we look to
see whether the jury had sufficient information to appraise the bias and
motives of the witness.
6 2 2
The court's discretionary authority over the trial proceedings further
extends to selection of the type623 and language624 of jury instructions,
and the decision to discharge6 25 or pol1626 jurors, or to sequester wit-
621. 564 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1977).
622. Id. at 1389. See United States v. Kelley, 545 F.2d 619, 623 (8th Cir. 1976) (limita-
tion of cross-examination on collateral matter not bearing on truth or veracity within discre-
tion of court); United States v.. Turcotte, 515 F.2d 145, 151 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 423 U.S.
1032 (1975) (court may curtail impeachment examination if jury otherwise in possession of
sufficient information); United States v. Baker, 494 F.2d 1262, 1266-67 (6th Cir. 1974) (mat-
ters of impeachment not within collateral category); United States v. Blackwood, 456 F.2d
526, 529-30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 863 (1972) (where court refusal to allow recall of
prosecution witness challanged by defense, any abuse harmless when witness' motives re-
peatedly emphasized by court and counsel). See also Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S.
414, 421-23 (1953) (court discretion to curtail cross-examination cannot be expanded to pre-
clude relevant impeachment information).
623. United States v. Butcher, 557 F.2d 666, 670-71 (9th Cir. 1977) (cautionary instruction
on witness identification properly denied). See also United States v. Masterson, 529 F.2d
30,32 (9th Cir.), ceri. denied, 426 U.S. 908 (1976) (not error to deny eyewitness identification
instruction); United States v. Sambrano, 505 F.2d 284, 286-87 (9th Cir. 1974) (denial of
eyewitness identification instruction proper).
624. United States v. Thompson, 559 F.2d 552, 553 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cer. denied,
434 U.S. 973 (1977) ("A court is not bound to accept the language of an instruction re-
quested by counsel if the court gives it in substance."); United States v. Garcia-Rodriguez,
558 F.2d 956, 965-66 (9th Cir. 1977) ("A trial judge need not give an instruction proposed by
counsel for either side, provided he gives adequate instructions on each element of the
case."); Ajnsler v. United States, 381 F.2d 37, 52 (9th Cir. 1967) (court not bound to accept
proffered language nor give requested instruction).
625. United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 745-46 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1045 (1978) (appellant's rights not violated by discharge of juror prejudice, when replace-
ment with alternate approved by defense). See also United States v. Zambito, 315 F.2d 266,
269 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 924 (1963) (not error to discharge juror without hearing
following disclosure in chambers ofjuror after disclosure in chambers of untruthful voir dire
response).
626. United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 746 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045
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nesses.627 Provided he maintains the requisite neutrality,628 the trial
judge may actively participate in the criminal trial through questioning
witnesses6 29 or commenting to the jury.630 In United States v. Allsup,631
however, the effect of the judge's otherwise permissible intervention
(1978). See also Shibley v. United States, 237 F.2d 327,334 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
837 (1956) (court has discretion as to manner of polling jury).
627. United States v. Oropeza, 564 F.2d 316, 326 (9th Cir. 1977). See also Geders v.
United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87-91 (1976) (error to preclude defendant from conferring with
counsel during 17 hour recess); Taylor v. United States, 388 F.2d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 1967)
(refusal to permit defense to call witness in courtroom in violation of sequestration order
error where testimony important). The Court in Geders, importantly, distinguished the im-
pact of a sequestration order on the defendant from that on a non-party witness, holding
that, in light of alternative means of avoiding improper influence or coached testimony, an
order preventing the defendant from consulting his attorney for any purpose during a 17
hour recess violated his sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel. 425 U.S. at 88,
91.
The choice of sanctions for violation of a sequestration order falls within the discretion of
the court. It is clear that a witness present in the courtroom while under such an order is not
automatically disqualified, but may testify at the discretion of the court. United States v.
Oropeza, 564 F.2d at 326; Taylor v. United States, 388 F.2d at 788; Spindler v. United
States, 336 F.2d 678, 682 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 909 (1965) (disqualification
for violation of sequestration order not automatic; sanctions within court discretion).
628. The Ninth Circuit, of course, continues to recognize the importance of the appear-
ance of neutrality in this context.
While the trial judge has a broad discretion with respect to his interrogation of wit-
nesses, he must always be sensitive to his role as judge and the fact that in the eyes of
the jury he "occupies a position of preeminence and special persuasiveness" and ac-
cordingly "be assiduous in performing his function as governor of the trial dispassion-
ately, fairly and impartially."
United States v. Trapnell, 512 F.2d 10, 12 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (quoting Pollard v.
Fennell, 400 F.2d 421,424 (4th Cir. 1968)). See also United States v. Pena-Garcia, 505 F.2d
964, 967 (9th Cir. 1974) (cumulative effect of court's questioning of alien required reversal)
("It]he judge cannot conduct his questioning in such manner as to convey to the jury the
impression that he has formed an opinion as to the truth of the witness' statement or the
verdict that should be returned. [Nor may] the judge. . . usurp [the] role [of] competent
counsel."); United States v. Harris, 501 F.2d 1, 10 (9th Cir. 1974) (court must avoid even
appearance of advocacy or partiality); United States v. Malcolm, 475 F.2d 420, 427-28 (9th
Cir. 1973) (court interruption of prosecution cross-examination and closing argument not
error).
629. United States v. Cornfeld, 563 F.2d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 922 (1978) (questioning permitted to clear up ambiguities and clarify issues
for jury). See also United States v. Larson, 507 F.2d 385, 389-90 (9th Cir. 1974) (per
curiam) (court participation in examination insufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal);
United States v. Aguar, 472 F.2d 553, 555 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (court examination to
elicit answers in greater detail permitted); Smith v. United States, 305 F.2d 197, 204-05 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U. S. 890 (1962) (court participation in examination not error where
cumulative effect does not deny fair trial).
630. United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 751 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045
(1978) (although no prejudice possible because jury had retired, court retains right of fair
comment). See also United States v. Diaz-Rodriguez, 478 F.2d 1005, 1006 (9th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. dismissed, 412 U.S. 964 (1973) (not error to comment on evidence when it is
made clear that jury is ultimate fact-finder); Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721, 728 (9th
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into defense cross-examination was to rehabilitate a prosecution wit-
ness whose eyewitness identification had been seriously undermined by
defense counsel. The Ninth Circuit found this participation improper,
observing that "[tihe impact of the district court's interrogation was to
destroy the effect of telling cross-examination, to rehabilitate the wit-
ness, and to give her testimony an extra and a potentially prejudicial
persuasiveness.
632
Only an egregious exercise of this discretionary authority over the
trial proceedings will justify reversal on appeal.633  "[U]nless [the trial
judge's] misadventures so persistently pervade the trial or, considered
individually or together, are of such magnitude that a courtroom cli-
mate unfair to the defendant is discernable from the cold record, the
defendant is not sufficiently aggrieved to warrant a new trial. 634
To obtain effective review of the trial environment and any alleged
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, a complete and accu-
rate record of the trial proceedings is required. It is therefore
mandatory that all proceedings in open court, especially the opening
and closing statements of counsel, be recorded by the court reporter.635
Where there is a failure to record any part of the proceedings, the ap-
propriate remedy may be to vacate the judgment and remand the case
to determine whether an appellant was prejudiced by such error.636
Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 920 (1958) (court comment permissible if final decision left to
jury).
631. 566 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 1977).
632. Id. at 73.
633. United States v. Marshall, 532 F.2d 1279, 1286 (9th Cir. 1976) ("We have long held
that the trial judge's discretion in his management of the trial is wide, and that prejudicial
error is committed only when that discretion is abused.").
634. Smith v. United States, 305 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962).
See also United States v. Stanfield, 521 F.2d 1122, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (trial
judge's opening statement for both sides that obscured correct standard for jury considera-
tion of evidence constituted prejudicial error).
635. United States v. Piascik, 559 F.2d 545, 547-48, 550-51 (9th Cir. 1977), cer. denied,
434 U.S. 1062 (1978). See also Brown v. United States, 314 F.2d 293, 295-96 (9th Cir. 1963)
(failure to record closing arguments in prostitution prosecution required remand for eviden-
tiary hearing on possible prejudice); 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) (1976).
Although the Ninth Circuit stressed that voir dire examinations, opening and closing
statements of counsel and bench conferences when requested by court or counsel should be
included in the record, it acknowledged that "not. . .every word spoken during a criminal
trial must be recorded," indicating that pre-charge, in-chambers discussions of court and
counsel probably fall outside the ambit of the statute. 559 F.2d at 547-48. Of course, the
defendant may at trial waive the requirements of the statute (28 U.S.C. § 753(b)). Id. at
550.
636. United States v. Piascik, 559 F.2d 545, 547 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062
(1978). "The appropriate precedure [on appeal] is to vacate the judgment and remand for a
hearing to determine whether appellant was prejudiced by the error in failing to record the
1978] CRIMINAL LAV SUR VEY
2. Conduct of the Prosecutor
That the United States Attorney must conform to a high standard of
conduct in the exercise of his prosecutorial discretion is beyond
doubt.637 This discretion is necessarily broad, as to both the cases to
be tried and the charges to be ffled,638 and pursuant to the separation of
powers is generally immune from judicial review.639
The prosecutor, however, may be neither unconstitutionally selective
[closing] arguments. If [so], a new trial may be ordered. If [not], a new final judgment may
be entered." Id. (quoting Brown v. United States, 314 F.2d 293, 295 (9th Cir. 1963)).
637. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110-11 (1976) (prosecutorial nondisclosure
of unrequested information must create reasonable doubt of guilt not otherwise extant to
warrant reversal) (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)); Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) where Mr. Justice Sutherland observed:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a contro-
versy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done .... [His] twofold aim. .. is
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer... . [W]hile he may strike hard blows,
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one.
Id. Moroyoqui v. United States, 570 F.2d 862, 864 (9th Cir. 1977) (prosecutor may not
"goad" defendant into requesting mistrial); United States v. Segna, 555 F.2d 226, 234 (9th
Cir. 1977) (highly emotionally charged testimony of decedent's wife introduced by prosecu-
tor, admitted in absence of objection) ("[S]uch an intentional injection of sympathy and
prejudice falls far below the standard of conduct that should be expected of a responsible
representative of the United States Attorney.") (Gray, District J., sitting by designation, dis-
senting); United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 892 (9th Cir. 1974), cer. denied, 419 U.S.
1120 (1975) (improper closing remarks implying defendant was violent cured by cautionary
instruction) ("The prosecution, as the representative of the government, is expected to follow
high standards in conducting its ase.. .. [B]ut during an extensive and fiercely contested
trial, we cannot realistically expect perfection.").
638. United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir. 1976) (retaliatory
reindictment impermissible but prosecutor retains discretion as to initial charges); United
States v. Olson, 504 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1974) (dismissal of multi-count indictment
reversed when trial judge improperly attempted to limit prosecutor to single count); Spill-
man v. United States, 413 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 930 (1969) (prose-
cution decision contra to voluntary Justice Department memorandum not subject to court
review) ("The United States Attorney must be given wide latitude in order to effectively
enforce the federal criminal laws.").
639. United States v. Olson, 504 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1974) ("[A]s an incident of the
constitutional separation of powers. . . the courts are not to interfere with the free exercise
of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States in their control over crimi-
nal prosecutions.") (quoting United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167,171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 935 (1965)); United States v. Gray, 448 F.2d 164, 168-69 (9th Cir. 1971), cer.
denied, 405 U.S. 926 (1972) (district court not authorized, without prosecutorial consent, to
accept guilty pleas to lesser included offenses)); Spillman v. United States, 413 F.2d 527, 530
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 930 (1969) (prosecution decision contra to voluntary Justice
Department memorandum not subject to court inquiry); In re United States, 306 F.2d 737,
738 (9th Cir. 1962) (improper dismissal of three counts of four count indictment on ground
that one count imposed sufficient sentence denied executive branch right to prosecute).
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in initiating charges against the accused," ° nor vindictive in retaliation
for the defendant's successful assertion of procedural rights.641
In United States v. Thurnhuber,"2 for example, the defendant was
originally indicted and tried on one count of federal credit fraud. Fol-
lowing the district court's sua sponte declaration of a mistrial, the
government filed a superseding indictment charging the defendant with
three counts of fraud; the defendant was convicted on all three counts.
Although reemphasizing "that when the prosecution has occasion to
reindict the accused because the accused has exercised some procedural
right, the prosecution bears a heavy burden of proving that any in-
crease in the severity of the alleged charges was not motivated by a
vindictive motive,"643 the Ninth Circuit reasoned that this presumption
was inapplicable because the mistrial was declared, not in response to a
defense motion, but on the court's own initiative. ' The Thurnhuber
court further observed that the presumption of retaliation "arises only
as a shield against the possibility of actualvindictiveness and not against
640. A successful allegation of selective prosecution requires the claimant to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating first "that others similarly situated gen-
erally have not been prosecuted for conduct similar to that for which he was prosecuted
[and] [s]econdly... that his selection was based on an impermissible ground such as race,
religion or his exercise of his first amendment right of free speech." United States v. Scott,
521 F.2d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 1975), cer. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976) (member of tax rebel-
lion group prosecuted for tax evasion; discriminatory prosecution claim rejected). See also
United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1972) (member of census resistance
group prosecuted for failure to answer, discriminatory prosecution claim sustained); United
States v. Sacco, 428 F.2d 264, 271 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903 (1970) (selective
prosecution claim under alien registration statute rejected). Claims of discriminatory prose-
cution are deemed waived unless properly filed as part of a pretrial motion. FED. R. CraIM.
P. 12(bX2).
641. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-28 (1974). The Ninth Circuit considers the
attempted imposition of higher charges upon retrial for the same transaction as originally
charged to be "inherently suspect." United States v. Preciado-Gomez, 529 F.2d 935, 939
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 953 (1976) (superseding indictment charging more serious
offense on evidence unknown at time of original indictment permitted).
It is the prosecutor's burden in such cases to isolate either indentifiable conduct of the
defendant since the time of the original indictment justifying the increased penalty sought,
or other circumstances affirmatively appearing which serve as an adequate substitute. 529
F.2d at 940 (citing United States v. Gerard, 491 F.2d 1300, 1306 (9th 1974)). Cf. North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724-26 (1969) (absent affirmative demonstration of justifi-
cation, imposition of higher sentence by judge violates due process). See also United States
v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1369-71 (9th Cir. 1976) (felony reindictment conviction
reversed following defendant's refusal to waive right to jury trial on original misdemeanor
charge).
642. 572 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1977).
643. Id. at 1310 (quoting United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir.
1976)) (emphasis deleted).
644. Id.
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those situations which simply appear to the defendant to be vindictivly
motivated."' , 5
The prosecutor is held to an exemplary standard of behavior
throughout the trial proceeding." 6  He must therefore confine his re-
marks to the facts in evidence and reasonable inferences drawn there-
from.647 The prosecutor, moreover, may not make comments which
the jury would naturally and necessarily interpret as referring to the
failure of the accused to testify6
48
645. Id. n.3 (emphasis in original).
646. See note 637 supra.
647. United States v. Bracy, 566 F.2d 649, 658 (9th Cir. 1977) (closing comments concern-
ing defendant's illegal profit from smuggled narcotics not prejudical when supported by
record); United States v. Esquer-Gamez, 550 F.2d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir. 1977) (statement that
prosecutor was "trying to avoid bringing out some other matters that should not come out"
not error, when no reference to prior criminal conduct of defendant in record and other
evidence of guilt overwhelming); United States v. Fulton, 549 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir.
1977) (closing reference to defendant as "big dope peddler" constituted reasonable inference
from evidence falling within permissible latitude of argument); United States v. Jamerson,
549 F.2d 1263, 1267 (9th Cir. 1977) (incidental references to insignificant matter not in rec-
ord permitted); United States v. Parker, 549 F.2d 1217, 1222-23 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 971 (1977) (factual statements not fully supported by record fall within permissible
latitude of argument where no significant misstatement of evidence and cautionary instruc-
tion given); United States v. Gorostiza, 468 F.2d 915, 916 (9th Cir. 1972) (closing reference
to Perry Mason-like approach of defense fell within permissible latitude of argument);
United States v. Cummings, 468 F.2d 274, 277-78 (9th Cir. 1972) (improper closing remarks
concerning indictment procedure undermined presumption of innocence, requiring rever-
sal); United States v. Escoto-Nieto, 417 F.2d 623, 624 (9th Cir. 1969) (implied reference to
prior narcotic smuggling activities without basis in record warranted reversal); Tenorio v.
United States, 390 F.2d 96, 98-99 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 874 (1968) (closing com-
ment concerning heroin-caused destruction and human waste permissible in narcotics trial
as within common knowledge of reasonable people).
Of course, the failure of defense counsel to object to otherwise impermissable evidence
properly places that evidence before the jury, allowing prosecutorial comment. United
States v. Jamerson, 549 F.2d at 1266-67.
The Ninth Circuit recognizes a latitude of discretion in prosecutorial response to defense
arguments. See United States v. Fulton, 549 F.2d at 1328 (characterization of defendant as
"big dope peddler" permitted in partial response to defense arguments); United States v.
Parker, 549 F.2d at 1222-23 (unobjected-to response inferring personal belief in witness'
veracity not plain error where credibility hotly contested); United States v. Greenbank, 491
F.2d 184, 188 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 931 (1974) (praise and commendation of
informant permitted after defense characterization as "a rat.").
648. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 610-15 (1965). See United States v. Cornfeld,
563 F.2d 967, 970-71 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (reference to defendant's secrecy concern-
ing crime harmless because not naturally and necessarily taken as comment on silence);
United States v. Parker, 549 F.2d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1977) (reference to defendant's silence
improper but harmless beyond reasonable doubt); United States v. Helina, 549 F.2d 713, 718
(9th Cir. 1977) (skillful cross-examination not indirect comment on taxpayer's failure to pro-
duck privileged books and records) ('!Crafty questioning may constitute 'comment' despite
its obliquity."); United States v. Bodey, 547 F.2d 1383, 1387-88 (9th Cir. 1977) (statement
that defendant was "faking" lack of memory during cross-examination harmless where
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In reviewing the propriety of prosecutorial conduct the appellate fo-
cus is normally on the prejudicial effect of an alleged error, rather than
on the motive underlying its commission. 9 Since curative instruc-
tions by the trial judge may operate to neutralize the prejudicial impact
of improper remarks,650 the defendant must normally object at trial or
appellate relief is precluded.651 In the absence of such timely objection
the Ninth Circuit will grant relief only when "necessary. .. to prevent
a miscarriage of justice or to preserve the integrity and reputation of
the judicial process. '652 Prosecutorial comments which offend constitu-
weight attached by jury doubtful and curative instruction given); United States v. Wycoff,
545 F.2d 679, 681-82 (9th Cir. 1976) (reference to defendant's silence improper but harmless
beyond reasonable doubt when evidence of guilt overwhelming and curative instruction
given); Scarborough v. Arizona, 531 F.2d 959, 961-62 (9th Cir. 1976) (closing remarks con-
cerning defendant's silence during arrest and following Miranda warnings constituted re-
versible error). Cf. United States v. Murray, 530 F.2d 856, 857 (9th Cir. 1976) (reference to
failure of defense to produce corroborative witness permitted as not indirect comment on
defendant's silence); United States.v. Grammer, 513 F.2d 673, 676 (9th Cir. 1975) (closing
comment on defense failure to call expert fingerprint witness in rebuttal not improper as
indirect comment on silence); Ignacio v. Territory of Guam, 413 F.2d 513, 521 (9th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 943 (1970) (closing comment on defense failure to produce
rebuttal ballistics expert not indirect comment on defendant's failure to testify).
649. United States v. Dixon, 562 F.2d 1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 1977) (no punishment of prose-
cutor's unintentional blunder when no showing of prejudice made); United States v. Segna,
555 F.2d 226, 231 n.4 (9th Cir. 1977) (improper comments which shifted constitutional bur-
den of proof required reversal despite good faith of prosecutor).
The appellate court, of course, is not precluded from considering the bad faith of the
prosecutor. United States v. Segna, 555 F.2d at 231 n.4. See United States v. Trejo, 501
F.2d 138, 141 (9th Cir. 1974) (application of FED. R. CiuM. P. 52(b) within discretion of
court); Billed v. United States, 290 F.2d 628, 629 (9th Cir. 1961) (application of FED. R.
CIuM. P. 52(b) within court discretion); FED. R. CKIM. P. 52(b).
650. See United States v. Parker, 549 F.2d 1217, 1222-23 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 430 U.S.
971 (1977) (prosecutor's inferential arguments from evidence proper when jury instructed
that closing arguments themselves not evidence); United States v. Bodey, 547 F.2d 1383,
1388 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932 (1977) (impact of prosecutor's statement that de-
fendant "faking" memory lapse during testimony minimized when clear curative instruction
given); United States v. Pratt, 531 F.2d 395, 398 (9th Cir. 1976) (although no objection at
trial, no reversal for improperly exhibited weapon when evidence of guilt substantial and
cautionary instruction given); United States v. Gomez, 523 F.2d 185, 186 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1075 (1976) (not error for prosecutor to indicate defendant's son a
fugitive when curative instruction given); United States v. Bashaw, 509 F.2d 1204, 1205 (9th
Cir. 1975) (improper summation harmless when cautionary instruction given and evidence
of guilt overwhelming).
651. United States v. Cornfeld, 563 F.2d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
922 (1978) (when no objection made at trial and no plain error, no reversal granted); United
States v. Garcia, 555 F.2d 708, 711 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (no objection made and
reversal only if plain error); United States v. Memoli, 449 F.2d 160, 160 (9th Cir. 1971) (per
curiam), cer. denied, 405 U.S. 928 (1972) (plain error required for reversal if no objection).
652. United States v. Segna, 555 F.2d 226, 231 (9th Cir. 1977) (prosecutor statement im-
permissibly shifting burden of proof to defendant constituted plain error). See also United
States v. Cornfeld, 563 F.2d 967, 970 (9th Cir. 1977) (failure to object at trial requires dem-
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tionally protected rights of the accused are fundamentally erroneous
and warrant reversal unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.653
Prosecutorial misconduct not of constitutional dimensions will justify
reversal unless it is more probable than not that the error did not mate-
rially affect the verdict.6M
In United States v. Segna,65 for example, the prosecutor in his clos-
ing remarks made erroneous and misleading statements of the law, ef-
fectively shifting the burden of proof from the government to the
defendant. The defendant was consequently deprived of the benefits of
the reasonable doubt standard. Although the Ninth Circuit acknowl-
edged that the prejudicial impact of the comments may have been miti-
gated by both cautionary instructions and repeated correct statements
of the law, the court nonetheless found it highly probable that the ver-
dict had been "materially affected" and hence that the defendant had
been "seriously prejudiced."
65 6
The prosecutor's responsibility to seek substantial justice encom-
passes a duty of material disclosure to the defense.657 In United States
onstration of plain error to win appellate reversal); United States v. Garcia, 555 F.2d 708,
711 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (unobjected-to closing argument must constitute plain error
to warrant reversal); United States v. Wysong, 528 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir. 1976) (when no
objection made, failure to suppress evidence for lack of warrant not plain error); Reisman v.
United States, 409 F.2d 789, 791 (9th Cir. 1969) (reversal is warranted if unobjected-to error
is "seriously prejudicial" to defendant).
653. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) ("[B]efore a federal constitutional
error can be held harmless, the [appellate] court must be able to declare a belief that it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.").
654. United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1977) (upon timely objec-
tion, deficient jury instruction probably materially affecting verdict required reversal) ("A
more rigorous standard. . . is not justified where the interests involved are not sufficiently
important to merit explicit constitutional protection."). But see United States v. Rea, 532
F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 837 (1976) (reversal unwarranted
as deficient jury instruction harmless "beyond reasonable doubt."); United States v. Duhart,
496 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 967 (1974) (reversal required as deficient
jury instruction not harmless "beyond reasonable doubt.").
The Valle-Valdez court, however, avoided resolving any possible inconsistency in the
harmless error standard for jury instructions, reasoning that "application of either the
probability or the reasonable possibility standard results in reversal." 554 F.2d at 917.
655. 555 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1977) (when only contested issue was defendant's sanity, and
was extremely close, prosecutor's statement shifting burden of proof to defense to establish
insanity was plain error).
656. Id. at 232. See also United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1977).
657. The operational constraints in this area have been defined both by Supreme Court
decisions and local rules of court. See United States v. Jones, 564 F.2d 1315, 1316 (9th Cir.
1977) (per curiam) (suppression of defendant's inculpatory statement upheld when prosecu-
tion offered no justification for failure to follow local rule requiring written notice of intent
to use). For further discussion of the prosecutor's role in pretrial discovery, see notes 369-71
supra, and accompanying text.
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v. Agurs,6 58 the Supreme Court provided the benchmark by which
prosecutorial nondisclosure of material information is to be evaluated.
Recognizing that the extent of the duty to disclose turns upon both the
nature of the information and the scope of the defense request, Agurs
outlines the standard of review for each of the three situations in which
nondisclosure may occur: knowing use of perjured testimony by the
prosecution;659 failure to supply specific evidence in response to a spe-
cific defense request,660 and failure to disclose in response either to a
general demand for all exculpatory material or, no request at all.661
658. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
659. Id. at 103. "[A] conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is
fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the
false testimony could have affected the judgement of the jury." Id. (emphasis added) (foot-
notes omitted). See also United States v. Brown, No. 76-2925 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 1977) (as
amended Jan. 6, 1978) (nondisclosure upon general demand of government witness' false
statement, not perjured but relevant for impeachment purposes, not error when no reason-
able doubt as to guilt not otherwise extant created); United States v. Lasky, 548 F.2d 835,
839 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 821 (1977) (when cross-examination an-
swer of government witness concealing additional information so equivocal as to fall short
of perjury, nondisclosure must create reasonable doubt of guilt not otherwise extant); United
States v. Pope, 529 F.2d 112, 114 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (failure to disclose false testi-
mony by material government witness concerning plea bargain constituted reversible error
when bargain could affect credibility and, without testimony, strong likelihood of acquittal).
Cf. United States v. Bracy, 566 F.2d 649, 654-657 (9th Cir. 1977) (prosecution failure to
immediately disclose witness perjury before grand jury not denial of due process when testi-
mony immaterial, not relied upon by jury, and witness extensively cross-examined at trial
concerning perjury).
Rejecting a broader interpretation of the operative language of Agurs that could include
evidence relevant to witness credibility, the Ninth Circuit has specified that the "reasonable
likelihood" standard is limited to the knowing use of perjured testimony.
660. 427 U.S. at 104, 106. "When the prosecutor receives-a specific and relevant request,
the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable." Id. at 106. "[T]he suppres-
sion by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due proc-
ess where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id. at 104 n.10 (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1965)).
661. 427 U.S. at 106-07. The Court explained the rationale for reversal as follows:
[I]f the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt [as to guilti that did not otherwise
exist, constitutional error has been committed. This means that the omission must be
evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt
whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new
trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is already of questionable validity, additional
evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable
doubt.
Id. at 112-13 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). See also United States v. Bracy, 566
F.2d 649, 65 8-59 (9th Cir. 1977) (no prejudice occurred when jury otherwise apprised of all
exculpatory and impeaching evidence); Skinner v. Cardwell, 564 F.2d 1381, 1386 (9th Cir.
1977) (failure to disclose details of plea bargain with government witness not error when
undisclosed detail created no reasonable doubt of guilt).
Cognizant of the difficulties inherent in disclosure decisions, Mr. Justice Stevens cau-
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The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Brown,6 62 for example, was
confronted with prosecutorial nondisclosure, following a general de-
fense demand for all exculpatory matter, of portions of a material gov-
ernment witness' pretrial statement. In fact, the undisclosed portions
contained false claims. While acknowledging the relevancy of the
statement for impeachment purposes, the Brown court rejected appel-
lant's claim of prejudicial nondisclosure, reiterating that, absent per-
jury at trial or a specific defense request, to warrant reversal, any
undisclosed evidence must raise a reasonable doubt as to guilt.663
Moreover, as circumstances had suggested that appellant's co-counsel
was aware of the undisclosed statements, the Ninth Circuit observed
further that the defense
either negligently failed to discover and utilize information in their own
possession or deliberately withheld vital information from the trial court
as a ploy for a new trial or appellate reversal. In either event, defense
counsel will not be heard on appeal complaining about the failure of the
prosecution to disclose this very information.66'
3. Conduct of the Jury
The efficacy of the jury as a procedural safeguard 665 is seriously un-
dermined when a juror is prejudiced or otherwise improperly influ-
enced.666 Recognizing that the evaluation of such impropriety has
tioned that "[b]ecause we are dealing with an inevitably imprecise standard, and because the
significance of an item of evidence can seldom be predicted accurately until the entire record
is complete, the prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure."
427 U.S. at 108.
A well-reasoned dissent in Agurs, however, urged adoption of a less stringent standard of
review: "If there is a signffcant chance that the withheld evidence, developed by skilled
counsel, would have induced reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to avoid a
conviction, then the judgment of the conviction must be set aside." 427 U.S. at 119 (Mar-
shall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
662. No. 76-2925 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 1977) (as amended Jan. 8, 1978) (nondisclosure, upon
general demand, of government witness' false statement, not perjured but relevant for im-
peachment, not error when no reasonable doubt not otherwise extant created).
663. Id, slip op. at 2302-03.
664. Id, slip op. at 2303 (footnote omitted).
665. The Supreme Court has characterized the jury as a protective buffer, fundamental to
the equitable administration ofjustice: "The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exer-
cise of arbitrary power-to make available the commonsense judgment of the community as
a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional
or perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a judge." Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 530 (1975) (jury selection from representative community cross section essential to sixth
amendment guarantees; systematic exclusion of women from venire impermissible) (citing
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968) (sixth amendment applicable to states via
fourteenth amendment)).
666. United States v. Hendrix, 549 F.2d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818
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traditionally fallen within the discretion of the trial judge,667 the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Hendrix668 agreed that the decision to hold
an evidentiary hearing to investigate allegations of juror bias or mis-
conduct, as well as to determine that hearing's nature and scope, is
within the province of the court.169 The jury in Hendrix had been im-
paneled for several hours when the defendant's wife and mother-in-law
complained to defense counsel of juror statements allegedly revealing a
bias against, and a predisposition to convict, criminal defendants. De-
nying the defense request for an immediate investigation, the trial court
instead heard arguments three weeks later on the defendant's motion
for a new trial based on the allegations. While reserving unqualified
approval of the court's procedure,670 the Ninth Circuit nonetheless con-
cluded that a proper response to allegations of bias or misconduct
should "be directed by the content of the allegations, including the seri-
ousness of the alleged misconduct or bias, and the credibility of the
source."
671
(1977) (trial judge possesses broad discretion in initiation and control of evidentiary hear-
ings on juror bias or misconduct) ("If only one juror is unduly biased or prejudiced or
improperly influenced, the criminal defendant is denied his Sixth Amendment right to an
impartial panel."). See also Tillman v. United States, 406 F.2d 930, 937 (5th Cir.), vacated
on other grounds, 395 U.S. 830 (1969) (trial judge has broad discretion as to evidentiary
hearings on juror misconduct); Stone v. United States, 113 F.2d 70, 77 (6th Cir. 1940) (error
to deny juror discharge motion when attempted bribe of juror raised presumption of
prejudice).
667. United States v. Hendrix, 549 F.2d 1225, 1227-28 & n.l (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 818 (1977). See, e.g., United States v. Shahane, 517 F.2d 1173, 1179 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975) (although evidentiary hearing held, not error to deny mistrial for
bias in drug case when juror not incapable of giving defendant fair trial); United States v.
Doe, 513 F.2d 709, 712 (1st Cir. 1975) (court has discretion to determine extent and type of
evidentiary hearing on mistrial motion); Tillman v. United States, 406 F.2d 930, 938 (5th
Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 395 U.S. 830 (1969) (type and extent of hearing pursuant to
mistrial motion within discretion of court).
668. 549 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818 (1977).
669. Id. at 1227-28.
670. Id at 1229 & n.3 ("[Wle do not mean to imply that the approach taken to the prob-
lem was ideal. We simply hold that it did not amount to an abuse of discretion."). Recog-
nizing the rarity of reversal for conducting too extensive an evidentiary hearing, the Ninth
Circuit observed that the judge could have questioned the juror personally during or imme-
diately following the trial or at the later hearing. Id.
671. Id. at 1227-28 & n.2. See also United States v. McKinney, 429 F.2d 1019, 1031 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 922 (1970) (Godbold, J., dissenting) (although majority held
evidentiary hearings mandatory, court should have discretion to consider the source and
content of misconduct or bias allegations).
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D. Evidence
1. Character Evidence
a. Admissibility of Prior Acts
Subject to certain exceptions, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not
permit specific acts of a witness' conduct to be proved, for the purpose
of attacking or supporting his credibility, by extrinsic evidence.
672
"[T]he examiner must take his answer" 673 and is precluded from refut-
ing the witness' denial that he engaged in a particular act by calling
other witnesses to prove the misconduct.674 This rule, which follows
conventional federal practice,675 is applied throughout the circuits,
676
including the Ninth.677 Yet, in United States v. Batts,67 s the Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld the trial court's admission of extrinsic evidence to prove a
witness' misconduct, thereby ignoring the express provisions of rule
608(b). In Batts the defendant was accused of the importation and
possession of hashish.67 9 He took the witness stand in his own defense.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned him regarding his
knowledge of the use of cocaine; the defendant denied any such knowl-
edge.680 In order to refute the defendant's denial, the prosecutor called
a rebuttal witness who testified that the defendant had sold cocaine to
an undercover agent seven months earlier.681  By allowing this extrin-
sic evidence to be admitted, the trial court clearly failed to adhere to
rule 608(b). In upholding the lower court's decision, the Ninth Circuit
recognized that rule 608(b) precluded the admission of extrinsic evi-
672. FED. R. EVID. 608. The exceptions are: "(1) specific instances are provable when
they have been the subject of criminal conviction [FED. R. EVID. 609(a)], and (2) specific
instances may be inquired into on cross-examination of the principal witness or of a witness
giving an opinion of his character for truthfulness." FED. R. EVID. 608, Adv. Comm. Notes.
See United States v. Nevitt, 563 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (trial court's
failure to admit the prior felony conviction of a prosecution witness constituted reversible
error); United States v. Ortega, 561 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1977) (district court erred in
preventing defendant from impeaching government witness with prior felony conviction);
FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
673. 3 L WmNsTmN & M. BERGER, WEisTmiN's EVIDENCE 608[05], at 608-22 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as WEiNsTEiN].
674. Id.
675. See, eg., United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83, 89 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
986 (1977); United States v. Brown, 547 F.2d 438, 445 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 937
(1977); United States v. Cluck, 544 F.2d 195, 196 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
676. See, ag., United States v. Wood, 550 F.2d 435, 441 (9th Cir. 1977).
677. See WEINSTEIN, sufpra note 673, at 608-21.
678. 558 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1977).
679. Id. at 514.
680. Id. at 516.
681. Id
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dence.68 2 However, the court stated that a "rigid, blind application" of
this rule would result in submitting a distorted view of the case to the
jury,683 and would thus defeat the ultimate purpose of the rules of evi-
dence: the ascertainment of the truth.684 The court viewed the issue in
this case as essentially a confrontation between rules 608(b) and 102,
which required the trial court to undertake a balancing test. Yet, rule
608(b) specfcally prohibits the extrinsic proof of a witness' con-
duct-the use of any "balancing" by the trial court is simply not a part
of the rule's application.
b. Proof of Consequential Facts
The Federal Rules of Evidence preclude the admission of evidence
of prior acts to prove an accused's propensity to act in conformity with
the crime charged.685  However, prior acts that are relevant to prove a
material fact in a case are admissible. 8 6 Because the prior conduct is
682. Id at 517.
683. Id
684. See FED. R. EvD. 102.
685. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
The rationale for the exclusion of evidence of prior acts to prove criminal disposition has
been discussed as follows:
The rule is justified primarily on the ground that the probative value of propensity
evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect on a jury. The introduction of such
evidence is said to create a danger that the jury will punish the defendant for offenses
other than those charged, or at least that it will convict when unsure of guilt, because it
is convinced that the defendant is a bad man deserving of purnishment. In addition, it
is argued that the jury might be unable to identify with a defendant of offensive charac-
ter, and hence tend to disbelieve the evidence in his favor. At the least, it is said that
such evidence would be given greater probative weight than it deserves, and so lead to
convictions on insufficient evidence. Furthermore, saddling a person forever with his
record might tend to discourage reformation.
Note, Procedural Protections of the Criminal Defendant-A Reevaluation of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination and the Rule Excluding Evidence of Propensity to Commit Crime,
78 HARv. L. RaV. 426, 436 (1964) (footnote omitted).
686. See Fernandez v. United States, 329 F.2d 899, 908 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
832 (1964) ("Relevant evidence which tends to prove a material fact in the case on trial is
admissible even though it incidentally shows that the accused committed another offense at
a different time and place."); United States v. Grammer, 513 F.2d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1975)
(handwriting samples culled from defendant's prison records admissible even though they
incidentally revealed the existence of such records). But see United States v. Pavon, 561
F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1977) (probation officer's testimony from which jury could infer that
defendant had committed prior criminal acts was inadmissible). Attorneys must be pre-
pared to inform the court precisely how the proffered character evidence "may tend to prove
or disprove a proper consequential fact in the case." 2 WEiNSTEiN, supra note 673, 404
[08], at 404-42.
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not part of the crime charged, some relevancy between the two acts
must exist." 7 However, if the probative value of the proffered charac-
ter evidence is outweighed by undue prejudice to the defendant, the
judge may exclude it under rule 403 .688 The appellate court will scruti-
nize the judge's actions in order to determine whether an abuse of dis-
cretion has occurred.68 9
The Ninth Circuit has held that where the defendant's criminal
intent is at issue,61 evidence of prior acts will be admissible if three
criteria are met: "(1) the prior act . . . [must be] similar and close
enough in time to be relevant, (2) the evidence of the prior act...
[must be] clear and convincing," and (3) as with all prior acts, the pro-
bative effect must outweigh potential prejudice. 69 1 However, in United
States v. RMMgins 692 the court recognized that
[t]he other crimes disclosed by the proffered evidence must be "similar,"
to the offense charged f similarity of the crimes is the basis for the rele-
vance of the evidence. But relevance is the essential criterion. Relevant
evidence is not to be excluded because it fails to meet a similarity require-
ment.
693
Following the holding in Riggins, the Ninth Circuit upheld the ad-
mission of evidence of dissimilar acts in United States v. Hearst.
694
Hearst was on trial for armed robbery committed in San Francisco.
During its case-in-chief, the Government introduced evidence which
connected her with criminal activity at a sporting goods store in Los
Angeles. The Government also presented evidence which showed that
Hearst was involved in a kidnapping and a theft. All of these acts were
subsequent to those charged in the indictment. On appeal, Hearst
claimed that these acts were so dissimilar to the crimes charged that
687. United States v. Jones, 425 F.2d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 823
(1970).
688. FED. R. EvID. 403. See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1336 (9th Cir. 1977)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1657 (1978) (per curiam); FED. R. EviD. 404, Adv.
Comm. Note, subd. (b).
689. See United States v. Brown, 562 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1977).
690. As provided in FED. R. EvID. 404(b), intent is only one of the issues which may be
proved by prior acts. Thus, acts not part of the crime charged may be used to show motive,
opportunity, plan, scheme, knowledge, modus operandi, or absence of mistake or accident.
See United States v. Testa, 548 F.2d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 1977).
691. United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315, 1325 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1111 (1977).
692. 539 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977).
693. Id at 683. See also United States v. Satterfield, 548 F.2d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir. 1977)
("T]he test of admissibility is frequently whether the prior offenses are similar to those
charged.").
694. 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977).
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they "offer[ed] little insight into her state of mind during the rob-
bery." '695 In rejecting Hearst's argument, the court stated that the sub-
sequent acts, although dissimilar to the robbery, were most relevant to
the issue of her state of mind as of the time the robbery was commit-
ted.6 96 Since Hearst had raised a defense of duress at the trial, the
court viewed the evidence of the subsequent acts as tending to show
that she had willingly participated in later criminal activity with the
same people that had been involved in the robbery.697 Consequently,
it could be inferred that she had not acted under duress when she par-
ticipated in the bank robbery itself.698 The relevance, then, of the evi-
dence of Hearst's Los Angeles activities was not "depend[ent] on the
similarity" to the crime charged.699  Rather, the relevance lay in the
proof of a consequential fact in the case-Hearst's state of mind. The
lack of similarity was, therefore, not a sufficient reason for excluding
the proffered evidence since the relevance criterion was satisfied.700
2. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a verdict,
the appellate court must necessarily look to the facts of each case.
However, "[a] verdict of a jury in a criminal case must be sustained if
there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the
Government, to support it."'70 1 The Ninth Circuit will thus not invade
the jury's province in reviewing a case.70 2 And, direct evidence is not
considered as being more probative than circumstantial evidence.70 3
Even where a case is tried before a judge only, the burden of proof is
the same as in a case tried before a jury: guilt must be proved beyond a
695. Id at 1336.
696. Id at 1337.
697. Id at 1336-37.
698. Id
699. Id at 1336.
700. See U.S. v. Riggins, 539 F.2d 682, 683 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1045 (1977) ("Relevant evidence is not to be excluded because it fails to meet a similar-
ity requirement.").
701. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). "The proper standard for deter-
mining the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal is 'whether the trier of fact could reasonably
arrive at its conclusion... ." United States v. Cornfeld, 563 F.2d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 1977)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 435 US. 922 (1978) (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 80 (1942)) (citations omitted).
702. The jury has the exclusive function of "determin[ing] the credibility of witnesses,
resolv[ing] evidentiary conflicts, and drawling] reasonable inferences from proven facts."
United States v. Nelson, 419 F.2d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 1969); accord, United States v. Rami-
rez-Rodriguez, 552 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
703. United States v. Cruz, 536 F.2d 1264, 1266 (9th Cir. 1976).
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reasonable doubt.7° Applying these standards, the Ninth Circuit sus-
tained the majority of convictions which were appealed on the grounds
of insufficiency of evidence.7 °5
3. Privilege
Society recognizes that confidential communications arising from
certain relationships are privileged." 6 This notion, based upon the
common law,707 allows at least one participant in a relationship to pre-
vent testimonial disclosure of the content of communications occurring
within that relationship.70 8 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
courts, absent statutes to the contrary, are empowered to interpret the
common law principles of privilege "in the light of reason and experi-
ence."
709
Confidential communications between attorney and client were priv-
ileged at common law and are so recognized today.710 The privilege
704. United States v. Costey, 554 F.2d 909, 910 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 968
(1977).
705. United States v. Valdovinos, 558 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1977) (evidence sufficient to sus-
tain defendants' participation in conspiracy); United States v. Ferguson, 555 F.2d 1372 (9th
Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (evidence sufficient to sustain conviction for possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute); United States v. Segna, 555 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1977) (evidence
sufficient to permit jurors to conclude that defendant was sane; case reversed on other
grounds); United States v. Green, 554 F.2d 372 (9th Cir. 1977) (sufficiency of evidence up-
held in affirming violation of the Mann Act); United States v. Chenaur, 552 F.2d 294 (9th
Cir. 1977) (evidence sufficient to prove that institution protected by 18 U.S.C. § 1006 was
defrauded); United States v. Polk, 550 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1977) (evidence sufficient to prove
defendant had failed to withhold taxes from employees' wages); United States v. Perry, 550
F.2d 524 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 972 (1977) (evidence sufficient to prove defendants'
participation in conspiracy); United States v. Parr-Pla, 549 F.2d 660 (9th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977) (sufficiency of the evidence upheld in proving defendant's
knowledge that travelers checks he possessed were stolen and contained counterfeit signa-
tures). In United States v. Ramos, 558 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1977), the trial court sustained the
defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal after the jury had found him guilty of theft
from a foreign shipment. The government appealed, maintaining that there was sufficient
evidence for the jury's verdict The Ninth Circuit agreed and reinstated the verdict of
guilty.
The Ninth Circuit Court reversed the following cases due to insufficiency of the evidence:
United States v. Drebin, 572 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 2232 (1978)
(government failed to prove absence of first sale of motion pictures in copyright infringe-
ment action); United States v. Cloughessy, 572 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1977) (insufficient evidence
to prove defendant's connection with conspiracy).
706. See generaly C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 72 (2d ed.
1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK].
707. Id
708. Id § 73.
709. FED. R. Evlm. 501. See H.R. RaP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973).
710. 8 . WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WIG-
MORE].
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protects those disclosures which are "necessary to obtain informed le-
gal advise."7 1  Thus, it is the substance of matters communicated to
the attorney in professional confidence which will fall within the privi-
lege.71 2 The attorney-client privilege, however, will not "conceal eve-
rything said and done in connection with an attorney's legal
representation of a client in a matter."713 Where fee arrangements and
client identity are at issue, the Ninth Circuit has held that such matters
will not be viewed as privileged if a party can show a "legitimate need
for a court to require disclosure. '7 14 However, an exception to this rule
is allowed where disclosure will implicate the client "in the very crimi-
nal activity for which legal advice was sought.
'71 5
In addition to spoken communications between attorney and client,
the privilege also extends to papers prepared by the attorney which
contain confidential information revealed by the client.71 6 If the pa-
pers contain unprivileged information received from third parties and
communications made between attorney and client, the privilege will
not be applied unless the claimant demonstrates that disclosure will
reveal confidential communications made within the confines of the at-
torney-client relationship.717 The Ninth Circuit dealt with this issue in
In re Fischel.718 The attorney had prepared summaries of her client's
business transactions with third parties. At the client's trial, the attor-
ney testified and was ordered to produce these documents. She refused,
claiming the attorney-client privilege.' 9 On appeal, the court stated
that in order to preclude disclosure a link must be established between
the unprivileged and the privileged information which demonstrates
711. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
712. McCoRMICc, supra note 706, at § 91. The general principles upon which the attor-
ney-client privilege is based have been enumerated by Professor Wigmore:
(I) Where legal advice of any kind is sought
(2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such,
(3) the communications relating to that purpose,
(4) made in confidence
(5) by the client
(6) are at his instance permanently protected
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser,
(8) except the protection be waived.
WIGMORE, supra note 710, at § 2292.
713. In re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir. 1977).
714. United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977) (attorney-client
privilege will not prevent production of attorney's business records where client secured
legal representation in furtherance of illegal purpose).
715. Id
716. In re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir. 1977).
717. Id at 212.
718. 557 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1977).
719. Id at 210-11.
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that the two are so interwoven that "disclosure of the former leads irre-
sistibly to disclosure of the latter."
720
Although recognition of this privilege fosters the needed openness
between attorney and client,721 the privilege will not apply if the client
is using the legal representation to further an illegal plan.722 Addition-
ally, negation of the privilege occurs even where the attorney was not
aware of his client's improper purpose.723
Two privileges arising out of the marital relationship are also recog-
nized by the federal courts.724 The confidential communications privi-
lege bars testimony regarding private intra-spousal expressions, 725 even
if the marriage has ended.726 This privilege applies "only to utterances
or expressions intended by one spouse to convey a message to the
other." 727  The "anti-marital facts" privilege, which does not survive
the marriage,728 prevents one spouse from testifying against the
other.7 9
4. Hearsay
Within our judicial system, witnesses normally testify under three
conditions: oath, personal presence, and cross-examination. 730  These
conditions buttress the reliability factor of testimonial proof. "The
danger against which the hearsay rule73 1 is directed is that evidence
720. Id at 212.
721. For a discussion of the policies supporting the attorney-client privilege, see WIG-
MORE, supra note 710, at § 2291.
722. United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1085 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958
(1971); accord, United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977).
723. United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 1971).
724. United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045
(1978).
725. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1951).
726. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737,
747 (9th Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 434 U.S. 1045 (1978).
727. See United States v. Bolzer, 556 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 1977) (defendant's ex-wife's
testimony identifying his clothes related only her knowledge and was therefore not pre-
cluded by the confidential communications privilege).
728. Id
729. Id
730. McCoRMIcK, supra note 706, at § 245.
731. FED. R. Evm. 801(c) defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted." Hearsay statements are to be distinguished from those which are admitted
simply to show that the statement was made. Such statements are not hearsay and are
therefore admissible. See United States v. McLennan, 563 F.2d 943, 946 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 969 (1978) (statement by defendant's former attorney not admitted to
prove truth of what attorney had said--that acts of defendant were illegal-but merely to
show that statement was made); United States v. Bigelow, No. 75-3845 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31,
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which is untested by these three conditions will be unreliable because
faults in the perception, memory and narration of the declarant will not
be exposed." '732 Certain extrajudicial statements are nevertheless ex-
tremely important in the proof of a case; strict adherence to the hearsay
rule would, therefore, result in the exclusion of crucial evidence, and an
increase in the likelihood of an erroneous decision.733 Exceptions to the
hearsay rule serve to remedy this problem.73 1 Out-of-court statements
which bear strong indicia of reliability may be admissible,735 thereby
furthering the goal of admitting all highly relevant evidence.
In criminal cases, the admission of hearsay statements may conflict
with the defendant's confrontation rights guaranteed by the sixth
amendment.736 Clearly, where the declarant is not on the witness
stand, the defendant is denied the opportunity to confront and cross-
examine his accuser. However, in Dutton v. Evans737 the Supreme
Court held that the presence of certain criteria 738 will be "viewed as
determinative of whether a statement may be placed before the jury
though there is no confrontation of the declarant.' ' 739  Thus, where
statements are admitted under exceptions to the hearsay rule, it is suffi-
cient if they bear "indicia of reliability" such that "the trier of fact [has]
a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement. 740
a. Prior Inconsistent Statements
The Federal Rules allow the use of prior inconsistent statements for
substantive purposes of those statements fall within the confines of rule
1977), aft'd, 549 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[T]he significance of these statements lies not in
the truth of what they assert, but in the fact of their being said.").
732. 4 WmNsTmN, supra note 673, at 800[01], at § 800-11 (1977).
733. See id
734. See Adv. Comm. Note, FED. R. Evw. 804, subdivision (b) in which the Committee
states:
[Hiearsay which admittedly is not equal in quality to testimony of the declarant on the
stand may nevertheless be admitted if the declarant is unavailable and if his statement
meets a specified standard. The rule expresses preferences: testimony given on the
stand in person is preferred over hearsay, and hearsay, if of the specified quality, ft
preferred over complete loss of the evidence of the declarant. (Emphasis added).
735. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
736. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI, cl. 2. See generally Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123,
136 (1968), where the Supreme Court recognized that due process requires that a defendant
be permitted to confront the witnesses against him in order to defend against the State's
accusations.
737. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
738. See note 759 infra and accompanying text.
739. 400 U.S. at 89.
740. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970) (declarant's statements at preliminary
hearing sufficiently reliable to warrant admission).
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801(d)(1)(A). 74" As such, these statements are categorized as non-hear-
say. The Ninth Circuit applied this rule in upholding the use of grand
jury statements as direct evidence in United States v. Morgan.74 Rely-
ing on the Conference Committee's notes following rule 801(d)(1)(A),
the court had no difficulty in allowing the sworn statements before the
grand jury to be admitted for substantive purposes.743
The defendant in Morgan attacked the government's use of the prior
testimony on the ground that at the time it was offered, it was not yet
inconsistent with the witnesses' trial testimony, as 801(d)(1)(A) re-
quires. This situation arose because the government had used the prior
testimony both to impeach and to refresh witnesses' recollections.
Thus, in some instances the grand jury statements were admitted before
the witnesses had actually contradicted the statements in their trial tes-
timony.' While not applauding "the indiscriminate use of prior-pre-
pared statements," the court focused on Judge Weinstein's analysis as
to the proper test for inconsistency under 801(d)(1)(A).7 4 5 The court
felt the key to be "whether [the prior statement] ... is helpful in
resolving a material, consequential fact in issue."'746  Finding that the
grand jury testimony clearly served this purpose, the Morgan court af-
firmed the trial judge's action.747
b. Statements of Co-Conspirators
Statements made by co-conspirators during the course and in fur-
741. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A) provides:
A statement is not hearsay if-
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is (A) incon-
sistent with his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury
at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition ....
Statements which do not adhere to this rule are categorized as hearsay and may be utilized
for impeachment purposes only. But see United States v. Jamerson, 549 F.2d 1263, 1267
(9th Cir. 1977) ("[I]f testimony, even though improper, is introduced into evidence without
objection, it becomes part of the record and is available to be considered... by the trier of
fact."); Isaac v. United States, 431 F.2d 11, 15 (9th Cir. 1970) ("[O]bjectionable hearsay is
nevertheless probative if offered by defendant or received without objection.").
742. 555 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1977).
743. Id at 241.
744. Id
745. Id at 242.
746. Id In presenting his analysis, Judge Weinstein discusses the test for inconsistency
where prior inconsistent statements are used for impeachment purposes versus substantive
purposes. In both instances the court must look to relevancy. However, for impeachment
purposes, the question becomes whether the prior statement would "help the trier of fact
evaluate the credibility of the witness." Id
747. Id
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therance of a conspiracy are non-hearsay under the Federal Rules of
Evidence.748 Before such statements may be submitted to the jury,
however, the Ninth Circuit requires that independent evidence estab-
lish a prima facie showing749 that (1) a conspiracy existed and (2) the
party against whom the statements are offered was a member of the
conspiracy.75 0 This independent evidence may be either circumstan-
tial or direct. 5 Once the conspiracy has been shown to exist, how-
ever, only slight evidence is necessary to connect the defendant with
it.
7 5 2
Although a co-conspirator's statement may properly be admitted into
evidence as non-hearsay, compliance with the confrontation clause"13 is
not automatic.5 Conversely, an improperly admitted statement
which constitutes hearsay does not necessarily violate the right to con-
frontation.755 In either instance, the admission of an extra-judicial dec-
laration may deny the defendant of his sixth amendment right to
confront the witnesses against him.75 6  The trier of fact may conse-
quently be deprived of a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of
the out-of-court statement.
7 7
In Dutton v. Evans,158  the Supreme Court isolated four indicia of
748. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(e). See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218
(1974); United States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Di
Rodio, 565 F.2d 573, 575 (9th Cir. 1977). Statements made by a coconspirator after the
conspiracy has ended may not be used to prove their truth. Such statements, however, may
be employed to show the declarant's state of mind, United States v. Brown, 562 F.2d 1144,
1148 (9th Cir. 1977), motive, opportunity, intent, plan, knowledge or absence of mistake or
accident. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
749. United States v. Testa, 548 F.2d 847, 852-53 (9th Cir. 1977).
750. United States v. Dixon, 562 F.2d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
927 (1978) (evidence sufficient to permit introduction of testimony); United States v. Peter-
son, 549 F.2d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 1977) (showing insufficient to meet prima facie burden);
United States v. Testa, 548 F.2d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 1977) (evidence offered by prosecution
sufficient).
751. United States v. Cruz, 536 F.2d 1264, 1266 (9th Cir. 1977). Both forms of evidence
are weighted equally. United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 162 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 996 (1965) ("Circumstantial evidence is not inherently less probative than direct evi-
dence....").
752. United States v. Costey, 554 F.2d 909, 910 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 968
(1977).
753. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI provides that the accused "[i]n all criminal prosecutions...
shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him."
754. United States v. Wood, 550 F.2d 435, 442 (9th Cir. 1976).
755. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). The Court observed that "[m]erely be-
cause evidence is admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay rule does not lead to
the automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been denied." Id at 156.
756. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
757. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
758. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
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reliability which bear on the propriety of admission of an extra-judicial
statement in the absence of confrontation of the declarant.759 The
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Eaylin760 held that a constitutional
analysis of the confrontation clause is proper only in those cases which
fail the Dutton test, hearsay violations notwithstanding.76'
5. Cross-Examination
a. Scope of Cross-Examination and the Criminal Defendant
The Federal Rules of Evidence limit the scope of cross-examination
to those areas brought out on direct examination.762 However, the trial
court is given the discretion to allow counsel to question a witness as
though on direct examination.763 This procedure eliminates the need
to later call the witness for direct examination, and also allows the trial
judge to save time by controlling the order of proof during the trial.764
Where the witness is a criminal defendant, however, fifth amendment
problems may arise. Unlike other witnesses, a criminal defendant can-
not be called to the witness stand by the prosecutor. Therefore, where
the court permits a prosecutor to question a defendant "as if on direct
examination," it is allowing the government to do on cross-examina-
tion what it cannot normally do at all-that is, call the defendant as a
witness and question him. This may even be directly violative of the
accused's fifth amendment rights.765
Although this improbable situation arose in the recent case of United
759. The four factors considered by the Court to be of importance in this area are:
(I) The statement includes no express assertion of past fact;
(2) The declarant had personal knowledge of the identity and role of participants in
the crime;
(3) The possibility is remote that the declarant was relying on faulty recollection;
and
(4) The circumstances under which the statement was made gave no reason to be-
lieve that the declarant had misrepresented the defendant's involvement in the crime.
Id. at 88-89. See United States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d 1069, 1083-84 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[I]t is the
reliability test of Dutton by which the confrontation issue... is to be decided.").
760. 571 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1977).
761. Id at 1081-82.
762. FED. R. EvID. 611 (b) states:
Scope of cross-examination. Cross-examination should be limited to the subject
matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness.
The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if
on direct examination.
See 3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 673, at 1 611[02].
763. FED. R. EvID. 611(b). See note 762 supra.
764. According to McCormick, "[t]he scope of cross-examination is essentially a matter of
control over the production of evidence; the primary policy being served is the orderly con-
duct of the trial." McCoRMIcK, supra note 706, § 132 at 280.
765. See Carlson, Cross-Examination of the Accused, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 705, 709 (1967).
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States v. Batts,766 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction. Batts had
been arrested for possession of hashish as he entered the United States
from Canada. During the trial, a customs inspector testified that while
searching Batts, he had found a silver trinket around his neck. He
further testified that Batts had told him it was a "coke spoon." At that
point, the trinket was admitted into evidence without objection.
7 67
Batts was the first witness to testify for the defense. At no time during
his direct examination did Batts testify regarding the "coke spoon" or
its intended use.7 68  On cross-examination the prosecutor went beyond
the scope of Batts' direct testimony and questioned Batts as to his
knowledge about the coke spoon's use and his knowledge about co-
caine use itself.
7 6 9
In its analysis of Batts' testimony, the Ninth Circuit focused upon
two issues. First, the court observed that the coke spoon had already
been received into evidence without objection when Batts testified.
The court further noted that Batts' own counsel had not objected to the
prosecutor's inquiry about the coke spoon or cocaine use. Therefore,
only the trial court could have ordered the testimony stricken.770  The
Ninth Circuit, however, doubted the availability of such an action since
"it was at least arguable that appellant had opened up the subject area
by testifying to other contemporaneous events at the port of entry. 771
This reasoning seems to ignore basic tenets which are applicable to a
trial court's control of cross-examination. 72 When a defendant opens
up a subject area on direct examination by testifying to a few isolated
events, the prosecutor's questions must still be reasonably related to
those matters brought out on such examination by the defendant. 3
766. 558 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1977).
767. Id at 515.
768. Id at 515-16.
769. Id at 516. Batts denied knowledge of both, whereupon the prosecutor extrinsically
impeached his testimony; such impeachment was in violation of FED. R. EVID. 608(b). See
notes 672-84 supra and accompanying text.
770. 558 F.2d at 516.
771. Id
772. The Federal Rules utilize a restricted form of cross-examination whereby the cross-
examiner is limited by the direct examiner's choice of topics. However,
subdivision (b) [of Rule 6111 recognizes that the object of adducing all releant
information on cross-examination may have to be modified in the interests of justice.
As in the case of Rule 403, the judge must balance the factors of prejudice, confusion
and delay against the probative value of the testimony which would be excluded in
deciding whether to curtail cross-examination.
See 3 WEiNSTEiN, supra note 673 611[02], at 611-31 (emphasis added).
773. See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 1000 (1978). Defendant Hearst maintained that the trial court erred in denying her
motion to limit the scope of her cross-examination when she took the witness stand. Hearst
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Here, the prosecutor was allowed to question Batts regarding his possi-
ble cocaine use, a matter which did not illuminate the subject matter of
the direct examination. Although Batts' testimony did embrace certain
events which occurred at the time of his arrest, the contemporaneous
discovery of the coke spoon was irrelevant as to any of the events which
led to the charges against Batts.
Second, the court stated that even if Batts' counsel had objected to
the prosecutor's inquiry, "it was still within the court's power to admit
the testimony."774
Relying on federal rule 611 (b), the Ninth Circuit approved the prose-
cutor's questioning of the defendant as though he were on direct exami-
nation.775  Although the government initially was precluded from
calling Batts to the stand, the Batts court effectively eliminated this re-
striction by permitting Batts to be questioned beyond the scope of his
direct examination.776 In sanctioning this procedure, the Ninth Circuit
thus utilized rule 611(b) to circumvent the prohibition against permit-
had wanted to avoid invoking the fifth amendment in response to questions implicating her
in other crimes for which she was not on trial. As part of her argument, Hearst claimed that
the government had gone beyond the scope of her direct examination in questioning her
about events to which she had not earlier testified. The court, however, found that while on
direct examination Hearst attempted to show that from the time of her abduction to her
arrest, she was coerced by her captors to behave as she did. Given this testimony, the Ninth
Circuit held that Hearst had therefore placed her behavior during this period in issue. As
such, the government's cross-examination "about her activities, associations and residences
during the interim year were more than 'reasonably related' to the subject matter of her
prior testimony." Id at 1341.
774. 558 F.2d at 516.
775. Id Compare FED. R. EvrD. 611(b) with CAL. EvlD. CODE § 772(c)-(d) (West 1975),
which provides:
(c) Subject to subdivision (d), a party may, in the discretion of the court, interrupt
his cross-examination, redirect examination, or recross-examination of a witness, in or-
der to examine the witness upon a matter not within the scope of a previous examina-
tion of the witness.
(d) If the witness is the defendant in a criminal action, the witness may not, without
his consent, be examined under direct examination by another party.
776. See Tucker v. United States, 5 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1925), an early case which is prece-
dent for the federal rule of limited cross-examination. Addressing itself to this issue, the
court stated.
The primary purpose of cross-examination in the federal courts is to test the truth of the
testimony adduced by the direct examination and to clarify or explain the same. It is
not to prove independent facts in the case of the cross-examining party. If there is good
reason why a defendant should not be compelled to be a witness against himself, there
ought to be equally good reason why, if he has testified voluntarily upon one issue, he
should not be compelled to testify against his will concerning matters wholly unrelated
to that issue, which would not be within the scope of proper cross-examination if he
were an ordinary witness.
Id at 822. See also Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958). In dictum, the Supreme
Court stated that a witness who voluntarily testifies, "certainly if he is a party, determines
the area of disclosure and therefore of inquiry." d at 155. This observation would seem
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ting a prosecutor to call a criminal defendant to the witness stand. Not
only does such bootstrapping conflict with the standards set by the fed-
eral rules, it raises serious questions of the constitutional ramifications
for criminal defendants in future trials within this circuit.
b. Complaince with the Confrontation Clause
An accused's sixth amendment right to confront the witnesses against
him has been considered an essential element of due process of law.
777
An integral part of this right is cross-examination, 7 78 which allows de-
fense counsel to attack the weaknesses in the testimonial proof given
against a defendant. 77 9 The extent to which cross-examination will be
allowed is within the trial court's discretion.780 The necessity of a thor-
ough and effective cross-examination is manifest in order "to expose to
the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credi-
bility,. .. [can] appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability
of the witness.I781 The Supreme Court, in Davis v. Alaska,782 has held
that curtailment of this right may amount to a denial of confrontation
rights.7
83
The Ninth Circuit employed the Davis rationale in reversing the
to indicate that the cross-examiner is not permitted to go beyond the scope of the witness'
direct testimony at all.
777. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
778. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965).
779. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) ("Cross-examination is the principal
means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.").
See United States v. Brady, 561 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), in which the trial
court refused to permit defense counsel to cross-examine the Government's key witness re-
garding her prior source of narcotics. The Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction, holding
that "the Government's whole case turned on her [the witness'] credibility .... [Cqounsel
thus must be given a maximum opportunity to test the credibility of the witness." Id at
1320.
780. See FED. R. EvID. 611(a). For further discussion of the court's discretion in this
area, see notes 619-22 supra and accompanying text.
781. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974).
782. 415 U.S. 308 (1974). In Davis, the Court reviewed a burglary and larceny conviction
resulting from a trial in which the court had prohibited the defense from questioning a key
government witness regarding his juvenile record. The defense hoped to show that the wit-
ness was on probation at the time of the events about which he was to testify. The purpose
of the inquiry was not for general impeachment; rather, defense counsel hoped to show the
witness was biased due to his relationship with the state. In reversing Davis' conviction, the
Court pointed out that limiting the defense's inquiry had resulted in placing an inaccurate
view of the witness' credibility before the jury. Absent the benefit of the defense's theory,
the jury would not be able to make an informed judgment from the evidence. Thus, Davis,
precluded from presenting this evidence to the jury by questioning the witness, was "denied
the right of effective cross-examination. . .. ." Id at 318.
783. 415 U.S. at 318.
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lower court decision in United States v. Alvarez-Loez.8 The govern-
ment's case against Alvarez-Lopez depended primarily upon the testi-
mony of their informant, Gentile. During direct examination as the
government's witness, Gentile denied having previously been arrested
for drugs. Defense counsel, however, had information showing that
Gentile had been previously arrested for smuggling heroin, although
the charge was later dismissed for undisclosed reasons.78 5 As in Davis,
counsel's intent was not to impeach Gentile generally, but merely to
reveal any biases which he might have. The trial judge, however, citing
rules 609 and 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 8 6 prohibited
any inquiry into Gentile's criminal record. Writing for the majority,
Judge Hufstedler clearly rejected the trial court's reasoning. 7 Cur-
tailment of cross-examination in this instance had precluded the de-
fense from illuminating a crucial issue in the case--the key witness'
possible prejudice stemming from the fact that Gentile's prior criminal
activity may have rendered him extremely vulnerable to government
pressures at the time of his testimony.788 The defendant was entitled to
784. 559 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1977).
785. Id at 1157.
786. FED. R. EvmD. 609(a) states:
GeneralRule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness evidence that
he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by
public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was con-
victed, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.
FED. R. EvID. 404(b) states:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not ad-
missible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
787. In responding to the use of these evidentiary rules as justification for curtailing the
cross-examination of Gentile, Judge Hufstedler stated.
Neither rule is applicable in this context. This case does not involve rules of im-
peachment or impeachment of a witness by collateral means. Moreover, it does not
involve the rules of general impeachment applicable to cross-examination of a defend-
ant in a criminal case who has taken the stand. The Evidence Code does not attempt to
write a catalog of all the rules which govern evidence that can be used to impeach a
witness. Rather, the code only attempts to lay down a few specific rules dealing with
the situations in which impeachment upon collateral matters may be particularly sub-
ject to potential abuse, and, in those situations, to give substantial discretion to the trial
court in admitting or excluding the impeaching evidence.
559 F.2d at 1158.
788. In Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), Chief Justice Burger elaborated upon the
importance of this issue:
A more particular attack on the witness' credibility is effected by means of cross-exami-
nation directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the
1978]
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have this evidence brought out so that the jury could adequately assess
the informant's credibility. Addressing itself to this issue, the court
stated: "Extensive cross-examination of a Government witness
designed to reveal any biases or prejudices of the witness is compelled
by the confrontation clause. Especially should great latitude be al-
lowed when, as here, the key prosecution witness is also a professional
informant." 789
6. Opinion Testimony
The Federal Rules of Evidence allow the opinion testimony of both
lay790 and expert 91 witnesses. The testimony of lay witnesses must be
based upon personal knowledge and aid in resolving a fact in issue. 92
"The general test for the admissibility of expert testimony is whether
the jury can derive 'appreciable help' from such testimony. '793  Not
only must the witness be qualified by knowledge, skill, experience,
training or education in order to testify as an expert, 9 but the subject
matter of the expert testimony must be "in accordance with a generally
accepted explanatory theory."795 In determining whether the expert tes-
timony should be allowed, trial courts must balance the probative value
of the evidence against any prejudice to the defendant.796 Judges main-
witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand. The
partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is "always relevant as dis-
crediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony." We have recognized
that the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important func-
tion of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.
Id at 316-17 (citations omitted).
789. 559 F.2d at 1160.
790. FED. R. EvID. 701. See United States v. Butcher, 557 F.2d 666 (9th Cir. 1977) in
which the Ninth Circuit upheld lay opinion identification testimony by police and parole
officers, but discouraged the practice if other adequate identification testimony were avail-
able to the prosecution.
791. FED. R. EvID. 702.
792. See FED. R. EVID. 701, Adv. Comm. Note.
793. United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 166 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 423 U.S. 996
(1975); accord, United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds
sub nora United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975) (expert testimony on photographic
identification of defendant did not assist the jury and therefore should not have been admit-
ted).
794. FED. R. EVID. 702.
795. United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973). See also United States
v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978) in
which the court affirmed the lower court's decision to exclude the testimony of a psycho-
linguist because the subject matter of her testimony "had not yet 'achieved such general
acceptance among psychological and scientific authorities as to justify courts of law in ad-
mitting expert testimony on this subject'." Id at 1350.
796. United States v. Butcher, 557 F.2d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 1977). Once the trial court
indicates that expert testimony is permissible, the expert can testify as to an ultimate issue in
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tain broad discretion in the matter of the admission or exclusion of
evidence,797 however, and absent a clear abuse the appellate court will
not disturb the lower court ruling.
798
E. Defenses
1. Entrapment
a. In General
In order to assert the affirmative defense of entrapment, the defend-
ant must "come forward with evidence of his non-predisposition and of
governmental inducement. '799 The focus of the entrapment defense is
on the intent or predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime, °8 0
and the defense will be unsuccessful when the defendant is found to
have been predisposed to commit the offense with which he is
charged.
801
The defendant's predisposition to commit the alleged offense is a
question of fact. 02 Although an appellate court is normally reluctant
to upset a factual determination in this area,8"3 the Ninth Circuit will
the case. FED. R. EviD. 704; United States v. Davis, 564 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978); United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978).
-797. United States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1947). For a discussion of the
trial court's discretion to curtail direct and cross-examination, see notes 618-20 supra and
accompanying text.
798. United States v. Butcher, 557 F.2d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 1977). For a discussion of the
standard utilized by the Ninth Circuit to evaluate an abuse of discretion in the context of
cross-examination, see notes 621-22 supra and accompanying text.
799. United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc). See also
United States v. Hermosillo-Nanez, 545 F.2d 1230, 1232 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1050 (1977); United States v. Glassel, 488 F.2d 143, 146 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 941 (1974).
800. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 429 (1973). The Court in Russell declined to
reconsider its position that the essence of the entrapment defense is the defendant's predis-
position to commit the crime. See also Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958);
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1935).
801. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433-36 (1973). The trial court may, in its
discretion, determine that the evidence is insufficient to warrant the submission of the en-
trapment issue to the jury. United States v. Glaeser, 550 F.2d 483, 487-88 (9th Cir. 1977).
In such cases, the defendant may still attempt to assert a violation of due process of law.
See notes 810-11 infra and accompanying text.
802. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 331 (1966) (determination of defendant's pre-
disposition is within province of jury); United States v. Griffin, 434 F.2d 978, 981-82 (9th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 995 (1971) (conflicting testimony on question of entrapment
allows fact finder to resolve conflicts).
803. See United States v. Hermosillo-Nanez, 545 F.2d 1230, 1232 (9th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1050 (1977) (on review of conviction all inferences are to be
drawn in favor of Government; court's function is not to reweigh credibility of witnesses;
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remand for reconsideration where evidentiary errors prevent the fact-
finder from hearing all relevant testimony.s°4
In United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa,0 the Ninth Circuit discussed
several factors which it will consider in evaluating the predisposition of
a defendant:
[Tihe character or reputation of the defendant, including any prior crimi-
nal record; whether the suggestion of the criminal activity was initially
made by the Government; whether the defendant was engaged in the
criminal activity for profit; whether the defendant evidenced reluctance to
commit the offense, overcome by only repeated Government inducement
or persuasion; and the nature of the inducement or persuasion supplied
by the Government.
806
While none of these factors is conclusive, the most significant is
"whether the defendant evidenced reluctance to engage in criminal ac-
tivity which was overcome by repeated Government inducement. ' s 7
An offer of money to the defendant by government agents, however,
does not constitute entrapment absent a finding that the defendant was
an unwilling person persuaded by the government to commit the of-
fense.808 Moreover, a defendant need not admit the elements of the
crime charged in order to assert the entrapment defense.s°
b. Due Process
The Ninth Circuit continues to leave open the possibility that the
defendant can assert a due process challenge in addition to or in lieu of
issue is jury determination of predisposition beyond reasonable doubt). See also United
States v. Pico-Zazueta, 564 F.2d 1367, 1372 (9th Cir. 1977) (fact finding that co-conspirators,
not police, had convinced defendant to sell heroin, even where agents importuned defend-
ant, was valid) ("[A] line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent and the
trap for the unwary criminal.").
804. United States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335,342 (9th Cir. 1977) (although admission of
expert testimony on issue of predisposition was within court discretion, court may not admit
prosecutorial hearsay evidence while excluding defense hearsay).
805. 548 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1977).
806. Id at 1336 (footnotes omitted).
807. Id The proper inquiry for the jury is whether the government agents have convinced
an otherwise unwilling person to commit a criminal act or, on the other hand, whether the
defendant was predisposed to violate the law. Id
808. United States v. Esquer-Gamez, 550 F.2d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir. 1977).
809. United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 982 (9th Cir. 1975) (overruling Eastman v.
United States, 212 F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1954)). See United States v. Glaeser, 550 F.2d 483,
486 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Paduano, 549 F.2d 145, 148 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 838 (1977). In Paduano, the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the defense
of entrapment entailed an admission by defendant that he had in fact committed the offense
charged. Nevertheless, reversal was deemed unnecessary since the jury had been properly
instructed on two other counts, convictions on those counts were affirmed, and the sentences
on each count were of equal length and were to run concurrently.
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the entrapment defense.81° Such a challenge would be appropriate in
cases where the conduct of law enforcement agents is "so outrageous
that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from
invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction ... ,,811
c. Jury Instructions
The Ninth Circuit has approved a jury instruction which provides
that the essence of the entrapment defense is the predisposition of the
defendant to commit the offense.812 The instruction reads in pertinent
part:
[Wihere a person already has the predisposition, that is, the readiness and
willingness to break the narcotics laws, the mere fact that Government
agents provided what appears to be a favorable opportunity, is not en-
trapment .... If, then, the jury should find beyond a reasonable doubt
from the evidence in this case that before anything at all occurred respect-
ing the alleged offenses involved in this case, the defendant was ready and
willing to commit the crimes as charged in the Indictment, whenever op-
portunity was afforded, and the Government officers or their agents did
no more than offer the opportunity, then the jury should find the defend-
ant was not a victim of entrapment.
8 13
If the defendant does not object to the entrapment instruction at trial
or submit an alternative instruction, he cannot later claim the entrap-
ment instruction given was erroneous."'
2. Insanity
The purpose of the insanity defense is "to save from criminal convic-
tion one who lacks responsibility for his unlawful acts." ' 5 An accused
is presumed legally sane until he comes forward with some evidence of
810. See United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329, 1338-39 (9th Cir. 1977).
811. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973). See also Hampton v. United
States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976). The Russell Court left open the possibility of a due process
challenge. In Hampton, however, a plurality of the court seemed to foreclose this alterna-
tive, suggesting instead that the appropriate remedy is to prosecute "the police under the
applicable provisions of state or federal law." 425 U.S. at 490.
812. United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329, 1339 (9th Cir. 1977).
813. Id This instruction is substantially similar to that approved by the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Griffin, 434 F.2d 978, 981-82 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 995
(1971) (standard jury instruction on entrapment sufficient). See also United States v. Pico-
Zazueta, 564 F.2d 1367, 1370 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d
1329, 1339-40 (9th Cir. 1977) (elaborating instruction improper where it incorrectly states
law).
814. United States v. Pico-Zazueta, 546 F.2d 1367, 1370 (9th Cir. 1977); see Esposito v.
United States, 436 F.2d 603, 604 (9th Cir. 1970).
815. United States v. Collins, 433 F.2d 550, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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his insanity.8"6 Once the defendant comes forward with such evidence,
the prosecutor bears the burden of showing defendant's sanity beyond
a reasonable doubt. 17 '"The nature and quantum of evidence of sanity
which the Government must produce to sustain its burden and take the
case to the jury will vary in different cases."818
The Ninth Circuit defined insanity in Wade v. United States,819
where a part of the American Law Institute test for sanity was
adopted.82° Under this test, "[a] person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law."82
In adopting the ALI test for insanity, the Ninth Circuit substituted
the word "wrongfulness" for the word "criminality" 822 as several other
circuits had done.8Z "Wrongfulness" means moral rather than criminal
816. See United States v. Schmidt, 572 F.2d 206, 208 (9th Cir. 1977) (expert testimony
that defendant was suffering-from "schizophrenia of the chronically recurrent paranoid
type" overcame presumption of sanity); United States v. Segna, 555 F.2d 226, 229, 230-31
(9th Cir. 1977) (expert and lay testimony that defendant was suffering from "fixed delusion-
ary system" overcame presumption of sanity; prosecutor's closing argument which had effect
of shifting burden of proof to defendant after defendant had overcome presumption of san-
ity was plain error); United States v. Monroe, 552 F.2d 860, 863 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 972 (1977) (evidence that defendant suffered from "moderate to severe anxiety neuro-
sis" overcame presumption of sanity).
817. See note 816 supra. See also Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373, 378 (1897);
United States v. Shackelford, 494 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 934 (1974);
United States v. Ingman, 426 F.2d 973, 976 (9th Cir. 1970).
818. Brown v. United States, 351 F.2d 473, 474 (5th Cir. 1965), cited in United States v.
Ingman, 426 F.2d 973, 976 (9th Cir. 1970).
819. 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970) (en banc).
820. The court approved the first paragraph and rejected the second paragraph of the
American Law Institute's test. Id at 71-72. The rejected paragraph reads as follows: "(2)
As used in this Article, the terms, 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct." Id. at 71. How-
ever, in United States v. Lemon, 550 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1977), the court held that the inclu-
sion of the second paragraph of the instruction was harmless error. In Lemon, the
defendant based his defense on "toxic psychosis, a form of black-out," and not upon "re-
peated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct." Consequently, the inclusion of the second
paragraph of the ALI test was not harmful. Under the circumstances, "the insanity instruc-
tions as a whole conveyed the proper standard." Id at 470. See United States v. Trejo,
501 F.2d 138, 140 (9th Cir. 1974) (instructions must be evaluated in their entirety); United
States v. Martin, 489 F.2d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 948 (1974) (surplus
language in an instruction is not necessarily reversible error).
821. 426 F.2d at 71. This instruction is still the standard in this circuit. United States v.
Lemon, 550 F.2d 467, 470 (9th Cir. 1977).
822. 426 F.2d at 71-72.
823. Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908, 915-16 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc); United States
v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 1967) (en bane); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d
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wrongfulness.8 24 This rule has been interpreted to mean that "a de-
fendant lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct if he knows his act to be criminal but commits it because of a
delusion that it is morally justified."
825
In United States v. Monroe,126 the defendant insisted that testimony
by a government witness to the effect that the defendant did not believe
it was morally wrong to sell cocaine established the defendant's in-
sanity under the Wade test.827 However, the testimony in question,
taken in its entirety, suggested that the defendant "believed that selling
cocaine was not morally wrong because he did not consider cocaine to
be a dangerous drug.""s  On the basis of such testimony, the jury
could have concluded that the defendant's belief in the moral propriety
of his actions "did not result from a mental disease or defect as re-
quired by Wade."829
In reviewing a jury's decision to reject an insanity defense and con-
vict the defendant, the appellate court must view the evidence in a light
most favorable to the Government.83 The conviction will be upheld
when the reviewing court finds that the evidence was sufficient "to per-
mit a rational conclusion by the jury that the accused was sane beyond
606, 622 & n.52 (2d Cir. 1966). The Eighth Circuit followed the Wade approach in United
States v. Frazier, 458 F.2d 911, 918 & n.7 (8th Cir. 1972).
824. United States v. Fresonke, 549 F.2d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
McGraw, 515 F.2d 758, 759 (9th Cir. 1975).
825. United States v. McGraw, 515 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1975). The court has made it
clear, however, that the use of the term "delusion" should not be interpreted as adding an
additional element to the insanity defense. See United States v. Sullivan, 544 F.2d 1052
(9th Cir. 1976). "The word [delusion] adds no additional element to those which must be
established before an individual is entitled to any instruction on legal insanity; it is a word of
clarification, not of limitation." Id at 1055 (footnote omitted). See Blake v. United States,
407 F.2d 908, 915-16 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 622
n.52 (2d Cir. 1966).
826. 552 F.2d 860 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977).
827. Id at 864.
828. Id
829. Id See United States v. Sullivan, 544 F.2d 1052 (9th Cir. 1976) in which the court
distinguishes, for the purposes of the insanity defense, between a "mistaken" belief that an
act is morally justified and a "false" belief that results from a mental disease or defect:
[O]ne who acts pursuant to a mistaken belief that he is morally justified, without more,
does not legally lack substantial capacity to appreciate the moral wrongfulness of his
act; he simply chooses not to do so. But someone who commits a criminal act under a
false belief, the result of a mental disease or defect, that such an act is morally justified,
does indeed lack substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct
.... The Wade test for legal insanity requires no more.
Id at 1056.
830. United States v. Ortiz, 488 F.2d 175, 178 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Handy, 454
F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 846 (1972).
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a reasonable doubt."83'
3. Competency
- ---Due- process_ requires that the defendant be competent to stand
trial.8 32  "Competency" refers to the defendant's ability to understand
the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with
his attorney, and to assist his attorney in the preparation of his de-
fense. 33  Competency "relates not to mental illness in general but to
the practical aspects of the defense of the action ... .834
Whenever there is substantial evidence before the court which cre-
ates a "genuine doubt" as to the defendant's competency to stand trial,
the court must sua sponte conduct a hearing on the question.8 35  The
court's failure to conduct such a hearing when one is warranted de-
prives the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial and neces-
sitates reversal of the conviction. 36 In Bassett v. McCarthy,837 after
acknowledging the difficulties involved in ruling on an appellant's
claim that he was improperly denied a competency hearing at the trial
831. United States v. Monroe, 552 F.2d 860, 864 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972
(1977) (jury could have concluded that defendant's belief in the moral justification of his
criminal acts did not result from mental disease or defect); United States v. Ortiz, 488 F.2d
175, 177 (9th Cir. 1973) (jury could properly resolve conflict in psychiatric testimony) ("If
the jury chose to accept the doctor's opinion in spite of the alleged weaknesses in his reasons,
we cannot say, as a matter of law, they could not do so.").
832. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966) (where evidence raises bona fide
doubt as to defendant's competency, court must provide a hearing to determine competency
notwithstanding defendant's failure to request one; court's failure to provide such a hearing
denies defendant his right to fair trial.) ("mhe conviction of an accused person while he is
legally incompetent violates due process.. . "'); De Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975,
979-81 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977) (competency hearing required
where record as a whole, including testimony and events at trial, raises genuine doubt in
mind of trial judge as to defendant's competency to stand trial).
833. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S.
402, 402 (1960) (per curiam). See 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1976) (establishes pretrial procedures
for determining whether accused is insane or "otherwise so mentally incompetent as to be
unable to understand the proceedings against him or properly to assist in his own defense.").
834. Bassett v. McCarthy, 549 F.2d 616, 619 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 849 (1977).
835. Greenfield v. Guhn, 556 F.2d 935, 937 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 928 (1977);
Bassett v. McCarthy, 549 F.2d 616, 619 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 849 (1977); De
Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975, 982-83 (9th Cir. 1976), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 1075
(1977). See Tillery v. Eyman, 492 F.2d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir. 1974) (trial court erred in
failing to hold a hearing when substantial evidence before the court, including defendant's
outbursts in the courtroom and bizarre, irrational behavior in confinement, indicated that he
"may have been mentally incompetent to stand trial.").
836. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966); Moore v. United States, 464 F.2d 663,
666 (9th Cir. 1972). See note 832 supra.
837. 549 F.2d 616 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 849 (1977).
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court level, 3 ' the Ninth Circuit ruled that, "in light of the record as a
whole,. .. the trial court's failure to hold a competency hearing can-
not be found to have denied petitioner a fair trial." '39 Evidence cited
by the court in support of its conclusion included petitioner's intelli-
gence and ability to articulate, '  a staff report from the hospital to
which petitioner had been committed following a prior plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity,841 and the opinion of petitioner's own ex-
pert witness, who testified that petitioner had recovered somewhat from
his mental illness and was capable of understanding what was happen-
ing around him. 4
Judge Hufstedler, in dissent, declared that the evidence raising a
doubt as to petitioner's competency "was at least as substantial as the
evidence tending to dispel doubt"843 and that, therefore, the lower
court erred in failing to conduct a competency hearing. 8 "
VI. POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
A. Sentencing
Federal appellate courts are normally hesitant to review the sentence
imposed after conviction unless the sentence exceeded the maximum
allowable.8 45 The Ninth Circuit "has consistently held that the matter
of sentencing is within the discretion of the trial judge and that where
...the sentence falls within the bounds prescribed by statute, it is not
reviewable." s  In United States v. Kearney, 47 the court, after reaffirm-
838. Id at 618-19. Claims based on the issue of competency are likely to arise in cases
where it is apparent that the defendant is mentally impaired to some extent. Id at 619. It
is the difficult task of the appellate court to "sift the record of abnormal behavior for evi-
dence which might, at a hearing on the issue of competence, be found to be relevant and
material to competency." Id Adding to the difficulty is the fact that the reviewing court
evaluates the appellant's claim by analyzing "a trial record in which the parties presumably
did not address the issue of the defendant's competency, and from which the evidence of
petitioner's demeanor and attitude and of his understanding and cooperation may therefore
be largely missing." Id
839. Id at 621.
840. Id at 620.
841. Id The hospital report indicated that petitioner, upon his release, was able to under-
stand the nature of the proceedings against him and to rationally cooperate with his attor-
ney. Id
842. Id
843. Id at 621 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting) (quoting De Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d
975, 989 (1976), cerl. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977) (Hufstedler & Ely, JJ., dissenting)).
844. Id See note 832 supra.
845. See United States v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 910
(1978) (no prejudice to defendant where trial judge did not indicate felony or misdemeanor
since defendant's sentence did not exceed the maximum allowable for a misdemeanor).
846. United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 877 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977)
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ing this principle, set forth an exception.848 Where the sentence is
based on misinformation, review may be warranted to remedy a consti-
tutional violations 49 However, no such misinformation was consid-
ered by the sentencing judge in Kearney.8 5 0 In rejecting the
defendant's contention that his twenty-five year sentence was an abuse
of discretion on the ground that he was a "small fry," the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the defendant's participation was "early, fundamental,
and substantial.
851
In United States v. Stevens,"5 2 the court labeled as "frivolous" 853 the
defendant's argument that a sentence in excess of six years under the
Federal Youth Corrections Act 54 was invalid. Since the statute8 55 spe-
cifically authorizes an extension of the sentence where the defendant
may "not be able to derive maximum benefit from treatment" within
six years, the sentence was within the discretion of the trial judge.
85 6
In Masterana v. United States85 7 the Ninth Circuit rejected defend-
ant's argument that the sentencing judge had been unaware of Parole
Commission guidelines and that those guidelines resulted in an incar-
ceration longer than that intended to be imposed by the judge.858 It
was further observed that even if the trial judge had not been familiar
with the guidelines, his action in denying defendant's petition to correct
sentence indicated approval of the parole board's actions.8 5 9
When a defendant has remained in prison awaiting trial, he may at-
tempt to credit the time served against the length of the sentence which
is ultimately imposed. The right to credit time is not absolute;8 60 how-
ever, if the sentence imposed, when added to time already served, ex-
(citing with approval United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1061 (1972)); United States v. James, 443 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1971). See United States
v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 751 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045 (1978); United States v. Perri, 513 F.2d 572, 575 (9th Cir.
1975).
847. 560 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 971 (1977).
848. Id at 1369.
849. Id See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972).
850. 560 F.2d at 1369.
851. Id
852. 548 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 975 (1977).
853. 548 F.2d at 1361 n.4.
854. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5006, 5010-5026 (1976). For a discussion of sentencing under the
Act, see notes 1249-65 infra and accompanying text.
855. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(c) (1976).
856. 548 F.2d at 1361 nA.
857. 549 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1977).
858. Id at 1343.
859. Id
860. See Hook v. Arizona, 496 F.2d 1172, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 1974).
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ceeds the maximum punishment prescribed by law, then the defendant
will be allowed to credit the time served.86 1 It is clear, however, that
not all types of confinement will lead to this result. For example, con-
finement in a mental institution before trial is not equivalent to con-
finement in prison. 62 In United States v. Robles, 63 the Ninth Circuit
held that a defendant is not sufficiently confined when he is released on
bond pending appeal to warrant credit against the sentence for the time
spent under the bond. Although one's liberty is somewhat limited
under these circumstances, it is not the type of situation in which credit
will be extended."'
In determining whether sentences should be imposed concurrently or
consecutively, the court may look to the statute for aid.865 In United
States v. Ortiz-Martinez,66 the court determined that consecutive sen-
tences could not be imposed upon conviction for two different crimes
resulting from the same transaction unless there was a clear intention
from the face of the statutes that Congress intended cumulative punish-
ment. 67 Even though the statute covering each crime sets forth a sen-
tence, the principle of United States v. Clements 68 "militates against
breaking this essentially unitary transaction into its component parts in
order to exact consecutive sentences.
8 69
In a slightly different situation, a defendant challenged the imposi-
tion of separate sentences on separate counts.870 The court held that
since the sentences were concurrent and therefore added nothing, the
sentence did not exceed the lawful penalty. 17 ' The trial judge may, of
course, in his discretion, order consecutive sentences imposed in order
to insure that the defendant is punished for an original conviction and
a subsequent one.872 However, a district court has no authority to im-
861. Id
862. Makal v. Arizona, 544 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 976 (1976).
863. 563 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978).
864. Id at 1309.
865. United States v. Ortiz-Martinez, 557 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1977).
.866. Id
867. Id at 216.
868. 471 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1972).
869. 557 F.2d at 217. The dissent, however, argued that since different facts were re-
quired for each of the two convictions, they should entail separate punishments. Id
870. United States v. Davis, 548 F.2d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1977).
871. Id
872. United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045
(1978); United States v. Tacoma, 199 F.2d 482, 483 (2d Cir. 1952). Cf. United States v.
Bartholdi, 453 F.2d 1225, 1226 (9th Cir. 1972) (probation revoked after expiration and de-
fendant sentenced to four months consecutive to a state sentence he was serving).
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pose a federal sentence concurrently with a state sentence. 73 This is
true "because a federal term cannot begin until a prisoner has been
received by federal authorities."8 74
When a defendant is retried after having had his first conviction set
aside, the court is normally limited to the defendant's original sen-
tence. 75 However, where there have been events subsequent to the
original sentencing which shed new light on defendant's "life, health,
habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities," the court may
impose a more severe sentence upon reconviction.
8 76
A sentence may be considered cruel and unusual punishment if the
penalty is "so out of proportion to the crime committed that it shocks a
balanced sense of justice. ' 77 In United States v. Tolias, 7 8 the Ninth
Circuit rejected defendant's argument that he was a victim of cruel and
unusual punishment. The defendant, a homosexual, was sentenced to
serve time in prison. He claimed this was a violation of his eighth
amendment rights because "there are assaults and homosexual rapes in
prison. '  The court held that this argument fell short of meeting the
test for cruel and unusual punishment. 80
In deciding what sentence to impose a trial judge may, in his discre-
tion, consider the defendant's candor as a witness.8 81  The Ninth Cir-
cuit recently reaffirmed this principle in two cases.88 2 In United States
v. Lustig,8 83 the court emphasized that appellate review of the sentence
imposed by a trial judge is improper absent some "extraordinary cir-
cumstance."' s ' While formulating a defendant's sentence, the trial
judge must also design probation conditions which avoid the risk of
873. United States v. Segal, 549 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 919 (1977).
874. Id at 1301; 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1976).
875. United States v. Hall, 559 F.2d 1160, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1977), cer. denied, 435 U.S.
942 (1978).
876. Id at 1163 (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969)).
877. Halprin v. United States, 295 F.2d 458, 460-61 (9th Cir. 1961) (quoting Gallego v.
United States, 276 F.2d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 1960)).
878. 548 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1977).
879. Id at 279.
880. Id
881. United States v. Cluchette, 465 F.2d 749, 754 (9th Cir. 1972); see text accompanying
notes 1195-96 infra.
882. See United States v. Hall 559 F.2d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977), cer. denied, 435 U.S.
942 (1978); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 751 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1045 (1978).
883. 555 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045 (1978).
884. Id at 751 (citing United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 1977)). See note
846 supra and accompanying text.
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self-incrimination."8 5
In addition to objecting to the length of sentences, defendants may
attack their sentences on grounds of illegality.886 In United States v.
Walker,88 7 the defendant contended that his previous conviction for a
violent crime disqualified him from commitment under the National
Addiction and Rehabilitation Act8e 8 and that therefore his commitment
was illegal.8 8 9 The court found the applicable sections applied only to
the present offense or to two prior offenses and therefore defendant's
single conviction for a violent crime did not disqualify him. 90
The defendant in United States v. Marron 91 succeeded in attacking a
split adult sentence imposed under 18 U.S.C. section 3651892 on the
basis that he was a youthful offender.8 93 The court held that this sen-
tence was illegal because a combination of rehabilitative treatment and
retributive punishment was not intended by the Federal Youth Correc-
tions Act. 94 Although the court determined the sentence was illegal,
the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the principle that the trial court was enti-
tled to resentence the defendant.8 95 To alter a sentence, the defendant
must move for correction or modification thereof within 120 days.
8 96
Although the Eighth Circuit has permitted an exception to this time
limitation, 97 the Ninth Circuit has found the limit to be jurisdictional
in nature 98 and has specifically declined to recognize the exception ex-
pressed by the Eighth Circuit. 99
Where there is a direct conflict between the written and the oral
885. United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735, 740 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923
(1978). The trial judge, however, need not take account of an unasserted fifth amendment
claim.
886. See text accompanying notes 887-95 infra.
887. 564 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1977), cer. denied, 435 U.S. 916 (1978).
888. Narcotic Addiction and Rehabilitation Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4251(t)(1), 4251(b) (1970).
889. 564 F.2d at 892.
890. Id
891. 564 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1977).
892. A split sentence is one in which the defendant is placed on probation on the condi-
tion that he spend a specified amount of time in jail. See 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976).
893. 564 F.2d at 868.
894. Id at 869; United States v. Hayes, 474 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Waters, 437 F.2d 722, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
895. 564 F.2d at 871 (citing Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957)).
896. FED. R. CRIm. P. 35.
897. Kortness v. United States, 514 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1975).
898. United States v. United States District Court, 509 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 962 (1975).
899. Sanchez v. United States, 572 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1977); Andrino v. United States Bd.
of Parole, 550 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1977).
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judgments, an unambiguous oral sentence will control.9
°° In United
States v. Velazco-Hernandez,901 the court reaffirmed this principle but
concluded that there was no conflict between the oral and written
sentences involved in the case.90 2
B. Probation Revocation
Probation revocation, like parole revocation, is not a stage of the
criminal prosecution. °s It does, however, result in a loss of liberty and
therefore a probationer is entitled to a hearing complying with due
process requirements.' In United States v. Segal,90 the Ninth Circuit
determined that a probationer must be given both a preliminary hear-
ing and a final revocation hearing before his probation may be re-
voked.90 6 The preliminary hearing is to be held at the time of arrest
and should determine whether there is probable cause to believe that
the probationer has committed a violation. The final revocation hear-
ing must include the following minimum requirements:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of [probation]; (b) disclosure to
the [probationer] of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in
person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing of-
ficer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a
"neutral and detached" hearing body... ; and (f) a written statement by
the factfnders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking [pro-
bation]. 907
900. United States v. Munoz-Dela Rosa, 495 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1974).
901. 565 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1977).
902. Id at 584.
903. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (probation revocation); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,480 (1972) (parole revocation); United States v. Segal, 549 F.2d 1293,
1297 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 919 (1977) (probation revocation); see text accompany-
ing notes 949-50 infra.
904. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973). In United States v. Segal, 549 F.2d
1293 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 919 (1977), the Ninth Circuit differentiated between
four types of proceedings in which the Supreme Court has required "differing levels of due
process:
(1) criminal prosecutions, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969);
(2) probation revocation hearings with imposition of a sentence theretofore sus-
pended, ag., Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128... (1967); (3) probation revocation hear-
ings with the sentence already established and parole revocation hearings, e.g.,
Morrssey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 ... (1972) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973); and (4) prison disciplinary proceedings, e.g., Wol'v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539. . . (1974) and Baxter v. Pamigiano, 425 U.S. 308... (1976).
Id at 1296.
905. 549 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 919 (1977).
906. Id at 1297.
907. 549 F.2d at 1297 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)).
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In Mempa v. _Rhay,90 these rights were extended to include the right to
counsel.909
After the preliminary and final hearings, probation may then be re-
voked where the hearing officer is reasonably satisfied that a state or
federal law or a condition of probation has been violated.910 In deter-
mining whether a condition of probation has been violated, the hearing
officer must find that the condition was reasonably related to the pur-
poses of the Federal Probation Act.911 There are three factors which
contribute to such a determination: "(1) the purposes sought to be
served by probation; (2) the extent to which constitutional rights en-
joyed by law-abiding citizens should be accorded to probationers; and
(3) the legitimate needs of law enforcement." 912 In United States v.
Pierce,913 the Ninth Circuit found that a condition of probation which
required the disclosure of certain financial information, even though it
denied probationer the right against self-incrimination, carried out the
purposes of the Act.914 Protection of the public and the needs of law
enforcement were served through the acquisition of information on
probationer's assets because such information permitted the detection
of illegal investment activity.9 5 Rehabilitation of defendant would be
furthered by such detection because it would deter the defendant from
engaging in illegal activities. Such deterrence would also serve the in-
terests of the public.916
The court in United States v. Dane917 took a slightly different ap-
proach by concentrating on whether there had been an abuse of discre-
tion by the judge in revoking probation.918 Where the offensive acts
are not illegal, due process requires a "prior fair warning" to defendant
908. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
909. Id at 137.
910. United States v. Carrion, 457 F.2d 808, 809 (9th Cir. 1972) (state conviction sufficient
for revocation although appeal of conviction pending). In 1977 the Ninth Circuit reaf-
firmed the Carrion rationale twice: United States v. Marron, 564 F.2d 867, 871 (9th Cir.
1977) (facts may be considered from an invalid conviction since the conviction itself need
not be considered); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1977), cert denied,
434 U.S. 1045 (1978) (certified copy of conviction which goes unchallenged is sufficient proof
of a violation of probation).
911. United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing United States v.
Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc)).
912. Id
913. 561 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1977).
914. Id at 739-40.
915. Id
916. Id
917. 570 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1977).
918. Id at 843 (citing Bums v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 222 (1932)); United States v.
Lara, 472 F.2d 128, 129 (9th Cir. 1972); Trueblood Longknife v. United States, 381 F.2d 17,
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that those acts will lead to revocation.919 The court found that defend-
ant Dane had been put on notice at his sentencing that the continuation
of his life as a mercenary soldier would lead to a revocation of his
probation.920 After considering two main concerns of a probation sys-
tem,921 the Ninth Circuit concluded that the trial judge had not abused
his discretion by revoking defendant's probation on the basis of acts
committed outside the United States which were not illegal.922 The
court reasoned that the acts showed probationer's continued fascination
for weapons and soldiering, which could be reasonably construed as a
threat to the community.9z
Rule 11(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the
trial judge to personally address the defendant to determine whether
his plea of guilty is made voluntarily and with an understanding of the
nature of the charges and the consequences of the plea.9 The issue of
19 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 926 (1967); Brown v. United States, 236 F.2d 253, 254
(9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 922 (1958).
919. 570 F.2d at 844 (citing Tiitsman v. Black, 536 F.2d 678, 682 (6th Cir. 1976)). See
United States v. Foster, 500 F.2d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 1974) (where defendant not advised
that he was to report to probation department, his failure to do so could not be grounds for
revocation). Cf Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1964) (conviction over-
turned since statute did not give prior notice that conduct was illegal).
920. 570 F.2d at 844.
921. The twin goals isolated by the Dane court were successful rehabilitation of the pro-
bationer and protection of the community. Id at 845 (citing United States v. Consuelo-
Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc); United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51,
54-55 (9th Cir. 1975); and United States v. Nu-Triumph, Inc., 500 F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir.
1974)).
922. Id at 845-46.
923. Id at 846.
924. FED. R. CRim. P. 11(c) provides:
Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defend-
ant personally in open court and inform him of, and determine that he understands, the
following:
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum
penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law;
and
(2) if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that he has the right to be
represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding against him and, if neces-
sary, one will be appointed to represent him; and
(3) that he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has already
been made, and that he has the right to be tried by a jury and at that trial has the
right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses
against him, and the right not to be compelled to incriminate himself; and
(4) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere there will not be a further trial of any
kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo contendere he waives the right to a trial; and
(5) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere, the court may ask him questions
about the offense to which he has pleaded, and if he answers these questions under
oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel, his answers may later be used
against him in a prosecution for perjury or false statement.
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whether rule 11 applies to violations admitted by the probationer at
revocation hearings was addressed by the Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Segal.9 s The court concluded that rule 11 requires advise-
ment only before accepting aplea ofguily, not before admission of a
violation,91 and that the admission of a probation violation is not
equivalent to a guilty plea.92 7 The Segal court considered whether
Boykin 'v. Alabama928 required specific waivers of the right to confron-
tation and the privilege against self-incrimination in a probation revo-
cation hearing.929 After a survey of the case law which revealed that at
the probation revocation hearing the defendant was at best entitled to
an "attenuated confrontation right, a limited self-incrimination privi-
lege and no right to jury triar ' 930 and was subject to the same maxi-
mum punishment of which she had been advised before pleading
guilty, the court concluded that "the theoretical justifications for
Boykin" were absent and, therefore, its protections did not apply.931
The court emphasized the inapplicability of Boykin as well as its inap-
propriateness. 932 Since the probation officer's role is one of "represent-
ing his client's best interests as long as these do not constitute a threat
to public safety, . . . [t]his function can best be carried out in a less
adversary and contentious atmosphere. ' 933 Otherwise, the court main-
tained, the next logical step would be a requirement that the probation
officer advise the probationer of his or her rights at every meeting.934
Although this would not be necessary to protect the probationer's
rights, it would interfere with the relationship between the probation
officer and probationer which could best effect rehabilitation.935 In
dissent, Judge Browning argued that a simple recitation of the rights
guaranteed by Gagnon v. Scarpelli 9 36 at a probation revocation hear-
925. 549 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 919 (1977).
926. 549 F.2d at 1296. See also United States v. Hill, 548 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir. 1977)
(rule 11 inapplicable since probation revocation not a stage of criminal proceeding).
927. 549 F.2d at 1300.
928. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
929. 549 F.2d at 1296.
930. Id at 1299.
931. Id at 1298-1300. See also United States v. Hill, 548 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir. 1977).
932. 549 F.2d at 1300.
933. Id The Court discussed the difference in the nature of the proceedings prior to sen-
tencing and during the probation period. Prior to sentencing, the proceedings are adver-
sarial in nature. After sentencing, the prosecutor leaves and the relationship between the
court and the defendant is one of cooperation. Under such circumstances, formalistic pro-
cedures are unnecessary and may even inhibit the rehabilitative process. Id at 1300-01.
934. Id at 1301.
935. Id
936. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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ing937 where imposition of sentence could follow, would not signifi-
cantly alter the nature of the proceedings.938 Since the probationer's
liberty was at stake, the judge concluded that it was pointless to risk an
uninformed and unjustified admission of a violation.939
C. Parole Revocation
Under the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act,940 "parole
may be revoked when the parolee commits a crime while on parole, or
when no additional crime has been committed by him while on parole,
ie., when the parolee has violated the terms of his order of parole,
other than by committing a new crime. 941 When parole is revoked
not because of the commission of a crime but because of the violation
of the terms of parole, the parolee receives credit for time spent on
parole.942 This was not true under the law as it existed prior to the
passage of the Act. 43  In Thite v. Warden,9 " the Ninth Circuit held
that the Act is not to be applied retroactively. Consequently, defend-
ant was not entitled to 776 days credit for time spent on parole prior to
the effective date of the Act and prior to return to prison for a parole
violation.945 The court's conclusion was based on several factors, in-
cluding the reasoning of the district court in Daniels v. Farkas,946 an
earlier case in which it was held that the Act should apply prospectively
only.
"Preponderance of the evidence" is the standard of proof required at
revocation hearings.947 This is so even where the defendant has been
previously acquitted on identical charges in a criminal trial.948  Rea-
soning that parole revocation is not a part of the criminal prosecu-
tion,949 that it is remedial rather than punitive in nature, and that it
937. See text accompanying notes 57-62 supra.
938. 549 F.2d at 1303.
939. Id
940. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (1976).
941. White v. Warden, 566 F.2d 57, 59 (9th Cir. 1977).
942. See id at 58-59; 18 U.S.C. § 4210 (1976).
943. See Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 4205, 62 Stat. 854-55 (formerly
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4205) (repealed 1976) ("IThe time the prisoner was on parole shall
not diminish the time he was sentenced to serve.").
944. 566 F.2d 57 (9th Cir. 1977).
945. Id at 60-62.
946. 417 F. Supp. 793 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
947. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,479 (1972); Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303,
1307 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Carrion, 457 F.2d 808, 809 (9th Cir. 1972) (per
curiam).
948. Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303, 1307 (9th Ci. 1977).
949. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972).
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seeks to protect the welfare of parolees and safety of society,950 the
Ninth Circuit concluded "that collateral estoppel does not bar a subse-
quent parole revocation hearing after a criminal acquittal."951
The Ninth Circuit has extended the principle, originally announced
as dictum in a 1976 case,952 that a trial court need not inform a defend-
ant of the possibility of parole revocation when accepting his guilty
plea.953 This conclusion was grounded on the fact that the parole
board has authority separate and distinct from the sentencing judge.
954
It can therefore determine whether the remainder of the defendant's
pre-existing sentence will run concurrently or consecutively to his most
recent sentence.955 The court concluded that revocation of parole is a
collateral, rather than a direct, consequence of a guilty plea.956 While
rule 1 l(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the
trial judge to inform a defendant of the maximum penalties for the
offense charged prior to accepting his guilty plea, the defendant need
only be informed of all direct consequences of his plea.957
D. Appeal
1. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
The test to be followed by an appellate court reviewing a lower court
ruling on defendant's motion-for acquittal under rule 29(c) 95 8 is identi-
cal to that followed by the trial judge.959 The jurors are the sole judges
of the credibility of the witnesses. It is their responsibility to resolve
evidentiary conflicts and to draw any reasonable inferences from the
950. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783-84 (1973).
951. 557 F.2d at 1307. The Rhay court additionally focused on the differing standards of
proof in criminal and civil actions as reason for the inapplicability of collateral estoppel.
Id at 1305, 1307.
952. United States v. Harris, 534 F.2d 141, 142 n.4 (9th Cir. 1976).
953. Sanchez v. United States, 572 F.2d 210, 211 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
954. Id
955. Id
956. Id
957. Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946, 948-49 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 895
(1976).
958. FED. R. C~iM. P. 29(c). The rule provides:
Motion after Discharge of Jury. If the jury returns a verdict of guilty or is dis-
charged without having returned a verdict, a motion for judgment of acquittal may be
made or renewed within 7 days after the jury is discharged or within such further time
as the court may fix during the 7-day period. If a verdict of guilty is returned the court
may on such motion set aside the verdict and enter judgment of acquittal. If no verdict
is returned the court may enter judgment of acquittal. It shall not be necessary to the
making of such a motion that a similar motion has been made prior to the submission
of the case to the jury.
959. United States v. Nelson, 419 F.2d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 1969).
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proven facts.960  On appeal, the evidence must always be viewed in a
light most favorable to the government. 9 61 The reviewing court does
not reevaluate the evidence. Rather, it assesses the jurors' conclusions
to determine if it was rational to conclude that the defendant's guilt was
established beyond a reasonable doubt.962
In United States v. Ramos,963 the court, relying on United States v.
Nelson,9 4 held that the jury could have reasonably found the defend-
ant guilty by believing certain witnesses and by disbelieving the de-
fendant's alibi witness. The Ramos court held that reversal was
required965 because the trial court had disregarded the Nelson stan-
dard96 6 by ignoring the evaluation of the testimony by the jury.
The Nelson test was employed by the Ninth Circuit in United States
v. Rojas967 and United States v. Garcia-Rodriguez.968 In Rojas, appli-
cation of the Nelson test led to the conclusion that the district court
"erred as a matter of law in concluding that a jury could not rationally
find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of the
evidence presented."969 Similarly, the court in Garcia-Rodriquez reiter-
ated the principle970 and concluded, following an in-depth evidentiary
analysis, 97 1 that there had been no error.
972
In United States v. Kaplan,973 a 1977 case, the court added a slightly
new dimension to the old test:
[V]iewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the government as
prevailing party, is the court satisfied that the jurors reasonably could de-
cide that they would not hesitate to art in their own serious affairs upon
factual assumptions as probable as the conclusions that the defendant is
guilty as charged?974
The Ninth Circuit again applied this slightly modified test in United
960. Id at 1242.
961. United States v. Hood, 493 F.2d 677, 680 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 852 (1974);
United States v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Nelson,
419 F.2d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 1969).
962. United States v. Nelson, 419 F.2d at 1242.
963. 558 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1977).
964. 419 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1969). See text accompanying notes 959-62 supra.
965. 558 F.2d at 548.
966. See text accompanying note 962 supra.
967. 554 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1977).
968. 558 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1977).
969. 554 F.2d at 943 n.11.
970. 558 F.2d at 960.
971. Id at 960-66.
972. Id at 966.
973. 554 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1977).
974. Id at 963.
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States v. Dunn,975 concluding that the evidence was insufficient to jus-
tify the convictions of four of the defendants.976
2. New Trial
The Ninth Circuit has not supplied a decisive test to determine when
the defendant is sufficiently prejudiced by improperly admitted evi-
dence to warrant a new trial under the federal rules.977 It is clear, how-
ever, that several factors are afforded weight. These factors include the
inherent prejudice of the evidence presented, the forcefulness and time-
liness of the trial court's curative instructions, and the overall strength
of the prosecution's case.9 78
In United States v. Nace,979 the court reiterated that the post-trial
discovery of evidence which would have been valuable for impeach-
ment purposes does not warrant the granting of a new trial.98 Fur-
thermore, noted the court, since the exercise of due diligence in
discovering new evidence is a prerequisite to the granting of a new trial
on the ground of newly discovered evidence, 98 1 the motion in Nace
would have failed in any event inasmuch as counsel had not acted with
due diligence.982
3. Appealable Issues
A defendant generally will not be permitted to raise an objection or
issue for the first time in the reviewing court.98 3 Where the issue is of a
constitutional nature, however, the defendant's failure to object at the
trial level cannot be considered a waiver of the issue.984 A second ex-
975. 564 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1977).
976. id at 357, 359.
977. FED. R. Crum. P. 33.
978. United States v. Martinez, 514 F.2d 334, 343 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Bashaw, 509 F.2d 1204, 1205 (9th Cir. 1975); Thurman v. United States, 316 F.2d 205, 206
(9th Cir. 1963).
979. 561 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1977).
980. Id at 772 (citing United States v. Harris, 534 F.2d 1371, 1374 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 847 (1976)). Eg., United States v. Colacurcio, 499 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1974);
Lindsey v. United States, 368 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1025 (1967).
981. United States v. Carey, 475 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1973); Lindsey v. United States, 368
F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1025 (1967).
982. 561 F.2d at 772.
983. FED. 1. CriM. P. 51; Lienemann v. State Farm Mut. Auto Fire & Cas. Co., 540 F.2d
333,340 n.7 (8th Cir. 1976) (jury instructions). Cf. Bock v. United States, 375 F.2d 479,480
(9th Cir. 1967) (jury instructions).
984. Carmical v. Craven, 457 F.2d 582, 584 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 929
(1972). See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 449-52 (1965); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
438-39 (1963). But Vf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (failure to comply with state
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ception to the non-review rule recognized by the Ninth Circuit,"' is
when a showing of "plain error" can be made. Again, the previously
unraised issue may be asserted for the first time on appeal.
98 6
In United States v. Goldstein,9 7 the court set aside the lower court's
judgment and remanded the case since the parties had agreed that the
stipulation leading to judgment erroneously deleted evidence relating
to the defendant's motion to suppress. Inclusion of the evidence was
necessary to allow the defendant to raise this point on appeal.988 The
failure to meet this requirement was "plain error." In contrast, the
court in United States v. Nace989 and United States v. Helina990 deter-
mined that "plain error" did not exist, and consequently affirmed the
lower courts' decisions.991 In United States v. Klelfgen,992 the court did
not apply the "plain error" exception but rather determined that no
objection had been made and, therefore, the point had been "waived"
for the purpose of appeal.993
Federal appellate jurisdiction is purely statutory in origin994 and is
reserved primarily for the review of final decisions.995 In United States
procedures for raising constitutional issues may preclude raising of that issue in subsequent
habeas corpus petition).
985. See note 986 infra.
986. See, e.g., Egger v. United States, 509 F.2d 745 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 842
(1975); United States v. Rose, 500 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Machado, 457
F.2d 1372, 1375 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 860 (1972); FED. R. CrIM. P. 30,52; FED. R.
EVID. 103(d).
987. 558 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1977).
988. Id at 919.
989. 561 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1977).
990. 549 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1977).
991. 561 F.2d at 771; 549 F.2d at 718.
992. 557 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1977).
993. Id at 1299.
994. Heike v. United States, 217 U.S. 423,428 (1910). See John v. Paullin, 231 U.S. 583,
585 (1913); U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2. "Appellate review is not a constitutional entitlement.
It is a purely statutory right, and to avail oneself of that right, one must satisfy the terms of
the statute." United States v. Young, 544 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1024 (1977).
995. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). Cf. United States v. Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164, 170-71
(4th Cir. 1972) (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)) (excep-
tion to "finality" rule for orders made during course of litigation which relates to collateral
matters and which would not receive effective review as part of the final judgment in the
action; order denying motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds is such a collateral
order and is, therefore, reviewable prior to final judgment). Lansdown has been adopted in
three other circuits. See United States v. Barket, 530 F.2d 181, 185 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 917 (1977); United States v. DiSilvio, 520 F.2d 247, 248 n.20 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1015 (1975); United States v. Beckerman, 516 F.2d 905, 906-07 (2d Cir.
1975).
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v. Towill,996 the Ninth Circuit concluded that 18 U.S.C. section 373 1997
does not provide for appellate review of a denial of a governmental
motion to dismiss the indictment.
In United States v. Ritte,998 the defendant appealed a magistrate's
order for the forfeiture of the defendant's appearance bond for breach
of a bail condition. The Ninth Circuit held that because district courts,
not magistrates, have the power to adjudicate bond forfeitures999 and
because the record did not indicate that the forfeiture finding had been
adopted by the district court,' °° there was no final appealable order
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. section 1291.1001 Section 1291 does
not authorize appeals from magistrates' decisions.1
0 0 2
In Moroyoqui v. United States,"°°3 however, the Ninth Circuit re-
versed its earlier position" and held that an order denying a motion
to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds is a final decision and is, there-
fore, appealable under section 1291.1°° This result followed a United
States Supreme Court decision" ° announced during the pendency of
the Moroyoqui appeal.
4. Discretion to Review
Although an issue not raised in the trial court normally will not be
reviewed by the court of appeals,100 7 the reviewing court does have dis-
cretion to review such issues. 008 In Standlee v. Rhay,11 for example,
the court of appeals exercised its discretion to review and "dispose" of
a previously unraised issue of little merit.1010 In Schoultz v. Sheriff,
Carson City, Nevada,'0 1' rather than utilize its discretion to dispose of
996. 548 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1977).
997. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976).
998. 558 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1977).
999. See Campbell v. District Court, 501 F.2d 196 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879
(1974); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1976).
1000. 558 F.2d at 927.
1001. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). See text accompanying note 995 supra.
1002. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
1003. 570 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1977).
1004. See United States v. Young, 544 F.2d 415,418 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1024 (1977).
1005. 570 F.2d at 864.
1006. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
1007. See text accompanying notes 983-86 supra; Frommhagen v. Klein, 456 F.2d 1391,
1395 (9th Cir. 1972).
1008. See Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552 (1941).
1009. 557 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1977).
1010. Id at 1308 n.3.
1011. No. 76-3732 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1977) (unreported; see table, 568 F.2d 776, 778
(1977) (decisions without published opinions)).
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the previously unraised issue because the issue was "of little merit," the
Ninth Circuit instead held that because of the extensive record on the
speedy trial issue, justice required that the court dispose of the newly
raised "ineffectiveness of counsel" issue.10 1 2  The court concluded,
however, that the sparseness of the record with respect to the ineffec-
tiveness issue necessitated the return of the case to the trial court for
further development of this issue. 013
The appellate court may also employ its discretion to refuse to re-
view issues even when they have been previously raised.10 14 Such re-
fusals often occur in cases in which the defendant has received
concurrent sentences on several charges.10 15  In such cases, affirmance
of the conviction on any single count renders review on the other
counts unnecessary. Recent cases illustrating this discretionary power
include United States v. Garcia-Rodriguez"16 and United States v.
valdovinos.10 17
5. Dismissal of Appeals
The death of an appellant during the pendency of an appeal of a
criminal conviction abates the appeal and the trial court proceed-
ings.10 18  In United States v. Bechtel,'019 the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed
this principle, indicating that although Durham v. United States'0 20 had
been overruled by Dove v. United States,1 2' this aspect of the case re-
mained intact. 2 2  Since the appellant in Bechtel had died while re-
view of his criminal conviction was pending, the appeal was dismissed
with directions to the trial court to dismiss the indictment. 0 23
1012. Id, slip op. at 2657.
1013. Id, slip op. at 2658.
1014. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 791 (1969); United States v. Costey, 554 F.2d
909, 910 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 968 (1977); United States v. Chenaur, 552 F.2d 294,
302 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Westover, 511 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1009 (1975); United States v. Murray, 492 F.2d 178, 186 (9th Cir. 1973), cerl.
denied, 419 U.S. 854 (1974).
1015. See cases cited in note 1014 supra.
1016. 558 F.2d 956, 957 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Each appellant received a concurrent sen-
tence on each of the two counts. Thus, if we affirm the conspiracy count, we need not con-
sider the issues raised as to the possession count.").
1017. 558 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir. 1977) (power to refuse to review recognized, but review
undertaken nevertheless).
1018. Durham v. United States, 401 U.S. 481, 483 (1971).
1019. 547 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1977).
1020. 401 U.S. 481 (1971). See text accompanying note 1018 supra.
1021. 423 U.S. 325 (1976).
1022. 547 F.2d at 1380.
1023. Id
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The reviewing court may also dismiss an appeal where the appellant
has become a fugitive from justice and where there is no indication that
he will surrender, regardless of the outcome of the appeal. 0 24  In
United States v. Wood,' the Ninth Circuit concluded that there was
no indication that the defendant would surrender upon a decision ad-
verse to him; dismissal of the appeal was therefore appropriate.' 26
6. Standard for Reviewing Court
It has consistently been held that since trial judges are in the best
position to weigh and evaluate the credibility of witnesses, their find-
ings will not be overturned on appeal unless they are "clearly errone-
ous."10 27 Several recent Ninth Circuit cases upheld lower court findings
under this standard.' 28
The court of appeals also utilizes the "abuse of discretion" standard
to determine whether to uphold a decision. 0 29 In United States v.
Keamey,10 30 the court indicated that the district judge has "great lati-
tude in passing on the admissibility of evidence," and therefore his de-
cision will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.' The
Federal Rules of Evidence indicate that "[t]he extent of impeachment is
[also] committed to the discretion of the trial court."'0'- An appellate
court will reverse only upon an abuse of that discretion. 0 33 This stan-
1024. See Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970); United States v. Villegas-
Codallos, 543 F.2d 1124, 1125 (9th Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Laird, 432 F.2d 77, 79 (9th Cir.
1970).
1025. 550 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1977).
1026. Id at 437-38.
1027. See United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 111-12 (1946); United States v. Town-
send, 510 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81, 82-83, 85-86
(9th Cir. 1962) (en banc).
1028. See, ag., Moroyoqui v. United States, 570 F.2d 862, 864 (9th Cir. 1977) (trial
judge's findings that conduct of prosecutor did not constitute "bad faith" or "overreaching"
upheld because not clearly erroneous); United States v. Nace, 561 F.2d 763, 772-73 (9th Cir.
1977) (trial court's finding that government had not suppressed exculpatory evidence enti-
tled to great deference and will not be overturned "unless it clearly appears that it is not
supported by evidence"); United States v. Humphrey, 549 F.2d 650, 652 (9th Cir. 1977) (trial
court's ruling on defendant's motion to suppress upheld under "clearly erroneous" stan-
dard); United States v. Tolias, 548 F.2d 277, 278 (9th Cir. 1977) (district court's decision as
to whether defendant's consent to search was voluntary will not be reversed unless clearly
erroneous).
1029. See United States v. Phillips, 482 F.2d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 847 (1974); United States v. Haili, 443 F.2d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir. 1971).
1030. 560 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1977).
1031. Id at 1369.
1032. FED. R. EvID. 608(b).
1033. United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 748-49 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1045 (1978).
19781 1011
1012 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 11
dard was altered in United States v. Stevens,10 34 wherein it was held
that the appellate court should affirm on any grounds which will vali-
date the lower court's result. 0 35  In United States v. Segna,0 36 the
court reaffirmed its rigorous standard that reversal is required in only
those "very exceptional circumstances where reversal is necessary in
order to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to preserve the integrity and
reputation of the judicial process."'
10 37
7. Harmless Error
Not all errors committed at the trial level will result in a reversal for
the defendant. If the error is classified as "harmless error," the verdict
will not be disturbed by the appellate court. 10 38 As a result, the diffi-
cult task is determining when an error is prejudicial or harmless. While
there is no one test which is uniformly applied, the standards devised
address the degree of certainty required before an error is classified as
"harmless." 10 3 9 The inquiry usually is whether it is "more probable
than not," or whether it is "highly probable," that an error did not
materially affect the judgment.1 40
In United States v. Valle-Valdez,"° ' the most important case decided
by the Ninth Circuit in this area in 1977, the court indicated that the
most clearly articulated standard is one of "reasonable possibility" that
the error materially affected the verdict.1 42 The court stated: "Which
1034. 548 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 975 (1977).
1035. Id at 1363 n.9.
1036. 555 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1977).
1037. Id at 231 (citing United States v. Wysong, 528 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Larson, 507 F.2d 385, 387 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Trejo, 501 F.2d 138, 141
(9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Cozzetti, 441 F.2d 344, 352 (9th Cir. 1971)).
1038. See United States v. Pettersen, 513 F.2d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Henson, 513 F.2d 156, 157-58 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Davis, 501 F.2d 1344, 1345
(9th Cir. 1974).
1039. United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 915 (9th Cir. 1977).
1040. See generally Saltzburg, The Harm o/Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REv. 988, 1018-21
(1973). In United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 914-15 (9th Cir. 1977), the Ninth
Circuit recognized that "standards guiding appellate determination of harmless error are
variable, often confusing and frequently left unarticulated."
Perhaps the leading articulation of the harmless error standard is found in Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 22-24 (1967): "[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held
harmless, the [appellate] court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." Therefore, the applicable standard depends on whether the alleged er-
ror was of a constitutional or nonconstitutional nature. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (trial court refused to appoint counsel); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560
(1958) (coerced confession).
1041. 554 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1977). See text accompanying notes 1053-58 infra.
1042. 554 F.2d at 915. See Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 432 (1972); Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963).
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standard an appellate court selects depends on the type of case on ap-
peal--criminal or civil'° 4 3-- or on the type of error committed in the
trial court--constitutional or non-constitutional."' The court found
that since improper jury instructions are considered "non-constitu-
tional" errors, the "reasonable possibility" rule was inapplicable." 5
Rather, non-constitutional errors require application of the "more
probable than not" standard.1" Under the circumstances of Valle-
Valdez, however, the application of either the probability or reasonable
possibility standard would have required reversal since "the erroneous
jury instruction probably materially affected the verdict. Necessarily,
therefore, there is a reasonable possibility that it had such an im-
pact." o47
In United States v. Hunt,' 8 the court interpreted the "reasonable
possibility" standard to mean that the court must determine "beyond a
reasonable doubt" that the error complained of did not contribute to
the verdict."°49  Utilizing this test, the court found itself convinced be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the introduction into evidence of twelve
packets of heroin that allegedly had been unconstitutionally seized did
not contribute to defendant's conviction because "the independent, un-
tainted evidence of guilt was overwhelming."1050 Therefore, the ad-
mission of the twelve packets constituted harmless error beyond a
reasonable doubt.105'
Rules 52(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure indi-
cate that the applicable standard for determining "plain" and "harm-
1043. For an argument that the standards should be identical, see I WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 21 (3d ed. 1940); R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 48 (1970). Contra,
Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REv. 988, 995-98 (1973).
1044. 554 F.2d at 915. See Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of
Chapman v. Calfornia, 53 MINN. L. REv. 519 (1969). See also Note, Harmless Constitu-
tionalError, 20 STAN. L. REv. 83 (1967). The courts have viewed violations of the Bill of
Rights as "constitutional errors:" Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972) (confrontation
clause); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (self-incrimination clause); United States
v. Barcli, 514 F.2d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 842 (1975) (exclusionary rule
based on the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches).
1045. 554 F.2d at 916. For two cases which suggest that errors in jury instructions in
criminal cases should be measured against the reasonable possibility standard, see United
States v. Rea, 532 F.2d 147 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 837 (1976) and United States v.
Duhart, 496 F.2d 941 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 967 (1974).
1046. 554 F.2d at 916. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 108 (1974); United
States v. Cutting, 538 F.2d 835, 842 (9th Cir. 1976).
1047. 554 F.2d at 917.
1048. 548 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1977).
1049. Id at 269 n.l.
1050. Id
1051. Id
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less" error depends on the nature of the proceedings.10 52  In United
States v. Segna,0 53 the court relied on Valle- Valdez10 54 in determining
that it was highly probable that the prosecutor's improper argument
materially affected the verdict and amounted to "plain error" under
rule 52(b). 1055 In United States v. Dixon,'0 56 the court found that since
the trial court had considered an untimely motion for mistrial on the
merits, the harmless error standard of rule 52(a) applied. 10 57 The court
then used the Valle- Valdez "more probable than not" test to find that
the error in the prosecutor's closing argument probably did not materi-
ally affect the jury's deliberations and verdict.
10 58
The appellate court may find that an erroneous admission of evi-
dence is harmless by virtue of other overwhelming evidence of guilt. 109
Also, an error with respect to one count may be deemed harmless when
concurrent sentences are imposed on several counts. 1°60 In United
States v. Esquer-Gamez,'°6 the error was found to be harmless, but the
court reversed because the trial court failed to give a necessary jury
instruction." 2 The failure was overly prejudicial to the defendant.
1063
8. Automatic Reversal
Although a departure from constitutional procedures does not al-
ways automatically result in reversal," 6 the Supreme Court does re-
quire reversal when certain types of constitutional error are committed;
Ze., certain errors are, as a matter of law, never harmless.1065 In United
1052. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a): harmless error-if the issue were raised below; FED. R.
CRIM. P. 52(b): plain error-if the issue were not raised below; United States v. Kearney,
560 F.2d 1358, 1369 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 971 (1977); United States v. Esquer-
Gamez, 550 F.2d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 1977).
1053. 555 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1977).
1054. See text accompanying notes 1040-46 supra.
1055. 555 F.2d at 232.
1056. 562 F.2d 1138 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 927 (1977).
1057. Id at 1143.
1058. Id
1059. FED. R. CRIm. P. 52(a); United States v. Jones, 460 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1972); see text
accompanying notes 1047-50 supra.
1060. United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 877 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890
(1977).
1061. 550 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1977).
1062. Id at 1234.
1063. Id at 1236.
1064. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969); United States v. Helina, 549 F.2d 713
(9th Cir. 1977).
1065. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,23 (1967); see, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced
confession); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (impartial judge).
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States v. Turner,"'ss the court reiterated that an erroneous restriction of
the right of peremptory challenge during jury selection results in an
automatic reversal.1e 67
E. Habeas Corpus
Pursuant to statute,1 68 federal district courts are empowered to hear
petitions for habeas corpus relief "in behalf of a person in custody pur-
suant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.""1 69 In ruling on the petition, the district court judge is to
presume that the factual findings of the state court are correct. 0 70  This
presumption is rebutted, however, if the petitioner demonstrates the
presence of any one of eight sets of circumstances10 7 1 enumerated in the
statute. Many habeas corpus decisions turn on whether the petitioner
succeeds in overcoming the presumption.
In Arndell v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, °72 for example, the de-
fendant was seeking federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that his
guilty plea was not given freely, voluntarily, and with a full under-
standing of its consequences. As a result of the plea, petitioner was
1066. 558 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977).
1067. Id at 538 (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)).
1068. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).
1069. Id § 2254(a).
1070. Id § 2254(d). The presumption arises after a written determination has been made
"by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the
writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties.. . ." Id
1071. Section 2254(d) provides that a showing of any one of the following is sufficient to
rebut the presumption that the state court determination is correct:
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court hear-
ing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to
afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the person
of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his
constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State court pro-
ceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State
court proceeding;
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court
proceeding or
(8) unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the determi-
nation of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support such factual determination, is produced as provided for herein-
after, and the Federal court on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole
concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record. ...
1072. 549 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir. 1977).
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sentenced to an eight-year prison term for selling a controlled sub-
stance. The state court had held an evidentiary hearing and had con-
cluded that the plea was valid. The district court reviewed transcripts
of defendant's arraignment, the hearings on sentencing and change of
plea, and the aforementioned evidentiary hearing.10 73 The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the district court had acted properly in declining to issue
the writ in light of the petitioner's failure to establish the presence of
any of the eight circumstances 1074 specified by statute.
10 75
A prisoner must exhaust available state remedies before a federal
court will entertain his petition for habeas corpus.1°76 In fact, the
Ninth Circuit generally refuses to resolve any issue raised in the peti-
tion until all issues raised therein have been exposed to available state
remedies. 0 77 In Miller v. California,'078 the defendant alleged that his
state conviction was constitutionally invalid on double jeopardy
grounds. Earlier, the case had reached the Supreme Court on an ob-
scenity issue.0 79 Miller claimed that the instant conviction was barred
as a result of prior convictions on the same charge stemming from the
same incident., The court of appeals concluded that Miller's conten-
tions had probably been fully resolved by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion; but if they had not been, federal habeas corpus would not lie at
this stage because petitioner had "no business being here on issues not
presented to the state courts."' 0 80
The courts of appeals do not automatically have jurisdiction to enter-
tain all appeals from a district court's denial of habeas corpus relief.
Federal law specifically provides that no such appeal will lie "where
the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State
court, unless the justice or judge who rendered the order or a circuit
justice or judge issues a certificate of probable cause."' 10 8'
1073. Id at 1286.
1074. See note 1071 supra and accompanying text.
1075. 549 F.2d at 1286.
1076. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 419 (1963). This rule is based on the doctrine of comity.
Id at 420. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c)(1976).
1077. Gonzales v. Stone, 546 F.2d 807, 810 (9th Cir. 1976). The Fifth Circuit also ad-
heres to this rule. See West v. Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026, 1034 (5th Cir. 1973), aFd on
rehearing, 510 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1975). Some other circuits have adopted a different rule.
See, e.g., Johnson v. United States Dist. Court, 519 F.2d 738, 740 (8th Cir. 1975) (federal
court will decide exhausted issue unless interrelated with unexhausted issues presented in
petition); Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316, 1320 (4th Cir. 1969) (same).
1078. 551 F.2d 1168 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
1079. See Miller v. California, 418 U.S. 915 (1974) (Miller 11); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973) (Miller 1).
1080. 551 F.2d at 1168.
1081. 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1976).
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In Gardner v. Pogue,"8 2 the district court judge, after denying the
writ, failed to issue either "a certificate of probable cause [or] a state-
ment of his reasons for refusing to grant one." 1083  He had, however,
granted the petitioner's motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis.
In asserting that the court of appeals had jurisdiction, the defendant
raised two arguments: first, that the appellate court could itself issue the
certificate of probable cause in the first instance; and second, that the
district court's decision to allow him to proceed in forma pauperis was
tantamount to an issuance of the certificate of probable cause. The
Ninth Circuit rejected both arguments. The court held that rule
22(b) 108 4 prevents an appellate court from issuing the certification of
probable cause in the first instance. 0 8 1 It was also decided that a deci-
sion to allow the defendant to proceed in forma pauperis is not tanta-
mount to an issuance of the certificate because of the different
standards involved.
10 8 6
In a landmark decision,10 7 the Supreme Court held in 1890 that
states may not prosecute a federal officer on state criminal charges
when the alleged illegality stems from the performance of his federal
1082. 558 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1977).
1083. Id at 550.
1084. FED. R. App. P. 22(b). On its face, 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1976) allows "the justice or
judge who rendered the order or a circuit justice orjudge [to issue the] certificate of probable
cause." Id (emphasis added). However, rule 22(b) requires the district court judge to issue
a certificate "or a statement detailing his reasons for declining to confer one." 558 F.2d at
550. It is obvious that the circuit court judge can issue the certificate in the first instance
only when the trial judge has explained why he has failed to do so.
1085. 558 F.2d at 550. This result is compelled by rule 22(b) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure. See note 1084 supra and accompanying text.
1086. 558 F.2d at 550-52. The court noted that an indigent's motion to appeal in forma
pauperis must be granted "[unless the issues raised are so frivolous that the appeal would be
dismissed in the case of a nonindigent litigant. ... Id at 551 (quoting Ellis v. United
States, 356 U.S. 674,675 (1958) (per curiam). See Pembrook v. Wilson, 370 F.2d 37,39 (9th
Cir. 1966) ("frivolous" standard appropriate for in forma pauperis petition by habeas corpus
petitioner); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1976) (establishes "good faith" test for proceeding in forma
pauperis).
In Gardner, however, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the standard "for granting a
certificate of probable cause is stricter." 558 F.2d at 551. Prior to Gardner, the circuit had
not clearly formulated the test for determining when issuance of the certificate is proper.
Compare Poe v. Gladden, 287 F.2d 249, 251 (9th Cir. 1961) ("not plainly frivolous") with
Foster v. Field, 413 F.2d 1050, 1051 (9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam) ("substantial question"); In
re Burwell, 236 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1956) ("questions of sufficient substance"); Fou-
quette v. Bernard, 198 F.2d 96, 98 (9th Cir. 1952) ("substantial question"). Although the
Gardner decision did not fully resolve the uncertainty, the court appeared to adopt the
"sufficient substance" test: "[A]ppellant's contentions are not substantive enough to justify
the grant of a certificate of probable cause, even though they do meet the good faith test for
informapauperis relief." 558 F.2d at 551.
1087. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
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responsibilities. 10 8 8 Habeas corpus relief is available to persons who
have been imprisoned by the State as a result of actions taken pursuant
to federal authority.1089 When a federal officer seeks such relief on
such a ground, major constitutional issues arise with respect to federal-
state relations.10 90
In Clifton v. Cox,'0 91 a federal agent was charged under California
law with second degree murder. The charge was brought after a shoot-
ing had taken place during a drug raid engineered by a task force com-
prised of members of various state and federal agencies. The
defendant claimed that the shooting was justified under the circum-
stances'0 92 and that he was exempt from state prosecution by reason of
the supremacy clause.1
0 93
The Ninth Circuit held that in acting as he did, the defendant proba-
bly had not exceeded the scope of his authority. However, even if he
had, "this did not necessarily strip petitioner of his lawful power to act
under the scope of authority given to him under the laws of the United
1088. Id at 75-76. This result is mandated by the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution. See U.S. CoNsT. art. VI; Clifton v. Cox, 549 F.2d 722, 730 (9th Cir. 1977).
1089. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(2) (1976). This section provides in pertinent part: "The
writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless.. . [hie is in custody for an act
done or committed in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or
decree of a court or judge of the United States. .. "
1090. Ordinarily, a federal court is required to refrain from interfering with state court
attempts to enforce state law. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See also Allee v.
Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974). In Clifton v. Cox,
549 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1977) (discussed in notes 1091-97 infra and accompanying text), the
Ninth Circuit distinguished Younger. The court explained:
In the Younger line of cases a petitioner seeks to avoid prosecution under a state crimi-
nal statute by challenging the constitutionality of the statute in federal court under 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The reason for denying habeas corpus relief. .. is that the peti-
tioner can assert his constitutional claim as a defense in the state court prosecution
In a situation like the instant case .... when a petitioner is held by the state "to
answer for an act which he was authorized to do by the law of the United States, which
it was his duty to do. . . he cannot be guilty of a crime under the law of the State
Id at 729-30 (quoting In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 75 (1890) (footnotes omitted)).
1091. 549 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1977).
1092. In Clyon, federal officers obtained a warrant to search a ranch for an illegal drug
manufacturing operation. A warrant for the arrest of one of the owners of the ranch had
also been procured. The officers were transported to the site by a helicopter which created a
great deal of noise and flying debris. One agent fell during the commotion. Clifton, think-
ing the agent had been shot, forcefully entered a cabin on the property without identifying
himself or knocking. The suspect ran into the back yard and toward a nearby wooded area.
Clifton shouted twice for the decedent to halt. When his order was ignored, Clifton shot
and killed the suspect. Id at 724.
1093. See note 1088 supra.
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States."'1094  The court considered the key issue to be whether the ac-
tions of the federal employee were necessary and proper under the cir-
cumstances. 095  This determination is made according to both
subjective and objective standards.
10 96
The court also rejected the state's contention that because the peti-
tioner had not been suspended from his federal position, there was no
urgency requiring habeas corpus relief."° 7 It was observed that "suffi-
cient urgency is shown whenever it is made to appear that a federal
officer is detained on charges of violating state law because of acts com-
mitted in the performance of his official duties."'1 9
The "adequate state ground" doctrine'0 99 has been invoked fre-
quently in recent years to prevent the Supreme Court from reviewing
certain state cases." l ' It has been held, however, that this doctrine is
not a bar to the granting of habeas corpus relief by federal courts."
0'
Nevertheless, federal courts retain the discretion to refuse to review pe-
titions for habeas corpus when the defendant has "deliberately by-
pass[ed] the orderly procedure of the state courts .... ,,1o"2 Much
1094. 549 F.2d at 728.
1095. Id
1096. Id The court stated that a determination of whether the shooting was necessary
and proper "must rest not only on the subjective belief of the officer but also on the objective
finding that his conduct may be said to be reasonable under the existing circumstances."
The court, thus, approved the test of In re McShane, 235 F. Supp. 262, 274 (N.D. Miss.
1964) (habeas corpus relief granted to deputy U.S. Marshal charged by local authorities with
breach of peace after he ordered that tear gas be fired on hostile crowd protesting admission
of black student to University of Mississippi-honest and reasonable belief that what he did
was necessary in the performance of his duty.") Id at 274. See Brown v. Cain, 56 F. Supp.
56 (E.D. Pa. 1944) (habeas corpus relief granted to coast guard sentry who killed fleeing
rioter while attempting to quell dangerous disturbance).
1097. 549 F.2d at 729-30. See Brown v. Cain, 56 F. Supp. 56, 59 (E.D. Pa. 1944).
1098. 549 F.2d at 729 (quoting In re McShane, 235 F. Supp. 262, 274 n.13 (N.D. Miss.
1964)).
1099. This doctrine has been described by the Supreme Court as follows:
This Court from the time of its foundation has adhered to the principle that it will not
review judgments of state courts that rest on adequate and independent state
grounds.. . .The reason is so obvious that it has rarely been thought to warrant state-
ment. It is found in the partitioning of power between the state and federal judicial
systems and in the limitations of our own jurisdiction.
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945). See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 428-29 (1963).
1100. Karst, Serrano v. Priest:.A State Court's Responsibilities and Opportunities in the De-
velopment of Federal Constitutional Law, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 720, 743 (1972).
1101. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430-31 (1963). But see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72 (1976) (defendant's failure to comply with state procedural rules for challenging admissi-
bility of inculpatory statements barred federal habeas corpus relief).
1102. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963). But see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1976) (rejecting Fay to the extent that it limited the situations in which habeas corpus re-
view could be denied to situations involving a "deliberate bypass" or waiver of state reme-
dies).
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confusion has been generated by the courts' attempts to define "deliber-
ate bypass," but the phrase is connected with the doctrine of waiver or
forfeiture. 1 1
0 3
A guilty plea is generally treated as a deliberate bypass of state reme-
dies.11 4 Such a plea will not, however, operate in this manner when
the defendant can still raise his constitutional claim in a pending state
habeas corpus proceeding.1105  In Journigan v. Duffey,' 0 6 petitioner
contended that his guilty plea in state court did not foreclose the availa-
bility of federal relief, since the state statutes underlying the conviction
were allegedly unconstitutional. The Journigan court noted that while
a guilty plea is treated as a bar to federal habeas corpus relief because
of the state bypass doctrine, its primary impact was to establish the
factual guilt of the defendant.' 10 7 But where the constitutional claim
challenges the state's power to invoke criminal proceedings, or where
the constitutional claim is inconsistent with factual guilt established by
the plea, federal habeas corpus remains a viable remedy.' 108
In 1976, the Supreme Court held that where the state "has provided
an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment
claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief
on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or
seizure was introduced at his trial."'10 9 This holding was contrary to
1103. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963).
1104. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 768-69 (1970) (guilty plea voluntarily given
constituted bypass of state remedies and barred collateral attack based on deprivation of
constitutional rights that occurred prior to entry of plea). Cf. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420
U.S. 283, 288-89 (1975) (federal habeas corpus relief proper where state allowed defendant,
after guilty plea and as an exception to the bypass doctrine, to raise on appeal constitutional
claim stemming from pre-plea matters). See also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267
(1973) (guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which makes up the criminal
process and bars defendant from raising independent constitutional claims).
1105. See generally Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,297 n.3 (1967); United States ex rel.
Ross v. Fike, 534 F.2d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 1976); Partida v. Castaneda, 524 F.2d 481,483 (5th
Cir. 1975), aI'd, 430 U.S. 482 (1976), Hale v. Henderson, 485 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 930 (1974); Miller v. Carter, 434 F.2d 824, 825 (9th Cir. 1970), cerl.
denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971); Anders v. Turner, 379 F.2d 46, 49-50 (4th Cir. 1967).
1106. 552 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1977).
1107. Id at 287-88.
1108. Id at 288. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (explaining
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974)). While the Journigan court viewed Blackledge as
an exception to the doctrine which bars federal habeas corpus relief subsequent to a guilty
plea, it limited this exception to situations in which habeas corpus relief would normally be
barred for substantive reasons, not to situations in which relief would be barred because of
the deliberate bypass of state remedies. 552 F.2d at 288 n.8.
1109. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976). See also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 259-66 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
In petitions for habeas corpus which do not involve fourth amendment rights, federal
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the position taken by the Court seven years earlier.1110  Since Stone v.
Powell"" was decided, the Ninth Circuit has applied the rule enunci-
ated therein to petitions filed by state prisoners" 12 and to attempted
attacks by federal prisoners on their sentences."' 3  Because it is often
difficult to determine if a fourth amendment claim was fully and fairly
litigated at the state level, specific criteria to be considered in making
the determination have been provided by the Supreme Court."' 4
In an important 1977 decision, Mack v. Cupp,"' 5 the Ninth Circuit
stated that "[t]he Supreme Court has not yet delineated the perimeters
of 'full and fair litigation' of a fourth amendment claim."' 1 6 The cri-
teria' 17 provided by Townsend v. SainI 8 are highly relevant in decid-
ing what constitutes a full and fair consideration under Stone." 19
These criteria, however, are not to "be applied literally. . . as the sole
measure of fullness and faimess." 20
The Mack court clearly indicated that, under Stone, the only issue is
courts may hear the defendant's constitutional claims even though they were fully litigated
in prior state proceedings. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443 (1953).
1110. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 226-28 (1969) (district court has power
to consider fourth amendment claim in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition) (see note 1113 infra). In
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481 & n.16 (1976) the Court expressly overruled its earlier
decision in Kaufman.
1111. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
1112. Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1976); Corley v. Cardwell, 544 F.2d
349 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1048 (1977); Bracco v. Reed, 540 F.2d 1019 (9th
Cir. 1976).
1113. Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452, 456-59 (9th Cir. 1976). Federal prisoners
may attack their convictions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976). This section provides:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claim-
ing the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation
of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdic-
tion to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum author-
ized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which
imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
1114. In Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963), the Court listed the following fac-
tors as relevant in determining whether federal habeas corpus relief is available:
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the
state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the
fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and
fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence;
(5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or
(6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas appli-
cant a full and fair hearing.
1115. 564 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1977).
1116. Id at 900.
1117. See note 1114 supra and accompanying text.
1118. 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963).
1119. 564 F.2d at 901.
1120. Id See United States v. New Jersey, 562 F.2d 903, 906-07 (3d Cir. 1977); Graves v.
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whether the state court considered the claim fully and fairly; it is irrele-
vant whether the state court applied the law correctly.'1 21  In Mack,
the state court decided not to hold an evidentiary hearing after con-
cluding that there was no conflict between the defendant's recitation of
the facts and the version provided by the police. Under the circum-
stances, the failure to hold an evidentiary hearing did not render the
state litigation less than full and fair.'
1 22
The final argument made in Mack was that the state appellate court
improperly considered facts not in the record. The Ninth Circuit
acknowleged that the state appellate court had probably erred but re-
fused to reverse. The mistake, if made, was harmless error,' 23 since
Stone indicates that "error in a state appellate review of a fourth
amendment claim does not necessarily justify habeas relief in a federal
court.
1 12 4
Where a habeas corpus petition isfiled while the defendant is serving
his sentence, but the merits are not reached until the sentence has ex-
pired, the petition is moot with respect to the sentence." 25  Neverthe-
less, if "any adverse collateral consequences""1126 remain from the
conviction, the petition is not moot." 27 Where the petitioner has not
Estelle, 556 F.2d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 1977); O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1211-12
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977).
1121. 564 F.2d at 901. The Ninth Circuit in Mack relied heavily on its earlier decision in
Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1976). In Tisnado it was stated: "Since,
under Stone v. Powell, the issue of whether the state court correctly applied the law of search
and seizure is apparently totally irrelevant as long as state procedures were 'fair,'... we
express no opinion on the merits of Tisnado's fourth amendment contentions." Id at 455
n.2.
1122. 564 F.2d at 901. But see Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 342-43 (1939)
(where evidence obtained through illegal wiretap, trial court's failure to pursue inquiry re-
garding possible taint on government's case was erroneous).
1123. 564 F.2d at 902. The court stated: "[Tihe [trial] court's mistaken recitation of the
facts, even assuming arguendo that it resulted in an incorrect decision, is not enough, in and
of itself, to establish that Mack's claims were not fully and fairly considered." Id
1124. Id.
1125. Naylor v. Superior Court, 558 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1977). See generally Spencer-
Lugo v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 548 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
1126. In Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968), the Court provided this illustration of
"collateral consequences:"
In consequence of his conviction, [the defendant] cannot engage in certain businesses;
he cannot serve as an official of a labor union for a specified period of time; he cannot
vote in any election held in New York State; he cannot serve as a juror. . . . On
account of these "collateral consequences" the case is not moot.
Id at 237-38.
1127. Naylor v. Superior Court, 558 F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1977). See Bjerkan v.
United States, 529 F.2d 125, 126-27 (7th Cir. 1975); Bratcher v. McNamara, 448 F.2d 222,
224 (9th Cir. 1971); Lambert v. Brown, 435 F.2d 148, 148 (9th Cir. 1970); Wade v. Carsley,
433 F.2d 68, 68 (5th Cir. 1970).
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alleged any collateral consequences, it appears that the court sua sponte
will make an attempt to uncover any such consequences.
1128
The Ninth Circuit also decided in 1977 that the district court could
consolidate a defendant's habeas corpus petitions.'12 9 In one case,"1
30
the petitioner alleged that he was unduly prejudiced by the consolida-
tion. This argument was rejected since each issue was given due consid-
eration.'
1 31
In Andrino v. United States Board of Parole,"32 the defendant was
serving a seven-year sentence for extortion and firearm offenses. After
sentence was imposed, the Parole Board published new guidelines that
were later applied to deny parole to the prisoner. The prisoner at-
tacked his sentence under 28 U.S.C. section 2255,1 33 arguing that the
trial court would not have imposed the same sentence had it known
that harsher parole guidelines would subsequently be imposed. The
district court accepted petitioner's argument and modified the sentence.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed for the Government, holding
that habeas corpus, and not a motion pursuant to section 2255, is the
correct vehicle for obtaining review of parole board decisions. 1 34 The
Andrino court further held that a section 2255 motion could not be
treated as a misbranded habeas corpus petition by the district court.
1135
Where an accused is about to be extradited, he may file a petition for
habeas corpus in the asylum state in an effort to defeat extradition."
36
A court in the asylum state will conduct a very limited inquiry"1 3 7 into
the accused's claim. One factor that the reviewing court determines is
whether the accused is a fugitive from justice."138  In one recent
1128. Naylor v. Superior Court, 558 F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1977) (by implication).
1129. Wyatt v. United States Parole Comm'n, 571 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1977).
1130. Id at 1090.
1131. Id
1132. 550 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
1133. See note 1113 supra.
1134. 550 F.2d at 520; Tedder v. United States Bd. of Parole, 527 F.2d 593, 594 n.1 (9th
Cir. 1975). The rule in other circuits, however, is contra. See, e.g., United States v. Sa-
lerno, 538 F.2d 1005 (3d Cir. 1976); Kortness v. United States, 514 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1975).
1135. 550 F.2d at 520. The reason for this holding is that a writ can only be procured
from a court which has jurisdiction over the prisoner or his custodian. Braden v. 30th Judi-
cial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
1136. See, e.g., United States v. Donovan, 321 F.2d 114, 116 (2d Cir. 1963), cert denied,
375 U.S. 977 (1964).
1137. There will be a limited inquiry to determine whether. "(1) a crime has been charged
in the demanding state; (2) the fugitive in custody is the person so charged; and (3) the
fugitive was in the demanding state at the time the alleged crime was committed." Woods
v. Cronvich, 396 F.2d 142, 143 (5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam).
1138. See id. at 143.
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case, 1 139 the petitioner claimed that he was not a fugitive because the
state attempting to extradite him was barred from prosecuting him due
to the double jeopardy clause and the speedy trial protections of the
sixth amendment. The Ninth Circuit concluded that a defendant may
not raise the Bill of Rights in federal habeas corpus proceedings in the
asylum state.' 140 This rule is predicated on a federal policy which en-
courages the expeditious return of fugitive so that justice can be satis-
fied. 11
4 1
F -Double Jeopardy
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution affords pro-
tections to individuals threatened with reprosecution for the same of-
fense. 1142  Specifically, a double jeopardy violation occurs when the
defendant, after an express or an implied acquittal, is tried again for
the same offense.1143 This double jeopardy prohibition is applicable to
the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 114
Defendants often argue that there are double jeopardy implications
when an accused is charged with the commission of two crimes stem-
ming from the same incident. 1 45  The Ninth Circuit has consistently
held that double jeopardy does not depend on the "identity of the evi-
dence actually produced" at the trial(s). 1146  Rather, the determination
depends upon the statutory requirements of each substantive of-
1139. Price v. Pitchess, 556 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1977).
1140. Id at 928. See also Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86 (1952) (eighth amendment
may not be raised); Watson v. Montgomery, 431 F.2d 1083 (5th Cir. 1970) (sixth amendment
may not be raised); Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 828
(1950) (sixth amendment may not be raised).
1141. Price v. Pitchess, 556 F.2d 926, 928 (9th Cir. 1977).
1142. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
1143. See United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975); Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184 (1957).
1144. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
1145. This claim is frequently asserted when one of the charges is conspiracy to commit
the other charge. See, eg., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 11 (1954); Pinkerton v.
United States. 328 U.S. 640,643-44 (1946); United States v. Ohlson, 552 F.2d 1347, 1348 (9th
Cir. 1977) (per curiam); United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755, 766 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1076 (1973).
1146. United States v. Kearney, 560 F.2d 1358, 1366 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 826
(1977); United States v. Ohlson, 552 F.2d 1347, 1348-50 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). See
United States v. Rueter, 536 F.2d 296, 298 (9th Cir. 1976). This conclusion is based on the
District of Columbia Circuit Court's decision in United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973). In Boyle the court stated: "A double jeopardy
violation] does not turn on the identity of evidence actually produced but on whether the
same evidence is required to prove the two offenses." Id at 766 (emphasis in original).
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fense. 1" 4 7 Therefore, although the same evidence is produced for each
charge, the defendant's rights have not been violated if all elements of
the respective statutory offenses were not proven.
1 1 48
In United States v. Oh/son," 49 the defendant was convicted on a two
count indictment for conspiracy to assist narcotics dealers in the manu-
facture and sale of illegal drugs, and for racketeering. The defense
argued that under Wharton's Rule'"50 the conspiracy charge "merged"
with the racketeering claim. While acknowledging the general rule
that conspiracy to commit a substantive offense can constitute an of-
fense separate from the substantive charge,'1 51 the court recognized
that Wharton's Rule is an exception to this principle, and held that this
case did not merit the application of the exception.Y
52
In United States v. Chases,"53 two separate indictments were filed
against the defendant. The first indictment charged the accused with
conspiracy to import marijuana; the second alleged that he was in pos-
session of marijuana with the intent to distribute. It was held that con-
spiracy and possession are two "separate and distinct offenses."
'"154
Therefore, the filing of separate indictments stemming from one trans-
action did not result in a double jeopardy violation.1"55
Double jeopardy claims are often predicated upon allegations of res
judicata,1 56 collateral estoppel,"1 57 or law of the case." 5  In United
1147. See note 1146 supra and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit position differs
from the "same evidence" rule adopted by the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Austin, 529
F.2d 559 (6th Cir. 1976) (constitutionally impermissible to impose consecutive sentences for
what amounts to same offense proven by same evidence).
1148. United States v. Kearney, 560 F.2d 1358, 1366 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 826
(1977); United States v. Ohlson, 552 F.2d 1347, 1349 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). This
result follows logically from United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755, 766 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973).
1149. 552 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977).
1150. The Oh/son court explained Wharton's Rule as follows: "Essentially, Wharton's
Rule states that an agreement by two persons to commit a particular crime cannot be prose-
cuted as a conspiracy when the crime is of such a nature as necessarily to require the partici-
pation of two persons for its commission." Id at 1348.
1151. Id at 1349. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 781-82 (1975). The
Oh/son court stated that adultery, incest, bigamy and dueling are classic Wharton Rule
cases. 552 F.2d at 1349.
1152. 552 F.2d at 1349. Wharton's "Rule applies only if the substantial offense necessar-
ily requires the participation of two persons." Id
1153. 558 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1977).
1154. Id at 914.
1155. Id
1156. In Tait v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 620, 623 (1933) the Supreme Court ex-
plained that res judicata applied where there was a previous final decision on the merits
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
1157. In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), the defendant was arrested as a result of a
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States v. Wise, 11 9 the Ninth Circuit was confronted with such a double
jeopardy claim based on collateral estoppel.'1 60  The defendant had
been convicted of criminal copyright infringement stemming from the
wilful, illegal sale of motion pictures. The collateral estoppel conten-
tion was based on defendant's argument that the same issues'1 61 had
been litigated in previous film piracy cases. 1 62  The court held that
collateral estoppel requires an identity of issues and parties between the
present dispute and any previous cases. When these requirements are
met, retrial is barred.
11 63
In another 1977 film piracy case,1164 the appellants claimed that the
trial was barred'1 6 by collateral estoppel because "previous film piracy
cases. . found that motion picture studios, including some involved
in this case, [had] sold their films. '1166  The court, relying on its deci-
sion earlier that year in Wise,1 167 held that collateral estoppel did not
apply since the requisite identity of issues and parties had not been
shown.'
1 168
Collateral estoppel was also the basis of the defendant's contentions
single robbery during which several persons were robbed. The Government proceeded to
charge him with the robbery of one of the victims. The jury returned a verdict of acquittal
with a specific finding that the defendant had not participated in the crime. Thereafter, the
Government filed new charges against the defendant for robbery of a second victim in the
same transaction.
The Court held that reprosecution on this second charge was barred by the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, which is embodied in the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amend-
ment. More specifically, the Court stated: "[W]hen an issue of ultimate fact has once been
determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the
same parties in any further lawsuit." Id at 443.
1158. In Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912), the Supreme Court supplied
this definition of "law of the case":
In the absence of statute the phrase, law of the case, as applied to the effect of previous
orders on the later action of the court rendering them in the same case, merely expresses
the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided, not a limit to
their power.
1159. 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929 (1977).
1160. Id at 1187-88.
1161. It was alleged that the question of whether defendant's sales constituted "first sales"
under the copyright laws was already litigated.
1162. American Int'l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 400 F. Supp. 928 (S.D. Ala. 1975).
1163. 550 F.2d at 1188.
1164. United States v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 910
(1978).
1165. Id at 1333.
1166. Id See American Int'l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 400 F. Supp. 928 (S.D. Ala.
1975).
1167. 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 929 (1977).
1168. 557 F.2d at 1333.
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in Standlee v. Rhay.116 9 In that case, the accused argued that since the
trial court had found him not guilty, the parole board was prohibited
from finding him guilty of a parole violation based on the same crimi-
nal activity of which he was acquitted.117 0 The court rejected this con-
tention, holding that collateral estoppel does not bar a parole
revocation hearing after a criminal acquittal because of the difference
in burdens of proof and available sanctions under the two proceed-
ings.1171
It is not always improper for the Government to prosecute a defend-
ant more than once for the same offense. For example, where the de-
fendant has moved for and obtained a mistrial, the prosecution is not
barred from proceeding again on the same charge, 1172 unless the mo-
tion was necessitated by bad faith or "overreaching" on the part of the
Government. 173 In Moroyoqui v. United States, 174 the prosecutor
elicited testimony that was improper and prejudicial to the defendant.
The defendant moved for and was granted a mistrial. He then moved
for dismissal alleging prosecutorial misconduct and overreaching, and
claiming that a retrial would violate the double jeopardy clause. The
trial court denied the motion, concluding that the prosecutor had not
acted knowingly. The appellate court agreed that such a finding would.
permit reprosecution. 
75
The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that once jeopardy has at-
tached, the Government will be prohibited from filing an appeal. 176 It
is not always a simple task, however, to determine when jeopardy has
in fact attached. The double jeopardy clause is offended when a de-
fendant is threatened with multiple trials. 1 7 7 Generally, if a reversal
of the lower court's verdict would necessitate further proceedings to
resolve factual issues, an appeal by the government is barred. 178 The
1169. 557 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 910 (1978).
1170. Id at 1305.
1171. Id at 1305-07 (citing One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232
(1971)).
1172. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971); Moroyoqui v. United States, 570
F.2d 862, 864 (9th Cir. 1977).
1173. Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 33-34 (1977); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S.
600, 611 (1976); United States v. Join, 400 U.S. 470, 485 n.12 (1971).
1174. 570 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1977).
1175. Id at 864.
1176. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975) (double jeopardy violation when re-
versal would subject defendant to further litigation of factual issues involved in offense of
which he was acquitted). Cf. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975) (Government
may appeal since reversal would lead to mere reinstatement of guilty verdict).
1177. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336 (1975).
1178. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1977); United
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primary test employed to determine if appeal may be pursued is
whether, upon reversal for the prosecution, a previous finding of guilt
can be reinstated. 79  If there has not been an earlier guilty verdict,
but only a verdict of not guilty, then any appeal filed by the prosecu-
tion will result in a double jeopardy violation.'
1 80
In United States v. Rojas, I I" the Ninth Circuit, in conformity with
other circuits,11 82 held that the Government has a right to appeal where
there is no danger that a second trial will be required.11 8 3 In Rojas, the
jury returned a verdict of guilty but the lower court set aside that deter-
mination. The appellate court found that the prosecution could ap-
peal, since any reversal would result in a reinstatement of the prior
guilty verdict and the defendant would not be subject to a second
trial. 1184
Later in 1977, the Ninth Circuit decided United States v. Ramos"8 5
in conformity with Rojas. In Ramos, the defendant was convicted of
States v. Finch, 433 U.S. 676, 677 (1977) (per curiam); United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S.
358, 368 (1975).
In United States v. Finch, 548 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 433 U.S. 676 (1977), the
court of appeals distinguished Jenkins and held that there was no double jeopardy violation
caused by the prosecutor's appeal since reversal would necessitate only further legal deter-
minations. Id at 826-27. The district court judge had dismissed the information after
receiving an agreed statement of facts. The Supreme Court, on certiorari, reversed the
Ninth Circuit's decision. 433 U.S. at 677. The Court noted that the district judge had
dismissed without any determination of guilt or innocence. Therefore, if the Government
was successful on appeal, there was no earlier guilty verdict to reinstate. See United States
v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352-53 (1975). Therefore, the prosecutor's appeal was barred by
the double jeopardy clause.
1179. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352-53 (1975). In W2lson, the jury had re-
turned a guilty verdict which the trial judge set aside. The district judge's decision was
based upon a determination that the defendant had been unduly prejudiced by the Govern-
ment's delay in filing the action. The Court of Appeals ruled that the prosecutor was barred
by double jeopardy from appealing. The Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that
an appeal was proper because if the Goveinment was successful, the earlier jury verdict
could be reinstated. Id
1180. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 369 (1975). Cf. Serfass v. United States, 420
U.S. 377 (1975). In Sefass, the district court had granted defendant's pretrial motion to
dismiss the indictment. The judge had relied on aii oral stipulation and facts contained in
petitioner's affidavit. The Government appealed and petitioner contended that the appeal
was barred by the double jeopardy clause. The Supreme Court held for the Government,
stating that the defendant had not yet been "put to trial before the trier of facts, whether the
trier be a jury or a judge." Id at 388.
1181. 554 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1977).
1182. See United States v. Donahue, 539 F.2d 1131, 1134 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Burroughs, 537 F.2d 1156, 1157 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Cravero, 530 F.2d 666, 669
(5th Cir. 1976); United States v. DeGarces, 518 F.2d 1156, 1159 (2d Cir. 1975).
1183. 554 F.2d at 942.
1184. Id See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 570 (1977).
1185. 558 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1977).
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theft and possession of goods known to be stolen from a foreign ship-
ment.1 86 The defendant's motion for acquittal was granted, and the
Government appealed. The court of appeals noted that there was no
threat that multiple trial would result from this appeal 187 and, there-
fore, held that there was no double jeopardy violation."1
88
In Ball v. United States,'189 the Supreme Court held that there is no
bar to retrial of a defendant who has had his conviction set aside on
appeal.119 The defendant essentially waives his right to assert a
double jeopardy violation when he files an appeal." 91 The Ninth Cir-
cuit followed this rule in United States v. Hall."92 In Hall, the court
also discussed the sentence which could be imposed on the defendant if
he were reconvicted. Ordinarily, the same sentence would be imposed
on the defendant upon reconviction since the double jeopardy clause
prohibits multiple punishment for the same offense.'19 3 However, the
clause does not represent an absolute bar to the imposition of a more
severe sentence upon reconviction119 4 The Hall court, quoting North
Carolina v. Pearce,' 95 concluded that a more severe sentence could be
imposed where events occurring since the original sentence was levied
cast new light upon the defendant's "life, health, habits, conduct, and
mental and moral propensities."' 19 6  The Ninth Circuit also held, in
conformity with its prior holdings,' 97 that the defendant's candor as a
witness during his second trial may be considered in imposing a new
sentence.' 
19 8
There is no violation of the double jeopardy clause when an illegal
sentence is increased to meet the minimum punishment required by
1186. Id at 546.
1187. Id
1188. Id
1189. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
1190. Id at 672. See also United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465 (1964); Forman v.
United States, 361 U.S. 416, 425 (1960); Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552, 560 (1950).
1191. 163 U.S. at 672. Note, however, that wliere the accused is charged with two of-
fenses, and where he is convicted of one and acquitted of the other, double jeopardy only
bars reprosecution for the offense of which he was acquitted. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784, 796 (1969). In this regard, it should be noted that a conviction for one charge may act
as an implicit acquittal of another offense. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190
(1957) (conviction for second degree murder operated as acquittal of first degree murder).
1192. 559 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978).
1193. Id at 1162-63.
1194. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969).
1195. -395 U.S. 711 (1969).
1196. 559 F.2d at 1163.
1197. See United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 751 (9th Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 434 U.S.
1045 (1978); United States v. Cluchette, 465 F.2d 749, 754 (9th Cir. 1972).
1198. 559 F.2d at 1163.
1978] 1029
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES L4W REVIEW
law for a given offense.1 199 In United States v. Stevens,12 ° a plea bar-
gain arrangement resulted in the imposition of concurrent ten-year
sentences. 120' Upon entry of sentence, however, the court erroneously
pronounced concurrent two-year sentences. 120 2 The trial judge cor-
rected the error two weeks later. 2 3 Upon review, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the correction of a sentence in this manner does not
violate double jeopardy, even when the punishment is enhanced
thereby." The defendant alleged that the double jeopardy clause
was violated because he had already begun serving the sentence. The
court held otherwise, 2 °0 basing its decision on the fact that prompt
proceedings were instituted to correct the error, in compliance with the
time limits prescribed by federal rule 35.206
There is also no fifth amendment violation when the defendant's
prior criminal record is considered by parole boards in determining eli-
gibility for parole.12 7 The Ninth Circuit, agreeing with other cir-
cuits, " ' 8 adopted this rule in 1977.12°9 The court of appeals reasoned
that one of the aims of parole is to determine whether the defendant's
release is compatible with the welfare of society.1210 It is necessary to
consider the defendant's prior record in order to make a proper deter-
ruination. The court concluded that denial of parole after due consid-
eration does not violate double jeopardy since there is no imposition of
multiple punishment for the same offense.'
2 "
1199. Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 165-66 (1947) (although decided under old
rule 35 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, equally applicable under new rule 35). See
also United States v. Kenyon, 519 F.2d 1229, 1233 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 935
(1975); United States v. Mack, 494 F.2d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1974).
1200. 548 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 975 (1977).
1201. Id at 1361.
1202. Id
1203. Id
1204. Id at 1362. See United States v. Munoz-Dela Rosa, 495 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1974)
(no issue of double jeopardy when a sentence is corrected).
1205. 548 F.2d at 1362-63. See also United States v. Walker, 564 F.2d 891, 892 (9th Cir.
1977) (court rejected defendant's argument that an NARA commitment after beginning a
sentence in prison was a double jeopardy violation).
1206. FED. R. CiuM. P. 35.
1207. Roach v. Board of Pardons and Paroles, 503 F.2d 1367, 1368 (8th Cir. 1974); Scarpa
v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 280-81 (5th Cir.), vacated and remandedfor
consideration ofmootness, 414 U.S. 809 (1973); Jones v. Salisbury, 422 F.2d 1326, 1327 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 836 (1970).
1208. See cases cited in note 1207 supra.
1209. Wyatt v. United States Parole Comm'n, 571 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1977).
1210. ld at 1091.
1211. Id
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G. Prisoners' Rights
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution 1212 guaran-
tees the right to an impartial jury.1 213  The Supreme Court has held
that the trial judge has a responsibility to protect this right.' 21 4 In
United States v. Hendrix,'211 the Ninth Circuit held that the trial judge
has wide discretion in establishing a procedure by which to deal with
charges ofjuror bias.1216 In so holding, the court distinguished dictum
in the Supreme Court case of Wade v. Hunter12 1 7 which stated that it is
"the duty of the judge"1 218 to direct a retrial in the event that he discov-
ers facts indicating that a juror might be biased against a defendant.
The Ninth Circuit expressly refused to establish mandatory procedures
for a trial judge to follow in dealing with juror misconduct. 12 19  In-
stead, it followed cases from other circuits which have recognized the
wide discretion to be given to a trial judge in dealing with charges of
juror bias.'1 0 In Hendrix, charges of bias were made by the wife and
mother-in-law of the defendant. They testified to an alleged statement
by one juror which tended to show bias. The charges were made
within a week after the conclusion of trial. The judge required the
filing of affidavits and then heard arguments on the motion for a new
trial based upon the allegations of juror bias. Determining that the
juror had made the statements prior to her swearing under oath that
she had no prejudice against the defendant, the judge refused to grant a
new trial. Although the Ninth Circuit stated that the trial judge
"could" have inquired further into the truth of statements and whether
or not those statements, in fact, biased the juror,1 221 the court empha-
1212. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
1213. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961);
Stone v. United States, 113 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1940).
1214. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
1215. 549 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818 (1977).
1216. Id at 1227.
1217. 336 U.S. 684 (1949). In Wade, the Court stated:
Inhere have been instances where a trial judge has discovered facts during a trial which
indicated that one or more members of a jury might be biased against the Government
or the defendant. It is settled that the duty of the judge in this event is to discharge the
jury and direct a retrial.
Id at 689 (footnote omitted).
1218. Id
1219. 549 F.2d at 1228 n.2.
1220. Id at 1227-28 n.1 (citing United States v. Shahane, 517 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975); United States v. Doe, 513 F.2d 709 (1st Cir. 1975); Tillman v.
United States, 406 F.2d 930 (5th Cir.), vacatedon other grounds, 395 U.S. 830 (1969); United
States v. Miller, 381 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 929 (1968); United States
v. Flynn, 216 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 909 (1955)).
1221. 549 F.2d at 1229 n.3.
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sized the discretion to be given to the trial court. The Ninth Circuit
determined that the alleged bias was not prejudicial 1222 because jurors
are presumed to act faithfully,'22 3 and because this was not the type of
allegation involving highly prejudicial acts.
1224
VII. JUVENILE OFFENDERS
When a minor is taken into custody for the alleged commission of a
crime, the processes to which he is thereafter subjected will differ de-
pending on whether he is tried as a juvenile 1225 or as an adult. Many
of the procedural differences1 226 stem from the belief that juvenile pro-
ceedings are not equivalent to a criminal trial. 1227  Although differ-
ences definitely do exist between the juvenile and adult systems, the
Ninth Circuit has recognized that "the rights of juveniles at the adjudi-
cative stage of a proceeding [are the same as] those essentials of due
process and fair treatment afforded adults .... ,, 1228 The Ninth Circuit
relied upon this principle in United States v. Indian Boy X12 2 9 for its
conclusion that the minor defendant is given no greater rights than his
1222. Id at 1230.
1223. Id (citing Cavness v. United States, 187 F.2d 719, 723 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 341
U.S. 951 (1951)).
1224. 549 F.2d at 1230 (citing United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 835 (1974)).
1225. See Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (1976). A 'Juve-
nile" is defined in the following manner.
For the purposes of this chapter, a "juvenile" is a person who has not attained his
eighteenth birthday, or for the purpose of proceedings... under this chapter for an
alleged act ofjuvenile delinquency, a person who has not attained his twenty-first birth-
day, and 'Juvenile delinquency" is the violation of a law of the United States commit-
ted by a person prior to his eighteenth birthday which would have been a crime if
committed by an adult.
Id § 5031.
1226. See, &g., United States v. Indian Boy X, 565 F.2d 585, 595 (9th Cir. 1977) (adopting
United States v. Hill, 538 F.2d 1072, 1076 (4th Cir. 1976) (no right to indictment in juvenile
proceeding under § 5031); United States v. Martin-Plascencia, 532 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976) (no right to jury trial in juvenile proceedings). f
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1967) (minor entitled to representation of counsel in juvenile
delinquency proceedings which could result in commitment to institution).
1227. United States v. Indian Boy X, 565 F.2d 585, 595 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Hill, 538 F.2d 1072, 1076 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Salcido-Median, 483 F.2d 162, 164
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1070 (1973). See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562
(1965) (juvenile hearing need not conform to all requirements of adult criminal trial, but
must comport with due process).
1228. United States v. Indian Boy X, 565 F.2d 585, 591 (9th Cir. 1977). Cf. Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948) ("[n]either man nor child can be allowed to stand condemned
by methods which flount constitutional requirements of due process of law.").
1229. 565 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1977).
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adult counterpart.' ° In addition, although the court clearly indicated
that juvenile and adult offenders are theoretically entitled to the same
rights, in many instances the former are deprived of these rights be-
cause a juvenile proceeding is not an adult criminal trial.1231
In Indian Boy X, a minor was charged in a juvenile proceeding with
acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute second degree
murder123 2 and assault with a dangerous weapon.12 3  Three confes-
sions were obtained from the minor by FBI agents. It was during the
third confession that the accused acknowledged he had committed
murder. This confession took place on a Friday afternoon, and the
minor was not brought before a federal magistrate until the following
Monday. The accused's parents were present when he was advised of
his Miranda rights, and written waivers were obtained from both the
father and the minor.
12 3 4
The appellant contended that his murder confession was illegally ob-
tained because of the delay in bringing him before a federal magistrate.
Relying on 18 U.S.C. section 5033,1235 appellant argued that "detention
for the purpose of interrogation, [was improper] regardless of how be-
nign the questioning may be.""'' 6 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged
that it had never interpreted section 5033 or its predecessor. 123 7  The
court, however, distinguishing decisions of other circuits, 238 concluded
that the minor's reliance on section 5033 was misplaced.
The Ninth Circuit reached its conclusion in Indian Box X "in light of
the strong policy. . . that the waiver of legal rights following Mfiranda
.. .warnings also constitutes a waiver of these rights enunciated in
1230. Id at 591.
1231. See notes 1226-27 supra and accompanying text.
1232. 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1976).
1233. Id § 113.
1234. Under 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (1976) when a juvenile is taken into custody, the authorities
"shall immediately notify... the juvenile's parents, guardian, or custodian... ." There
is also a requirement that "It]he arresting officer. . . notify the parents... of the rights of
the juvenile and of the nature of the alleged offense." Id
1235. Section 5033 states in pertinent part: "The juvenile shall be taken before a magis-
trate forthwith. In no event shall the juvenile be detained for longer than a reasonable
period of time before being brought before a magistrate." Id
1236. 565 F.2d at 590.
1237. Id
1238. See United States v. DeMarce, 513 F.2d 755 (8th Cir. 1975) (confession obtained
from juvenile was suppressed because of eighty hour delay between arrest and arraignment);
United States v. Binet, 442 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971) (confession obtained during four hour
delay suppressed because delay motivated solely by desire to obtain confession); United
States v. Glover, 372 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1967) (fifteen hour delay between arrest and arraign-
ment improper, so that confession obtained during period should be suppressed).
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McNabb. .. and Mallory .... ,2 Since a minor may effectively
waive his Miranda rights, 2' ° the waiver in this case also served to
waive the accused's prompt arraignment rights under McNabb and
Mallory.1241 The confession was therefore admissible.
Although the contours of a juvenile's speedy arraignment right are
uncertain after Indian Boy X, the Ninth Circuit in 1977 did clarify the
statutory provision giving the juvenile the right to a speedy trial.1
24 2
Under 18 U.S.C. section 5036,1243 the "delinquent who is in detention
pending trial [must be] brought to trial within thirty days from the date
upon which such detention was begun. ... 14 A key issue which
obviously must be resolved in applying section 5036 is the point at
which the thirty day period commences. The Ninth Circuit has held
that the period commences upon "(1) the date that the Attorney Gen-
eral certifies, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have cer-
tified, to the conditions stated in Section 5032, or (2) the date upon
which the Government formally assumes jurisdiction over the juvenile,
whichever event earlier occurs." ' Therefore, the time during which
the juvenile was in a state's custody is not considered part of the thirty
1239. 565 F.2d at 591. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) and McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) generally stand for the proposition that, if a confession is
obtained as the result of an unnecessary delay between arrest and arraignment, the confes-
sion will be suppressed. This result is mandated by rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure. Rule 5(a) states that the arresting officer "shall take the arrested person
without unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate.... ." In Indian
Boy X, the court noted that 18 U.S.C. § 5033 is the direct counterpart of FED. R. CRIm. P.
5(a). 565 F.2d at 591. Therefore, the MeNabbiMallory rule is relevant to procedures fol-
lowed under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act. q. United States v. Montes-Zarate,
552 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cer. denied, 435 U.S. 947 (1978) (analysis prop-
erly focused on time which passed between arrest and confession).
The Ninth Circuit consistently has held that waiver of Miranda rights also waives one's
rights under McNabb/Mallory. See United States v. Mandley, 502 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir.
1974); United States v. Woods, 468 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1045 (1972);
United States v. Cluchette, 465 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Lopez, 450 F.2d
169 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 931 (1972); Pettyjohn v. United States, 419 F.2d
651 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1058 (1970).
1240. 565 F.2d at 592. In order to determine whether the waiver was effective, the mi-
nor's age, intelligence, education, information, understanding and ability to comprehend
should be analyzed. DeSeuza v. Barber, 263 F.2d 470, 477 (9th Cir. 1959). See also Mc-
Bride v. Jacobs, 247 F.2d 595, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (per curiam) (when child not competent
to waive rights, parent may do so if there is no conflict of interest between parent and child);
Williams v. Huff, 142 F.2d 91, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (minor's competence to waive rights is
question of fact).
1241. See note 1239 supra.
1242. See United States v. Andy, 549 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
1243. 28 U.S.C. § 5036 (1976).
1244. Id
1245. United States v. Andy, 549 F.2d 1281, 1283 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
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day period.1246
When a juvenile is alleged to have committed a crime, he will either
be tried as an adult' 247 or subjected to juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings. If the minor is tried as an adult, sentencing under the Federal
Youth Corrections Act1248 may be proper.1249 It is uncertain whether a
minor who is convicted of a crime, and who is potentially eligible for
sentencing under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, has a right to be
proceeded against by indictment. 250 However, where a youth is fac-
ing juvenile delinquency proceedings, the Ninth Circuit has rejected an
allegation that section 50321251 "violates the Fifth Amendment by in-
structing the United States Attorney to proceed by information rather
than indictment."' 252 This result is mandated by the court's belief, dis-
cussed earlier, 253 that juvenile delinquency proceedings do not consti-
tute a criminal trial.
In United States v. Ramirez,"'54 the Ninth Circuit avoided the consti-
tutional question whether, when a defendant can be sentenced for a
misdemeanor conviction under the Act, the fifth amendment requires
the prosecution to proceed by indictment. The court, in a decision
1246. Id In Andy, the defendant was in custody from January 2, 1976 until his trial on
February 19, 1976. He argued that his speedy trial right secured by § 5036 was violated
because more than 30 days had elapsed, while he was in custody, before he was brought to
trial. However, a certain amount of this time had been spent in state custody. Since the
court of appeals could not determine what amount of time was spent in state, as opposed to
federal custody, it remanded to the district court for an exact determination. Id at 1283.
1247. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
A juvenile who is alleged to have committed an act ofjuvenile delinquency and who
is not surrendered to State authorities shall be proceeded against under this chapter
[Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act] unless he has requested in writing upon advice of
counsel to be proceeded against as an adult, except that, with respect to a juvenile six-
teen years and older alleged to have committed an act after his sixteenth birthday which
if committed by an adult would be a felony punishable by a maximum penalty of ten
years imprisonment or more, life imprisonment, or death, criminal prosecution [as an
adult] may be begun... by the Attorney General ....
Id (emphasis added). It is clear from the language of § 5032 that, under the circumstances
described therein, a minor may be tried as an adult for the substantive crime committed. In
comparison, a juvenile subjected to proceedings under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency
Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (1977)) is not the defendant in a criminal trial. See note 1227
supra and accompanying text. Instead, because of the commission of an act which would
be chargeable as a crime if the juvenile were an adult, the juvenile is adjudged a juvenile
delinquent. He is therefore eligible for treatment under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency
Act. See note 1225 supra.
1248. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976).
1249. See id § 5010(a)-(e).
1250. See notes 1254-59 infra and accompanying text.
1251. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1976).
1252. United States v. Indian Boy X, 565 F.2d 585, 595 (9th Cir. 1977).
1253. See note 1227 supra and accompanying text.
1254. 556 F.2d 909 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 926 (1977).
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which was rendered under the mistaken belief than an indictment had
not been filed, 125 5 first concluded that the Government must proceed by
indictment against a defendant subject to sentencing under the Act.
The court withdrew this earlier decision when it was discovered that an
indictment had in fact been filed.' 2 56  On rehearing, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the constitutional issue could be avoided. 257 In addi-
tion, the court refused to reconsider an earlier case1 218 in which it was
held that the imposition of a Federal Youth Corrections Act sentence
upon a misdemeanor conviction was valid.
1259
When a juvenile is tried as an adult and a conviction is obtained, the
trial court is supposed to state for the record that the youth would fail
to benefit 260 from sentencing under the Act, if a sentence thereunder is
not imposed. 26' In United States v. Silla,1262 the district court judge
1255. The Ninth Circuit in Ramirez addressed the question: "Does the Fifth Amend-
ment require that a prosecution for a misdemeanor be initiated by indictment when the
defendant can be sentenced under the Federal Youth Corrections Act (18 U.S.C. §
5010(b))?" Id The court held that an indictment was required under the fifth amendment.
The Government petitioned for rehearing and the motion was granted. At this time, the
court was informed for the first time "[tihat criminal proceedings against Ramirez were ini-
tially instituted by indictment, and not by information as represented by both parties [previ-
ously]." Id at 925 (emphasis added). After the indictment had been filed, a superseding
criminal information was filed charging the defendant with a misdemeanor. The defendant
did not object to this action. He waived a jury and was convicted on the misdemeanor
charge upon a set of stipulated facts. The indictment was not dismissed until Ramirez ap-
peared for sentencing.
1256. See note 1255 supra.
1257. 556 F.2d at 925-26. The court stated: "As the full history has unfolded, it is evident
that the case does not present the constitutional issue that we earlier decided. Ramirez,
through his lawyer, made no objection to the superseding information, and the underlying
indictment was not dismissed until Ramirez was sentenced upon the information." Id In
support of the proposition that the constitutional issue may not be raised for the first time on
appeal, see United States v. Golden, 532 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hord,
459 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1972).
One court has concluded that an indictment was not required where, as the result of a
misdemeanor conviction, the defendant could be sentenced under the Act. See Harvin v.
United States, 445 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971). Cf United States
v. Reef, 268 F. Supp. 1015 (D. Colo. 1967) (indictment required).
1258. See Eller v. United States, 327 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1964).
1259. The defendant wanted the Ninth Circuit to reconsider its position "in light of the
realities of such commitments as described by Judge Weigel, dissenting in United States v.
Leming (9th Cir. 1975) 532 F.2d 647, at 652... , and recognized. . . in United States ex
rel Sero v. Preisner (2d Cir. 1974) 506 F.2d 1115." 556 F.2d at 926.
1260. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b)-(e) (1976) indicates that the trial court's decision on how to
sentence the juvenile, after he has been tried and convicted of a crime, will depend on
whether he will "benefit" from sentencing under the Act.
1261. In Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 444 (1974) the Court observed: "Lit-
eral compliance with the Act can be satisfied by any expression that makes clear the sentenc-
ing judge considered the alternative of sentencing under the Act and decided that the youth
1036 [Vol. I11
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erroneously remarked for the record that the defendant was not eligible
for Federal Youth Correction Act treatment, rather than stating that he
could not beneft by such treatment. The Ninth Circuit concluded that
the requisite test, formulated earlier by the Supreme Court, 12 6 3 "does
not lay down an inflexible standard under which only established phra-
seology will suffice. ' ' l264 In Silla, the district court did explain its deci-
sion on the ground that the defendant had "more of a record; he was
more deeply involved in this transaction."1 65 This language was suffi-
cient to meet the procedural standard required by the Supreme Court.
An accused who is subjected to juvenile delinquency proceedings is
afforded statutory protection against the public disclosure of his iden-
tity.1  There is a specific requirement that the juvenile record and
file be sealed when the proceedings are completed.12 67  Once sealed,
the files are subject to release only in the limited circumstances which
are enumerated in the statute.
12 68
In United States v. Chacon,1 269 an adult defendant and a juvenile
offender were arrested and charged with importing marijuana, and pos-
session with the intent to distribute. The minor was tried and acquit-
ted in a juvenile proceeding. Thereafter, the adult was brought to trial.
He moved for production of the sealed juvenile trial transcript.1270
The district court, relying on provisions of the Federal Juvenile Delin-
quency Act,12 71 refused to grant the motion. In the interim, a code-
fendant was somehow able to procure a copy of the juvenile file. The
defendant alleged that his due process, equal protection and statutory
offender would not derive benefit from treatment under the Act." See also United States v.
Cruz, 523 F.2d 473, 474 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1060 (1976).
1262. 555 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1977).
1263. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 444 (1974). See note 1261 supra and
accompanying text.
1264. 555 F.2d at 708.
1265. Id
1266. Under 18 U.S.C. § 5038(d)(2) (1976), where a minor is tried as a juvenile and not as
an adult, "neither the name nor picture of [the] juvenile shall be made public by any me-
dium of public information...." Id
1267. Id § 5038(a).
1268. The exceptions under which disclosure of sealed juvenile records is permitted are
enumerated in id § 5038(a)(1)-(6).
1269. 569 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1977).
1270. Neither the defendant nor his attorney was allowed to attend the prior juvenile
proceedings. The defendant argued that production of the juvenile records was necessary to
impeach certain witnesses. Id at 1374.
1271. 18 U.S.C. § 5038(a) (1976) (entire record sealed after juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings completed).
19781 1037
LOYOL4 OF LOS ANGELES L4W REVIEW
rights1272 were violated by the denial of his motion.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the defendant that discov-
ery was potentially available in this case. The court held that the excep-
tion to the rule against disclosure provided in 28 U.S.C. section
5038(a)(l)-(5)1273 applied in this case. The district court is empowered
to balance the interests in favor of, and against, disclosure. 1274 If the
"evidence contained within the transcript [was] material to presentation
of a proper defense [it] was disclosable under an appropriate limiting
order."' 275 In Chacon, the court of appeals proceeded to inspect the
juvenile record in camara.276
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1272. The defendant claimed his rights under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976),
were violated.
1273. See note 1268 supra.
1274. 569 F.2d at 1375.
1275. Id The court was very explicit in limiting its holding to the facts in this case:
To permit release of juvenile records to any court for any purpose would substantially
weaken the protection intended by Congress in enacting § 5038. We therefore limit our
holding to the facts of this case, that is, one in which the juvenile himself was involved
in the transaction on which the prosecution of the defendants is based, even though the
juvenile is not a party to the action.
Id at 1375-76.
1276. The court of appeals concluded that the district court should have examined the
juvenile transcript for disclosable information. The court avoided remanding the case by
examining the transcript itself in camera. After performing this task, the Ninth Circuit
panel affirmed the conviction on the ground that the transcript was valueless to the defend-
ant. Id at 1375.
A concurring opinion in Chacon preferred to reach the same result by resort to the sixth
amendment's confrontation clause, instead of an expansive reading of 18 U.S.C. §
5038(a)(l)-(5) (1976). 569 F.2d at 1376-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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